





HUMANISM AT THE LIMITS 











A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 












© 2013 Drew Walker 






 This dissertation emerges from an analysis of the recent focus on the 
vulnerability and finitude of human life as an ethical foundation for politics. I argue 
that this humanist turn reinforces the experience of vulnerability and precariousness 
and, thus, promotes a conservative politics of alienation and recovery rather than of 
active social transformation and a politics of difference. In this new humanist guise 
alienation is figured as a problem to be ameliorated by the recovery or recognition of 
our common finitude that we have presumably lost. In response, I present an approach 
to the human that pursues limit experiences of the human and forms of power and 
politics that persist and work at the margins of norms and experiences––what I call a 
“humanism at the limits.” To do so, I develop a model of alienation in which 
experiences of alienation are always multiple and historically and socially specific, 
and thus must be examined and worked against in their particularity.  
 I examine this image of the human and alienation through several problematics: 
the legacy of humanist Marxism and what I call “the Feuerbach problem” in critical 
thought; Judith Butler’s use of the figure of the human and its implications for social 
movements like AIDS activism; the dilemmas of subjectivity in the work of Butler and 
Louis Althusser and the subject’s relation to dominant forms of power; the possibility of 
a “weak,” or strategic, approach to critical theory that avoids the traps of strong, 
paranoid readings, particularly those that see the state as a threatening “cold monster”; 
and, finally, the project of failure as articulated by queer theories of politics and the 
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dramatic work of Samuel Beckett. This dissertation works to chart a course that 
recognizes the limits of human agency and that sees the conditions of alienation that 
attend them, but that attempts to resist the false choice of revolution or recovery. A 
humanism at the limits affirms that there are many lives worth living and promotes an 
image of politics that might see such lives proliferate in our contemporary conjuncture 
where such possibilities are both profound and precarious. 
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Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman––a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a 
dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping. What 
is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an 
overture and a going under. – Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible spaces. To make a truly 
unavoidable challenge of the question: What can be played? – Michel Foucault, Friendship as 
a Way of Life 
 
 Despite the continual displacement of nearly every established conception of 
the human,1 the figure of the human remains a powerful idea for political theorizing. 
The lure of the human drives both theorists who affirm an Enlightenment-inspired 
notion of the human as combining elements of autonomy, rationality, and 
responsibility as well as theorists who seek to disrupt that image by emphasizing the 
relational, embodied, finite, and even non-human characteristics of (human) existence. 
Moreover, in the era of human rights, the human has come to mark a status that 
promises protection from the “dehumanizing” effects of violence, discrimination, and 
other modes of injustice. In spite of these alluring promises, this dissertation argues that 
the figure of the human tends to obscure as much as it reveals and to exclude as much 
as it promises to include. The problem with humanisms––both those inspired by 
classical humanist tropes of autonomy and rationality and the “new” humanism based 
on a shared recognition of vulnerability and finitude––is that they both tend to operate 
according to a logic of alienation and recovery, and, thus, promote a vision of politics 
                                            
1 Indeed, contemporary science is now even challenging our image of the human down to the level of 
the organism in finding that our bodies consist of more “non-human” cells than “human” ones, that 
heavy metals and even parasites can affect the character of our brain function, and so on. 
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that depends upon what Gilles Deleuze calls a “reactive,” rather than creative, critique 
(1983 [1962]). In other words, alienation is read by and large as a problem to be 
solved or ameliorated by the recovery of that from which we have become alienated, 
thus playing a conservative function of reclaiming a lost essence. The strangeness of 
this development is that it emerges just as easily from theoretical attempts to displace 
the biases of Enlightenment-inspired liberal accounts of the human subject and 
political life as from those that seek to promote such a view of the human and politics. 
For, in the attempt to break up the model of the free, autonomous, and rational 
individual, this new mortalist humanism replaces it with another of its own: the human 
as primarily vulnerable, precarious, finite.  
 Thus, both of these humanist projects remain limited by a politics of recognition 
or reappropriation.2 Like the liberal project of recognition, though ostensibly aimed at 
the project of pluralization and difference, theories of vulnerability and precariousness 
turn back on themselves in calling for the reappropriation or recognition of a 
(presumably lost or unrecognized) common human essence as a prerequisite for an 
ethical politics of difference. In this way, the projects ultimately remain conservative, 
or reactive, attempts to come to terms with the challenges of individual and collective 
                                            
2 Patchen Markell analyzes the limitations and binds of a politics of recognition in his volume Bound by 
Recognition (2009). Markell’s analysis develops out of the ongoing debate in political theory over the 
prospects for a politics of recognition that is notably explored in the work of Charles Taylor (1994) and 
Axel Honneth (1996). Markell’s criticism of the politics of recognition differs from Nancy Fraser’s insofar 
as Fraser (2004) sees the politics of recognition as a failure to address the redistribution of social and 
material goods. Markell, on the other hand, argues that the politics of recognition binds the subject in a 
particular identity, thus missing both the specificity of the particular individual and the possibility for 
identities to shift and change over time. The problems of politics of recognition are not my main 
concern in this dissertation, though I do see recognition as caught up in the dynamic of alienation and 
recovery that I discuss here. 
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life. My concern is that certain forms of these projects end up reinforcing more 
restrictive, constraining forms of liberal politics than those their projects seek to 
promote. Further, the problematic of alienation tends to reaffirm a dialectical mode of 
thought that reinforces stubborn dichotomies between the human and non-human (or 
the dehumanized), repression and liberation, structure and agency, freedom and 
oppression, rights and revolution, and public and private dimensions of agency. Thus, 
the problematics of alienation and recovery and of humanisms have powerful effects 
on how we understand the conditions of subjectivity and of communal life and the 
role that politics and critique might play therein. 
 My intention in this project is not to resolve these dichotomies once and for all. 
Instead, I am drawn to these puzzles because of the persistence of the human, 
alongside experiences of both alienation and agency, despite all that we might say 
about it and everything that might thwart it. In the face of the declarations of the 
dangers facing the public sphere of politics (Zerilli 2012), of the rendering of us all into 
biopolitical subjects of the neoliberal state (Agamben 1998 [1995]), and of the 
dehumanization of exclusive norms (Butler 2006b [2004]), human beings, like most 
other organisms, continue to survive and sometimes thrive despite (and because of) the 
difficulties they face. Yet, in insisting that the human persists, I must also clarify: first, 
the image of the human that I highlight and develop in this project is not one of an 
indomitable human spirit that manifests itself by overcoming obstacles for some 
genuine state of self expression. Instead, I am drawn to the unpredictable and 
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unexpected ways that the human and agency emerge in spite of systems of power—
and modes of theorizing—that impede them or tend to cover them over. Second, I 
advocate not the optimism that can be found in the works of Saba Mahmood (2005) 
and James Scott (1985 and 1990), projects that locate modes of resistance in everyday 
life, no matter how mundane. Sometimes subjection is just subjection and breaking 
minor laws is just a matter of expedience and not part of a intentional project of 
subversion. Instead, I examine what expressions of human forms of life might show up 
if we were to think outside these persistent binaries. My claim is that human (and non-
human, for that matter) life and agency exceed any attempt to capture them with a 
common essence—even the common fact of mortality—and that the human emerges 
in places outside or in between our ideal divisions between public and private, 
structure and agency, repression and freedom, human, non-human, or dehumanized. 
Thus, the attempt to capture something common about human experience—something 
upon which to ground ethics and politics—falls short, because human experience is so 
dynamic and manifold as to elude attempts to delimit any essence of this experience. 
Human beings do indeed have experiences of thought, agency, and they do identity as 
reflexive, intentional, and even at times self-same,3 and these forms of experience 
determine a significant part of our individual and collective lives. Yet, we also have 
powerful experiences of alienation in which our intentions are thwarted, and we find 
ourselves subjected beyond our complete control to our thoughts, our bodies, and 
                                            
3 Even Nietzsche, the critic of Enlightenment subjectivity par excellence, recognizes something like this 
experience. But he argues that it comes late on the scene of experience, rather than as its original 
source. See Daybreak, Book II (1997 [1880]). 
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affective states from both within and without. Where (and how) theorists place their 
focus, then, will determine to a large degree what possibilities for individual and 
collective lives show up for them.  
 To that end, I take up a kind of Nietzschean image of the human as “a bridge 
and not a purpose, a dangerous on-the-way” (1985 [1892]: 15). Such an image 
requires resisting the tendency to attribute to the human an essential nature, whether 
that be freedom, dignity, rationality, language, or vulnerability and finitude. 
Nietzsche’s image of the rope over an abyss places us in a “zone of indiscernibility”4 
between the human as an intentional agent and an affective assemblage, a rational 
actor and a dispersed, “larval” subject.5 Such a position is dangerous in a number of 
ways. First, it disrupts the theorist’s project of capturing an essential experience of the 
human as a basis for politics, and instead requires that the theorist be attentive to the 
unpredictable and sometimes seemingly insignificant—and to remain open to the 
insignificant is to open oneself, as theorist, to the criticism of irrelevance. Second, the 
image of the human as something non-essential poses a kind of threat to normative 
orders of identity and politics insofar as such an image presents a challenge to more 
settled models of what it means to be, act, and appear in ways that are recognizably 
“human.” Finally, this image of the human is dangerous for those who find themselves 
already outside of normative images of the human and who are struggling to survive in 
spite of and against their exclusion, for this image places into suspension prior criteria 
                                            
4 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s What is Philosophy?, especially Chapter 7 (1990 [1994]). 
5 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Chapter 2 (1994 [1968]).  
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of the human by which outsiders might be able to make a claim for their humanness to 
be recognized. Outside a framework of recognition, we risk the possibility that those 
who exist beyond the limits of the normative image of the human will remain 
unrecognized and unacknowledged by dominant insiders—even the theorists seeking 
to bring their experience to light. Yet, as Nietzsche notes, taking up this project also 
allows us to see that what is great in the human is not a pre-given form of life to which 
we must remain conservatively tied, but is instead a possibility for creative and 
multiplicative expression of life itself. This potential creativity, however, will not be 
found in the final overcoming of alienation, but in continually going through it and 
working upon it as it is encountered again and again. Thus, in this project, I engage 
with a number of thinkers whose work promotes a “dangerous” view of the human, 
one that emerges in unexpected ways often at the limits of what is considered 




                                            
6 This range of authors includes Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Rancière, Samuel Beckett, Leo Bersani, and even Stanley Cavell. Though this group may appear as a 
motley crew of writers to draw upon, as I will show in the dissertation, they share important affinities in 
troubling received views of humanism, subjectivity, and politics. Further, particularly with respect to 
Deleuze and Foucault’s relationship to Althusser, there are significant connections between them that 
have long been obscured by the development of schools of thought that have at times demanded a 
certain orthodoxy in reading these philosophers. Warren Montag’s Althusser and his Contemporaries 
works to break up these orthodoxies by pointing to the historical/biographical, as well as intellectual, 
relationships shared between them (Montag 2013). Likewise, Paul Patton has noted the ways that 
Deleuze both drew from and moved away from a kind of Althusserian structuralism in his development 
of the concept of difference. As Patton writes in Deleuze and the Political, “In Difference and Repetition 
Deleuze endorsed the concept of structural causality in terms of which Althusser and others sought to 
make sense of Marx’s thesis of economic determination.” (2000: 37). 
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Alienation and Reappropriation 
 I begin here with Nietzsche and Deleuze because together they present a 
powerful critique of the limitations of reactive critique and a politics of recovery, while 
also offering an alternative vision for active, creative critique.7 The task of critique can, 
of course, take on a number of forms: a project of judgment, one of reconciliation, one 
of unmasking or demystification, or even one of the multiplication of possible ways of 
thinking and acting in a given conjuncture. Here I follow Deleuze’s reading of 
Nietzsche as a particularly powerful account of the dangers of reactive critique and the 
possibilities of critique as a project of creation and multiplication of possibilities for 
life. Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche was in many ways a refutation of readings of 
Nietzsche as a promoter of nihilism, exemplified for instance in Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche (1991 [1961]). Against such readings Deleuze makes the claim that 
Nietzsche actively works against nihilism and that, in fact, Nietzsche’s targets are 
themselves the carriers of nihilism. Though Kant is often seen as Nietzsche’s prime 
target (as Kant exemplifies, for Nietzsche, the problems of Enlightenment rationality 
and morality), Deleuze reads Nietzsche’s project as a profound rejection of dialectics, 
and therefore as much anti-Hegel as anti-Kant.8 For Deleuze the dialectic always 
involves a kind of reactive thought because it functions under the assumption that 
there exists an original essence (of human nature, Being, the Divine, etc.) from which 
we have been alienated and which we must, then, recover. Deleuze reads Nietzsche 
                                            
7 Deleuze himself suggests that this concept of creative critique was one of Nietzsche’s most important 
contributions to the project of philosophy. See Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983 [1962]). 
8 See Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983 [1962]: 162). 
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as working to escape the Hegelian dialectic and its emphasis on alienation and 
reappropriation in order to overcome the reactive forces of thought and promote an 
active, creative critique—outside the recuperative tendencies of dialectical thought.  
 For Deleuze, reading Nietzsche, the dialectic presents a two-fold problem. First, 
as a recuperative project, the dialectic always remains caught up in the problematic of 
alienation and reappropriation; thus, it functions as a reactive project that Deleuze 
argues ultimately ends in the kind of nihilism that is often attributed to Nietzsche. That 
is, from the perspective of the dialectic, there is always a gap or lack in being that can 
only be filled in through the process of recovery and recognition. Thus, second, the 
dialectic requires a universalist, comparative frame that is capable of judging whether 
or not something qualifies or counts as an appropriation of the original (alienated) 
essence. Dialectical thought, then, loses sight of the particular in its quest to overcome 
alienation. As Deleuze puts it, “The speculative motor of the dialectic is contradiction 
and its resolution. But its practical motor is alienation and the suppression of 
alienation, alienation and reappropriation…an art of ressentiment” (1983 [1962]: 160). 
Deleuze demonstrates this argument by pointing to the development of the dialectic 
from Hegel to Feuerbach to Stirner, a development through which the dialectic reveals 
itself as a project driven by egoism and nihilism.9 With Hegel, the human is reconciled 
with God; with Feuerbach, the human recovers its essence from the divine. But with 
Stirner, we arrive at the nihilistic end of the dialectic where the ego recovers itself but 
                                            
9 Deleuze sees Stirner as the culmination of the nihilistic force of the dialectic. But as I argue in Chapter 
2, the Feuerbachian legacy in Marxian and post-Marxian critical thought continues to haunt the project 
of critical theory today. 
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now only as a power that destroys everything as it seeks to take everything into itself.10 
Quoting Stirner, Deleuze writes, “Overcoming alienation thus means pure, cold 
annihilation, a recovery which lets nothing which recovers subsist: ‘it is not that the 
ego is all, but the ego destroys all” (Deleuze 1983 [1962]: 161; quoting Stirner 1973 
[1845]: 182).  
 Thus, paradoxically for Deleuze, the dialectic, which promises to return the 
human to itself from the alienations first of the divine, then of the objectivity of the 
species being, and finally of its distance from its own ego, instead leads to an 
impoverished end and a new abstraction: that of the human as self-sufficient but alone, 
reunited but only through vulnerability and death: “Negative nihilism is replaced by 
reactive nihilism, reactive nihilism ends in passive nihilism. From God to God’s 
murderer, from God’s murderer to the last man” (1983 [1962]: 151). Nietzsche’s 
critique of the dialectic ultimately shows us “the incapacity of this philosophy to end in 
anything but the ego, man or phantasms of the human” (1983 [1962]: 162, emphasis 
in original).11 Following this logic we can read the movements of humanism in parallel 
to the nihilism of the dialectic: Enlightenment humanism appears as a reactive critique 
against the limitations of the human that Kant documented so well, as a recuperation 
of the proper place of the human as bound by the limits of reason. Next has followed 
                                            
10 Deleuze’s account of the development of the dialectic from Hegel to Stirner parallels Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s theory of the destructive development of instrumental rationality in which the human 
finally comes to master itself and the world at the cost of losing its individuality and its relation to the 
world of others (see Dialectic of Enlightenment 2002 [1947]). 
11 Deleuze also writes of the trope of the wretched man in Nietzsche, “The dialectical man is the most 
wretched because he is no longer anything but a man, having annihilated everything which was not 
himself. He is also the best man because he has suppressed alienation, replaced God and recuperated 
his properties” (1983 [1962]: 163). 
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the rise of a kind of “passive nihilism” with the replacement of the Enlightenment 
image of the human with one of the human as primarily vulnerable, finite, precarious. 
The reaction to the insufficiency of the Enlightenment view of the human has led to a 
new pacifism in which human vulnerability and finitude becomes the binding source 
for collective life. This turn to finitude has been meant to put our egos in check and 
even to stave off the move to ressentiment, but as Nietzsche and Deleuze show us, this 
turn remains caught by the same dialectical mode that can so quickly give rise to 
ressentiment instead. As Heidegger demonstrates in his early writings, the realization 
of our “being-towards-death” is no safeguard against the dangers of fascism. The focus 
on our vulnerability today seems no less promising a way to face the alienations of the 
contemporary condition.  
 Nietzsche, then, goes outside the reactive mode by posing a new mode of 
thought and a new conception of the human form of life. Deleuze describes 
Nietzsche's project of transvaluation as “a new way of evaluating: not a change of 
values, not an abstract transposition nor a dialectical reversal, but a change and 
reversal in the element from which the value of values derives, a ‘transvaluation’” 
(1983 [1962]: 163, emphasis in original). Here we can see the difference between the 
kind of transvaluation that Deleuze presents through Nietzsche and the kind that 
someone like Charles Taylor promotes. For Taylor, humans are able to enact 
experiences of transvaluation because “all interpretation can be judged as more or less 
adequate, more or less distortive” (1985b: 75). Transvaluation, then, becomes possible 
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when one is able to move from a less adequate or more distorted interpretation of 
one’s experience to a more adequate or less distorted one.12 But for Deleuze the power 
of becoming and the transformation of values is never a matter of more or less. Rather, 
with Nietzsche he argues for a transvaluation that depends not on a prior standard, but 
on creative destruction of prior standards and a positive attempt at a new expression. 
Difference, then, is seen as multiplicative, often requiring the destruction of prior 
standards for the new to emerge. Here “affirmation conceived of as acceptance, as 
affirmation of that which is, as truthfulness of the true or positivity of the real, is a false 
affirmation…this false conception of affirmation is still a way of preserving man” (1983 
[1962]: 184). As Deleuze strikingly writes, “The world is neither true nor real but 
living” (184). In such a model of critique and the becoming of difference the 
movement of social “progress” like the movement of woman from homemaker to 
breadwinner or homosexuality from forbidden to legally protected cannot be read as a 
simple matter of liberation and recognition, but as the destruction of a previous mode 
of representation and the creation of the new.13In other words, Deleuze encourages an 
image of difference and becoming that does not always depend of a smooth story of 
progress that takes place within one coherent or homogenous medium. Thus, social 
and political change cannot be read as the unfolding, say, of a liberal project of 
                                            
12 For a fuller (and classic) discussion of the limitations of Taylor’s (early) political and ethical project, 
see William E. Connolly’s “Taylor, Foucault, Otherness” (1985), as well as Taylor’s response, “Connolly, 
Foucault, and Truth” (1985a). 
13 Much like Rancière’s notion of dissensus, here a new scene, or “partition of the sensible” is created, 
not just the liberation of a previously existent mode of being (Rancière 1999 [1995]: 26). For a larger 
discussion of this dynamic, see Chambers (2013). 
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tolerance and recognition. Instead, the pursuit of difference often requires a 
reconfiguration of a given order, rather than a recovery or extension of a common 
essence. 
 
Begging to Differ 
 Thus, for Deleuze and Nietzsche positive critique requires a conception of 
difference that goes beyond the affirmation “of what is” and the functions of 
comparison and opposition (cf. 1983 [1962]: 183).14  The point is to displace modes of 
thought that rely on preconceived standards by which to judge difference. And 
whereas the dialectic leads to nihilism and ressentiment, comparative orders of 
representation forestall the ability to see and participate in the becoming of difference. 
Spivak, of course, famously argues that the critique of representation in Foucault and 
Deleuze repeats the totalizing and silencing force of Euro-centric Enlightenment 
thought and prevents us from the hearing the subaltern speak (1988). Yet, I turn to 
Deleuze here for exactly the opposite effect: as a framework for illuminating difference 
outside of the dialectical, representative, and human-centered mode of thought. My 
claim is that the human conceived as “a bridge and not an end” comes into view not 
through a lens that sees various conditions as more or less human, but through a lens 
that finds various, often aberrant, expressions of the human as expressions of 
difference, as possible forms of life. For Deleuze difference cannot just be the 
                                            
14 Elsewhere Deleuze writes, “The negative expires at the gates of being. Opposition ceases its labour 
and difference begins its play” (1983 [1962]: 190). 
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repetition of something in a modified way, as in a series of A, A’, A’’, and so on, or a 
kind of repetition of a thing that compares more or less to what it repeats. For this way 
of thinking of difference and repetition remains only an additive or subtractive 
difference that stays at the level of representation and mediation, which in turn stays in 
the realm of the dialectic of alienation and reappropriation. Instead, Deleuze proposes 
a way of thinking difference and repetition as active processes of reconsidering and 
redrawing limits as part of series of selection, creation, and expression. Here difference 
is made, not determined or found. To make this point more concrete, I turn now briefly 
to consider the modes of representation that Deleuze argues obscure the expression of 
difference by remaining in a mode of comparison and abstraction.  
 
Organic Representation 
 Deleuze first takes on Plato and Aristotle as the kind of philosophers who 
attempt to mediate or tame difference through a philosophy of categorization and 
judgment. Both posit a finite limit or ground which allows for judgments based on 
differences in relation to this ground. Aristotle judges by marking out oppositions and 
contrarieties, by locating specific differences under genera (Deleuze 1994 [1968]: 30). 
This system of species and genera is ultimately one of representation and reflection: 
“the univocity of species in a common genus refers back to the equivocity of being in 
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various genera: the one reflects the other” (1994 [1968]: 34).15 Difference, then, can 
only take on a negative role as designating “catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in 
the series of resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures” 
(1994 [1968]: 35).16 For Plato, on the other hand, the process of division is not one of 
identifying difference in order to determine species. Instead, it is one of “selection 
among rivals, the testing of claimants” in their relation to reality, the Ideas: “It is not a 
question of identifying but authenticating” (1994 [1968]: 60). Here things participate in 
the pure Idea of them to a greater or lesser degree, and Plato is concern with 
distinguishing their degrees of participation in the Idea in order to weed out the 
inauthentic. Difference here is related to non-being and only measures the distance 
between the Idea and the thing, or the original and the copy (1994 [1968]: 64). If we 
consider how a concept like "the human" might function in the organic mode of 
thought, the human becomes either a genus under which we might allow certain 
modes of life as specific expressions of the genus; or the human becomes a kind of 
ideal against which we might compare conditions and behaviors as human, inhuman, 
dehumanized. As such, the organic mode appears unable to come to terms either with 
expressions of life that fall outside of established criteria or with the ways that humans 
                                            
15 This system of genera and species as branches of a common tree of being points to Deleuze and 
Guatarri’s later and more explicit critique of arborial thought (Deleuze and Guatarri 1987 [1980]: 
Introduction). 
16 Despite this misconstruing of difference, difference in Deleuze’s sense still seems to be lurking here 
insofar as this process of specification is a selection from a “confused species” or milieu in order to 
create lines of specification (1994 [1968]: 59-60). 
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living in “inhuman” conditions persist in and struggle against these conditions, perhaps 
producing expressions of difference within these very conditions themselves.  
 
Orgiastic Representation 
 In opposition to organic representation, which functions by judging, Deleuze 
offers orgiastic representation, which functions by expressing (1994 [1968]: 43). 
Unlike the finite determinations of organic representation where everything is judged 
in relation to a finite ground, in orgiastic representation the telos is not the limit from 
which things spring, but  that toward which things converge (1994 [1968]: 43). That is, 
the telos acts like a call for the multiplication of finite things, even as it brings them 
back together again in a kind of reappropriation (in the end). Here difference is made 
by the introduction of some infinite concept (the Good, negativity, etc.) that then 
serves as the goal toward which things move or strive. We see this in Hegel in the 
movement of all things toward the realization of absolute Spirit.17 The problem here is 
that “infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity as a 
presupposition of representations” (1994 [1968]: 49). It still “invokes a foundation” 
that it gives “an infinite value” and allows it “to reign over existence itself” (1994 
[1968]: 49). The problem still seems to be the positing of one principle by which we 
could judge everything that exists, even as the principle allows an infinite number of 
                                            
17 Deleuze also turns to Leibniz to show how he sees this in relation to his notion of compossible worlds 
––the infinite there would be maximum continuity in a maximum number of cases, without divergence 
(would lead to incompossibility). (1989 [1985]: 126). For a discussion of Deleuze’s study of film, 
particularly as it relates to his political thought, see Paola Marrati’s Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and 
Philosophy (2008 [2003]). 
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entities to come into existence and express themselves. In the regime of the orgiastic, 
then, "the human" appears as the big happy family that promises to be just around the 
corner as we realize more and more the universality of human rights, 
cosmopolitanism, and the like.  
 Thus, for Deleuze difference and repetition cannot be generality or 
representation, nor do they act as a model or original essence and its copies or 
manifestations. To begin to get at what repetition and difference might mean, then, we 
must reconsider existence and its phenomena not as things in themselves or as 
expressions of an essence or things in themselves, but as simulacra that lack an 
authentic or originary essence. Difference and repetition appear as an effect, a mask, a 
symbol, a sign—that is as something that is nonessential, even if it has become 
durable, sedimented, perhaps even rigid. It seems that this kind of disguising or 
covering over would mean that difference has something to hide, which we might 
uncover with a kind of phenomenological hermeneutics, or that the disguising might 
render the repetition ineffectual in covering it over. Yet, for Deleuze the 
unrepresentable nature of the mask/the simulacra means that it must always be 
signified through its enactment—through its signaling to other entities and through its 
responding to them. Thus, its masking may not be a hiding or covering over, but a 
cover that gives shape to something to allow it to have an effect. Deleuze presents an 
example of the theater: masks in the theater do not cover over anything essential to the 
performance; instead, they allow the performance to be enacted, for an effect to be 
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produced, for a communication/signaling to take place.18 Beneath the mask is another 
series of masks that allows the carrying out of roles on various stages or realms of life, 
in various systems of signals, none of which are more authentic or original than 
another. Behind the mask is a person, yes, but a person who herself performs a series 
of other roles each with its own sets of expression and masks—mother, father, lover, 
worker, boss. There is no ontological primacy to these positions. Some are more 
settled than others, but none of them are definitive. They work together as an 
assemblage in their effects. So, read one way, there is always a kind of gap between 
the role and the actor, but not a gap of negativity, lack, or of an alienation that needs 
recovering. Instead there is a gap in a series, that keeps the movement going, not a 
chasm that must be bridged, but a spacing that is necessary to the assemblage itself. 
The human here is an enactment of affects and expression, not something essential that 
might serve as a cornerstone for politics and ethics. “The human” of course remains 
very real and very powerful, even in my project here, but it can still perform this role 
as a function of difference. Much like Jane Bennett’s image of the “useful fiction of the 
subject,” which operates for her as a placeholder for the bodily center of experience in 
an examination of a materiality and affect, my image of the human operates as a 
important site of experience and theory, even it lacks a permanently coherent essence 
or being (see Bennett 2010: Introduction). 
 
                                            
18 For another discussion of the relationship between Deleuze’s philosophy and theatricality, see Gilles 




 The question remains how to capture an image of the human, and even 
alienation, without getting stuck in the binds of the dialectics of reappropriation, 
recognition, and representation. It is tempting to imagine the possibility of getting 
outside or beyond contemporary forms of power that condition our lives and to which 
we are subjected. These images seduce us with their promises of escape from the binds 
of our contemporary condition, even as they likewise provide us with tools to see 
everywhere the subjugating exercise of power, control, and stratification. In this 
project, I take a different tack, though one that is moved in a different way by a kind of 
Deleuzian and Foucaultian impulse. For as much as these two have inspired us with 
the possibilities of escape, they have also insisted that there is no real “beyond” and 
that the pursuit of lines of flight are just as likely to lead into “black holes” as they are 
into experiences liberated from the organizing forces of the state and society. In 
articulating a humanism at the limits, I try to take seriously the caution that is also 
contained in Foucault’s notion of experiment, which implies that we can only ever just 
experiment with going beyond our limits and even if there is no pure "beyond" (see 
Foucault 1997 [1984]). The question is whether such experimentation might just be 
enough to shift the balance of power from time to time. In other words, I suggest that 
dwelling for a while at the limits of the human—staying with the experiences of 
alienation, the inhuman, subjection, failure, and the often cold power of state 
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politics—that we find various, and valuable forms of life at the boundaries of inside 
and outside, human and inhuman, freedom and subjection.  
 In taking this approach, I am following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s thoughts on 
what the use of the prepositions “beyond, beneath, and beside” mean for how we do 
critical work (2003: 8). Here Sedgwick draws a different lesson from Deleuze (and 
from Sylvan Tomkins) than the drive for lines of flight and means of escape. As I am in 
this dissertation, Sedgwick is skeptical about the helpfulness of critique as a project 
that promises the unmasking of an original essence or truth or the arrival at a final goal 
that promises to overcome all our dilemmas. With great aplomb, she admonishes the 
critical project of the “bossy gesture of ‘calling for’ an imminently perfected critical or 
revolutionary practice that one can oneself only adumbrate” (2003: 8). In her attempt 
to bypass some of the pitfalls of a critical approach that exposes hidden sources of 
trouble in our literary and political practices by calling for us to get beneath and/or 
beyond them, she suggests that we consider the preposition beside as offering a 
different approach. She proposes that the word beside introduces a “spatial description 
into narratives of, respectively, origin and telos” (2003: 8). As she suggests, beside 
“permits a spacious agnosticism about several of the linear logics that enforce dualistic 
thinking” but one that does not “depend on a fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or 
even pacific relations” (2003: 9). The look beside does not attempt to neutralize the 
problems under investigation, but it allows for another possible set of answers to them. 
This approach resists the feedback loop of critical approaches to agency and 
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subjectivity in which the hegemonic serves as the given structure of norms and power 
and the subversive as “a purely negative relation to that” (2003: 12). Instead, Sedgwick 
suggests that attention to the “middle ranges of agency” between or beside dialectical 
binaries might better illuminate the spaces from which creativity and change emerge 
(2003: 13). Taking this approach, then, might require, like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 
“passing by” the temptation to take up modes of critique that promise liberation 
through the tools of unmasking and the overcoming of alienation which 
simultaneously threatening with the dangers of nihilism and reactive critique. 
 
****** 
 The dissertation proceeds, then, in two major stages. In the first two chapters, I 
offer a diagnosis of the effects of the persistence in contemporary critical thought of the 
problematic of humanism and its attendant model of alienation and recovery. In 
Chapter 1, "Humanism, Alienation, and the Feuerbach Problem," I frame this diagnosis 
in terms of what I call the “Feuerbach problem” in critical theory. Particularly, in the 
context of what Bonnie Honig has called a "new humanism"––her effort to capture the 
recent turn to vulnerability and finitude as an ethical basis for politics––the framework 
for alienation and recovery is returning to political thought. I argue that the these new 
humanisms are manifestations of the Feuerbach problem in critical thought in that they 
place too great a faith in the recovery of a lost or forgotten human essence to solve the 
deep divisions and challenges of life in late modernity, much like Marx did in his early 
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Feuerbach-inspired focus on recovery of the species being. Drawing from Althusser's 
reading of Marx, which insists on a break between Marx's early humanist period and 
his later "scientific" period, I argue that the "new humanism" in critical thought remains 
tied to a humanist approach to critique which almost inevitably leads to the worst 
elements of the politics of liberalism. The tendency of a politics driven by the 
overcoming of alienation is to overstate the power of recognition and recovery to 
liberate us from these alienating conditions. Further, the turn to vulnerability and 
finitude reinforces the liberal model of a politics of protection meant to shore us up 
from the dangers that we pose to one another. Finally, by presuming that the problem 
is a general condition of alienation and that the solution is the full recovery of some 
human essence or condition, this problematic short-circuits the very political 
negotiation of the terms of the human. Instead, I present a model of alienation in 
which experiences of alienation are always multiple and historically and socially 
specific, and thus must be examined and worked against in their specific contexts.  
 In Chapter 2, "The Politics of Mattering," through a reading of Judith Butler's 
work on the figure of the human, I put into question the language of the human, the 
inhuman, and dehumanization that has become a common frame for criticizing the 
abuses of state power and practices of social violence and inequality. I argue that 
Butler's work presents two distinct images of the human with very different effects. 
First, in her recent focus on "grievability" and the precariousness of human life, Butler 
offers a view of the human as a subject position necessary for one's life to matter and 
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bear political agency. This image, I argue, produces more problems that it solves, for it 
risks overstating the power of the "human" to protect us from violence and injustice. It 
likewise provides too easy an explanation of these conditions––one that reads the 
cause of such violence as the result of the dehumanization of the other. Second, Butler 
presents an image of the human as more dynamic field of contestation where the terms 
of the human can be debated and put to the test. This image of the human comes 
closer to realizing the potential of Butler's notion of performativity to trouble the terms 
of the human and illuminate a politics of difference.  
 To illuminate the consequences of these two images of the human, I turn to 
responses to the AIDS epidemic and the way that the "humanness" of its victims has 
been portrayed in critical accounts of it. Following Leo Bersani, I argue against theories 
that see the abandonment of gay men during the AIDS epidemic as evidence that they 
were not considered human, and thus did not matter. Instead of focusing on their 
potential grievability in public acts of mourning like the making of the AIDS quilt, I 
highlight how their form of life as a devious, dangerous expression of the human 
mattered intensely as a potential disruption of normative orders of sexuality and 
kinship. A politics of the human, then, cannot aim at the recovery of the humanness of 
the abject through the recognition of their finitude; instead, it must aim at illuminating 
those moments where the human expresses itself in spite of the attempts to stifle it or 
even snuff it out.  
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 In Chapter 3, "Interpellation and the Dilemmas of Subjectivity," I continue this 
analysis of Butler and Althusser, but here I shift to the question of the subject as it 
emerges out of the problematic of alienation and humanism. As many of Butler's 
commentators have described, the promises of Butler's theory of performativity and 
subversion have continually been weighed down by her turn to the grief over what she 
calls "the sorry bind" of subjectivity. In this chapter, I show how Butler's enduring 
commitment to a politics of recognition has led to a theory a subject that expresses a 
longing for a recuperation of a freely chosen state of subjectivity that can never be––a 
view of the subject that is on the road to the kind of reactive critique that stifles the 
politics of difference that she begins to put into play. Thus, I read her theory of the 
subject specifically through her appropriation and criticism of Althusser's concept of 
interpellation, arguing that her misreading of Althusser is symptomatic of her desire for 
a self-determining subject. Then, through a re-reading of Althusser's theory of 
interpellation and ideology as well as his theory of the state, I suggest that in giving up 
the grief over a self-determined subject that never was, Althusser presents us with 
possibilities for challenging the terms of political life that emerge out of the very 
conditions of subjection. By affirming the alienated conditions of subjectivity, rather 
than grieving it, Althusser offers the possibility model of theorizing the politics of the 
subject, ideology, and the state that can avoid the dilemmas of structure and agency, 
rather than further entrench them.  
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 Chapter 4, "Warming Up to the Cold Monster," considers the relation between 
critical thought and the possibilities for state politics. In this chapter, I argue that one of 
the results of the dialectic of the critical mode of alienation and recovery has been the 
tendency to adopt a paranoid relation to the power of the "cold monster" of the state. 
In response, drawing from Foucault's late lectures on neoliberalism as well as from 
Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of state capitalism, I propose taking up a strategic logic 
that takes a more localized approach the powers of the state and the dynamics of 
power that might resist the tendency to totalizing readings of the state. Following 
Sedgwick's notion of "weak" theory, I develop an approach to the state that is attentive 
to the ambivalences of state power and that resists collapsing the heterogeneous 
elements and effects of the state into a unified whole. To illustrate this case, I turn to 
the debate over same-sex marriage amongst feminist and queer theorists, which has for 
a long time, played out in stark terms: same-sex marriage has been read either as part 
of a smooth story of the progress of human rights or as a capitulation to the 
normalizing effects of state power. Both of these cases present a strong reading of the 
state that tend to collapse a dynamic set of variables––including kinship, electoral and 
judicial politics, neoliberal ideology, individual and collective forms of desire, the 
uneven distribution of state privileges––into a tightly woven whole. The strength of 
weak theory and strategic logic is that it helps us to loosen up this whole; its weakness 
is that it does not promise a final answer or goal. Instead, as with this dissertation as a 
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whole, this chapter aims to present a vision of politics as part of the creative 
multiplication of possibilities for (both human and non-human) life.  
 Following this reconsideration of the conditions of subjectivity and 
interpellation, I then move to the question of the efficacy of failure in Chapter 5, 
"Failure: The Best Medicine?". In this chapter, I take up the work of Samuel Beckett and 
recent discussions of failure in queer theory. Contemporary thinking about politics has 
a difficult time finding in the experience of failure any form of agency or power that 
might contribute to political life. Yet, many queer theorists have come to see the 
experience of queerness, and the unusual forms of power and subversion that come 
with it, as uniquely characterized by the experience of failure––in the failure of queer 
bodies and forms of life to conform to dominant norms of kinship, bodies, sexual life, 
and so on. Failure, likewise, dramatizes most starkly our experiences of alienation from 
our intentions, from our desires from our collective endeavors. The question remains 
open of whether dwelling with failure should serve as an "anti-social" project of 
queerness (e.g., Lee Edelman's No Future) or an aspect of queer life to be celebrated 
(e.g., Judith Halberstam's The Queer Art of Failure and José Esteban Muñoz’s Cruising 
Utopia). Taking another tack, I turn to the work of Samuel Beckett as offering an 
alternative vision of failure, one that finds in failure a peculiar form of power and 
resistance, even as it recognizes the inability of failure itself to ever meet its mark (that 
is failing completely). 
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I then offer a reading of Endgame that highlights Beckett’s thematization of the limit 
experiences of agency’s failures and the suspensions of time and meaning in late 
modern life. On my reading, Beckett dramatizes the persistence of both alienation and 
agency at the limits of zones of the political, intelligibility, and experiences of 
subjectivity. Beckett then, gives a strange model that can help dramatize the dilemmas 
of (queer) projects of subversion in which such projects are always risky endeavors, 
where failure risks both failing to fail (and getting recaptured by dominant norms) and 
failing completely (that is, coming to nothing). In light of this reading, I consider two 
examples—one from lesbian separatist movements and the other from the Occupy 
movement—to consider the pursuit of failure and the possibility of its power. Queer 
communities, like the Van Dykes of the 1970’s, have long recognized the potential 
agency of rejecting normative demands of identity and belonging, even though this 
agency is realized outside normative forms of politics and community. In a different 
way, Occupy took up a kind of political project of “failure” in its refusal of traditional 
political models of negotiation that too easily risked subsumption into existing policy 
positions or structures. Beckett’s plays, I argue, provide a perspective to see these 
movements as indicative of the conditions of late modern life where experiences of 
agency and alienation are pushed to the limit. 
 The dissertation as a whole considers the possibilities for (human) life in the 
pursuit of a politics of difference and a project of positive, creative, rather than reactive 
critique. In so doing, I work to develop a perspective on the human that takes up both 
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Nietzsche’s image of the human as a bridge, not an end, and Foucault’s challenge to 
pursue the project of “What can be played?”. Thus, I call this project a “humanism at 
the limits” because it pursues limit experiences of the human and forms of power and 
politics that persist and work often at the margins of norms and expectations. In this 
way, the dissertation resists the lure of grounding politics and ethics in a common 
human essence, for such a move places us, as Nietzsche and Deleuze suggest, on the 
path to reaction and ressentiment when we find that the recovery is blocked or 
impeded. The project also considers our limits from another direction: as a 
consideration of the limitations that our contemporary conjuncture places on us. Here 
we encounter the apparently unstoppable power of state capitalism, forces of war, and 
changing climates. These limit conditions tend to push both more conservative and 
more radical critical projects to hold fast to the demands for ethical recognition or for a 
kind of “ruthless critique of everything existing.” My dissertation tries to chart a 
different course, one that recognizes our limits and that sees and feels the conditions of 
alienation that attend them as well as the desire to amend or escape them. A 
humanism at the limits, as I see it, requires moments both of rage and refusal, and of 
compromise and conciliation. A humanism at the limits affirms that there are many 
lives worth living and promotes an image of politics that might see such lives 







Humanism, Alienation, and the Feuerbach Problem 
 
 
Humanism and Alienation 
 From the late-modern turn against existentialism, to the ascendance of “post-
humanism” and affect theory, one would expect humanist thought to be finally 
finished, and yet recent critical thought has been marked by the emergence of a new 
humanism. Likewise, the language of alienation, which often accompanies humanist 
thought, would appear to have been killed off by its association with the politics of 
authenticity that emerged from certain humanist brands of existentialism that ended up 
reinforcing the autonomous, voluntarist subject that it was meant to displace and by its 
inability in Marxian-inspired critical theory to overcome the complexity of 
contemporary capitalism and the capitalist exploitation of human and non-human 
resources. Yet, despite this waning of the language of alienation, the problematic of 
alienation has been sneaking back in. Indeed, it has been smuggled in by the new 
humanism. The return of this problematic is occurring in the unlikeliest of places: in 
the work of theorists like Judith Butler and Stephen White, whom Bonnie Honig has 
characterized as producing a new “mortalist” humanism that seeks to promote a new 
ethical grounds for politics based on the shared human condition of vulnerability, 
precariousness, and finitude (Honig 2010: 1).19 These theorists of vulnerability and 
                                            
19 As Honig has shown, this new humanist theme differs from earlier humanisms in that “what is 
common to humans is not rationality but the ontological fact of mortality, not the capacity to reason but 
vulnerability to suffering” (2010: 1). That is, rather than the promise of rationality and the deliberative 
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finitude see their projects as working to overcome the autonomous, voluntarist model 
of the subject that we have inherited from Enlightenment humanism and that has 
proved insufficient for dealing effectively with the challenges of contemporary life.20  
 In this chapter I argue that this new humanism not only risks displacing politics 
for ethics, but more importantly it leads to bad politics. It does so in two primary ways. 
First, in positing the common fact of human finitude and the recognition of and proper 
orientation to this finitude as the basis for politics, the focus on mortality remains 
bound up in the dialectic of alienation and recovery, the problems that I began 
analyzing in the introduction. That is, this orientation to politics works on a model of 
recognition in which the task of politics and ethics is the recognition and recovery of a 
common human essence from which we have presumably become alienated. 
Examples of this problematic of alienation and recovery abound: the recovery of our 
sense of mortality promises liberation from the alienating effects of unequal 
                                                                                                                                       
practices of democracy to help us overcome these exploitative conditions, this new “mortalist” 
humanism suggests that a recognition of the human condition of finitude – whether theorized as 
mortality, vulnerability, or precariousness – is crucial for enacting a moral ethical politics. For Honig, 
the trouble with this new humanism is twofold. First, it displaces politics for ethics and for an inward 
turn to the self, rather than a turn outward to an agonistic politics in the world of others. Second, in 
focusing on mortality, the new humanism misses the conditions and possibilities of natality and 
creativity born from the agon of politics. Honig’s analysis of the new humanism goes a long way toward 
showing the problems of grounding politics in an ethical turn to the fact of mortality. But, as I will argue 
in this chapter, there are other important issues at stake in this turn to a new humanism. 
20 See Butler’s explicit rejection of the claim that she is promoting a new humanism in Precarious Life: 
“By insisting on a ‘common’ corporeal vulnerability, I may seem to be positing a new basis for 
humanism. That might be true, but I am prone to consider it differently...if vulnerability is one 
precondition for humanization, and humanization takes place differently through variable norms of 
recognition, then it follows that vulnerability is fundamentally dependent on existing norms of 
recognition if it is to be attributed to any human subject” (2006b [2004]: 43-44). In this way, Butler tries 
to avoid the charge of humanism, but as I argue in Chapter 2, the problematics of humanization and 
recognition remain inextricably bound by the tropes of humanism, alienation, and recovery that actually 
give too much weight to the very norms of recognition that Butler wishes to displace. 
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experiences of and exposure to violence (Butler 2006b [2004]), from the drive to 
mastery and the traps of existential revenge (White 2009),21 and from the totalizing 
effects of the experience of bare life in a biopoliticized world (Agamben 1998 [1995]). 
Second, a mortalist humanism tends to reinforce two of the most persistent and 
troublesome elements of liberal politics. Most strikingly, the focus on the conditions of 
vulnerability and finitude calls up the scene of the liberal state of nature that leads to a 
politics of protection and to the image of a “buffered” or “capacious”22 subject that the 
new humanism seeks to avoid. Likewise, this vision of politics can give rise to too-
smooth stories of progress insofar as they suggest that the recognition and recovery of a 
common human essence will, in Honig’s words, “soften us up” and clear the road for 
more humane and equal treatment of others based upon mutual recognition.23 
 I do not disagree with the new humanist claim that a recognition of shared 
human finitude might spark a more ethical approach to politics and public life, and I 
affirm that human experience is indeed marked by experiences of alienation. But 
                                            
21 Interestingly, White takes his cues for this project from William Connolly’s work, but he drops out the 
very characteristics of Connolly’s work that seek to avoid the conservative dimensions of the ethical 
turn. In particular, he does not follow Connolly’s process oriented thought, most notably embodied in 
the latter’s focus on pluralization and a world of becoming (see Connolly 1995 and 2013). 
22 White uses the term “capacious” in an unusual way. The term could easily be read as a certain 
openness or porosity of the subject to the world of others. As such, the subject’s capaciousness could be 
read as the opposite of what Charles Taylor calls the “buffered” liberal subject that is closed off from as 
an autonomous individual (Taylor 2007). However, White’s use of capaciousness draws from the word’s 
root in the notion of being capable. Thus, White’s capacious liberal subject has the classically liberal 
character of a strong, independent will and the capacity to act freely in the world. White, then, wants to 
shift the notion of capaciousness toward a more open, porous direction. As he writes, “Our 
capaciousness does indeed mean that we can master much in the world, but such projections always 
remain arrayed before a background of remaining inarticulacy. As capacious, we are always also captive 
in this sense. This shift in the sense of capaciousness also allows for its becoming less central in our 
understanding of human dignity” (2009: 51). 
23 Honig argues, “Finitude is said to soften us up for the call of the other, to open us up to the 
solicitations of ethics and bypass the intractable divisions of politics” (2010: 1).  
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boiling the problem of alienation down to one dimension or aspect of human life––a 
dimension that might deliver or protect us from the more intractable dilemmas of 
politics, ethics, and subjectivity––overlooks the multiple and specific ways that we are 
alienated and the multiple, and often creative, ways that we humans seek to live and 
deal with these conditions of alienation in social and political life. Thus, the logic of 
alienation and recovery is insufficient because it poses the problem of alienation as if 
its solution were the return to origins.In reference to the Feuerbachian influence on 
early Marxism, I call this “the Feuerbach problem,” and I argue that it continues to 
drive the spirit of much of left critical thought. I suggest that the these new humanisms 
are manifestations of the Feuerbach problem in critical thought in that they place too 
great a faith in the recovery of a lost or forgotten human essence to solve the deep 
divisions and challenges of life in late modernity––much like Marx did in his early 
Feuerbach-inspired focus on the recovery of the species-being of man through the 
recovery of labor that has been alienated through the productive forces and processes 
of capitalism. The tendency of a politics driven by the overcoming of alienation is to 
overstate the power of both recognition and reappropriation to liberate us from these 
alienating conditions. As William Connolly has suggested, the conditions of alienation 
extend beyond one realm of life or another. Some of these conditions cannot be 
resolved, but only dealt with. As he writes, “Some modes of alienation need to be 
resolved and others need to be transfigured into modes of existential affirmation of the 
human condition” (Connoly 2012). The demands of contemporary life may then 
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require a conception of politics that emerges from the practices and forms of life that 
persist in spite of and alongside various experiences of alienation instead of a politics 
that promises a recovery from or overcoming of such experiences.  
 
The Feuerbach Problem 
 In order to make this case, I propose a reexamination of the humanist debates, 
and Louis Althusser’s contribution in particular, over the nature of the Marxist project, 
for some of the most trenchant insights and criticisms of the politics of alienation and 
recovery emerge from these debates. Unfortunately, these insights, including the 
recognition of the tendency of critical projects to return to the problematics of 
humanism and alienation, have been largely obscured by the ugliness of disciplinary 
debates that saw the rise of the intransigence of competing Marxist orthodoxies and of 
the structuralist/post-structuralist divide. So, to return to this terrain seems somewhat 
risky.24 But I think it is a risk worth taking.25 The contemporary condition bears some 
striking similarities to the social and political foment of the 1960’s, in which the stakes 
of humanism for Marxism and critical theory in general were vociferously contested. 
                                            
24 Indeed, the aftermath both of the disciplinary debates over the role of humanism for Marxist theory 
(and revolution) late 20th-century French Marxism and of the apparent failures of the 1968 uprisings left 
us seemingly no closer to ameliorating the repressive conditions of capitalist modernity and can still 
drag us back into a tangle of disciplinary battles that might seem better left behind. Thus, Jacques 
Ranicère suggests in answering the question of the turn to the human and humanitarianism, “It was 
obviously impossible to revive the Marxist critique” (2004: 298). In this chapter, however, I question this 
impossibility. 
25 There has been a slow return to Althusser since the late 1990’s, particularly as his later texts have 
been made available in English translation. This renewed interest can be seen in special issues devoted 
to a rereading of Althusser in Rethinking Marxism (Callari and Ruccio 1998) and borderlands (David 
McInerney 2005). This later writing of Althusser’s with its emphasis on Spinoza, on readings of figures in 
the history of political thought, and on a kind of aleatory materialism tends to be read as a “good” 
Althusser versus the “bad” early Althusser with its structuralist Marxism.  
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As in the late 60’s, the current climate is marked by frustration on the left with a 
decade of war and war crimes, tightened connections between state and capital, and 
the apparent inability of both protest and electoral politics to challenge these 
conditions effectively. Though the tropes of humanism always seem to maintain their 
appeal to various degrees, times like these intensify the drive to locate and recover a 
common human essence as a possible key to overcoming these conditions. But in so 
doing, these tropes threaten to result in the kind of reactive, and even passive, nihilism 
that I highlighted in the Introduction. 
 The point, then, is not to revive or relive these older disciplinary debates, but 
rather to show that the logic of alienation and recovery and its dangers still persist in 
the logic and practices of critical thought. Thus, Althusser's argument can cast critical 
light on these categories and what they mean for contemporary theory and life. For 
Althusser, humanism provides an ideological ideal of the human that does not take the 
particular conjuncture into consideration and instead operates under a liberal model of 
rationality as a move from darkness to light. He writes:  
The couple human/inhuman is the hidden principle of all humanism 
which is, then, no more than a way of living-sustaining-resolving this 
contradiction. Bourgeois humanism made man the principle of all 
theory. This luminous essence of man was the visible counterpart to a 
shadowy inhumanity…With this wish [to overcome terror, repression, 
and dogmatism] we move from the shade to the light, from the inhuman 
to the human...a world that can do without shadows or tragedies. (2005 
[1965]: 236-237)  
 
This is the world we still live in. Today’s focus on the vulnerability of humans is still a 
move from inhumanity to humanity, though it is now differently inflected. 
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Contemporary conceptions of the human no longer seek simply to overcome these 
conditions, but to fold the inhuman, the spectral, the unreal into what it means to be 
human. This may feel like a step in right direction, but it does not yet help us 
overcome the problematic of alienation and recovery. For it still remains too “simple”26 
to take this kind of position and make it into a claim like Agamben’s––one that sees the 
conditions of contemporary life as all already conscripted to the camp of biopoliticized 
life. As such, the possibilities for life and politics remain trapped within the boundaries 
of alienated inhumanity and the promise of a restored life. And, again, such a move 
elides the various ways that people seek to live in spite of and to work against these 
experiences of alienation. The recovery of a common sense of mortality, though, still 
provides powerful comfort insofar as we imagine that we can bring those in darkness 
into the light, even when the light has grown so dim as to illuminate only the barest 
common fact of life––mortality. 
 
Feuerbach’s Legacy 
 Certainly the whole of left critical thought cannot be reduced to a Marxist 
legacy, and there are plenty of theorists who may object to my attributing to the 
enterprise of critical theory the continued haunting of the “specters of Marx” (Derrida 
                                            
26 I intentionally use the word “simple” to invoke the spirit of Althusser’s essay “Is It Simple to Be a 
Marxist in Philosophy?” (1976 [1975]). In this essay, he argues for the difficulty of taking up a non-
traditional (i.e., humanist) Marxism in the milieu of 20th-century thought. Likewise, several of the other 
theorists that I draw on in this project work to contest the frame of what Deleuze calls the “everyone 
knows” that seems to drive critical thought toward the same taken-for-granted assumptions (Deleuze 
1994 [1968]: Chapter 3). See also Chapter 5 where I take up a discussion of Eve Sedgwick’s criticism of 
the paranoid mode of reading which she argues now dominates critical theory. 
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2006 [1994]). That said, my point is to highlight the degree to which dialectical 
approaches to critical thought continue to be informed by the Feuerbachian-early 
Marxian appropriation of the dynamics of alienation and recovery, an influence we 
can see in critical approaches to many challenges of contemporary life, including the 
experience of the inequalities of economic life, sexuality, gender, race, colonialism, 
and so on. As I discussed in the Introduction, Deleuze reads Stirner’s appropriation of 
the dialectic as that which took it to its nihilistic and egoistic end. However, it is 
Feuerbachian humanism that so heavily influenced the early Marx and that continues 
to exert such continued influence today.27 We see this in the identification of the 
Marxist project and much of critical thought in general with Marx’s early work, 
particularly the 1844 Manuscripts, where Marx lays out most strongly and 
compellingly his analysis of the alienating effects of capital. The predominance of this 
focus is evident not only in the logic of many critical projects, but also in the 
frequency of the appearance of 1844 Manuscripts on syllabi for courses in critical 
thought. That is, we tend to teach and read Marx through the lens of the 1844 
Manuscripts and the framework of alienation and recovery.28 Yet, this framework was 
exactly what was at stake in the humanism debates amongst Marxist scholars and 
communists parties in the early- to mid-twentieth centuries. And, as Althusser insists, 
Marx himself broke from this problematic by 1845.  
                                            
27 Marx, too, saw himself breaking not only from Feuerbach, but also Bruno Bauer, and Max Stirner––”a 
triumvirate of Marx’s own making,” as Terrell Carver puts it (1998: 214). 
28 Sam Chambers alerted me to the issue of how Marx is taught through his unpublished manuscript, 
“Society, Social Formations: Reading the 1857 Introduction.” 
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 To trace these logics and their continuing effects requires starting with 
Feuerbach’s own account of the alienation of religion (particularly Christianity) and the 
means for overcoming it. Feuerbach’s appropriation of the Hegelian logic of dialectics, 
particularly as a recovery of an alienated essence, provided Marx with an analogical 
base for his initial critique of capitalist labor. In his The Essence of Christianity 
Feuerbach develops a critique of Christianity that was highly regarded not only as a 
refutation of religion, but also as a refutation of Hegelian idealism in favor of a 
materialist application of Hegel’s dialectic. Feuerbach inverts the Hegelian logic. If, for 
Hegel, the dialectic of history is aimed at the recovery of Absolute Spirit through the 
realization of self-consciousness and -alienation through human history and action, for 
Feuerbach, alienation is not the product of the alienation of spirit/consciousness onto 
the objective world, but the result of the human projection of its own nature outward 
onto God/the divine (1957 [1881]). Feuerbach, then, argues that the very 
characteristics that Christianity/religion associates with God—Reason, Will, 
Affection—are, in fact, the proper nature of humans. These characteristics, moreover, 
are indeed perfections (as when they are attributed to God) that are constitutive of who 
and what we are (1957 [1881]: 3). The problem is that humans do not first recognize 
these characteristics in themselves, but instead discover them already projected 
outward onto God. For Feuerbach, this projection is made possible by bringing 
together the infinite nature of human consciousness with the human recognition of 
mortality, which makes humans long for a personal God as the source of their 
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attributes/perfections. The human, thus, “projects his being into objectivity, and then 
again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a 
subject” (1957 [1881]: 29-30). Religious humans alienate themselves from themselves 
by projecting their essential nature onto the divine as the perfect realization of that 
nature and then by subjecting themselves to that objectified being—God (1957 [1881]: 
31). For Feuerbach, then, humans become incapable of seeing within themselves the 
possibility of the perfection of the characteristics of Reason, Will, and Affection, and 
with these elements the realization of the species being of the human.  
 Importantly, Feuerbach’s criticism of religion and the problem of alienation 
takes the possibility of alienation as natural to the human, even if it is ultimately an 
obstacle to the realization of the species being. That is, following Hegel, Feuerbach 
argues that human consciousness (and, indeed, human being) is characterized by its 
ability to reflect on itself through a process of abstraction and objectification. As he 
writes, “Man is himself at once I and thou; he can put himself in the place of another, 
for this reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his 
individuality is an object of thought”29 (1957 [1881]: 2). On one hand, the human 
ability to objectify itself is for Feuerbach essential to the realization of the species-
being, because it allows humans to develop science as the study of the species, 
wherein our essential nature becomes an object of thought (1957 [1881]: 2). On the 
other hand, this ability can lead us astray: because humans are able to abstract from 
                                            
29 Thus, Feuerbach participates in the modern phenomena of the “creation” of the human as an object of 




the individual and see ourselves in the other (and because consciousness is infinite for 
Feuerbach), humans can also abstract from themselves to the thought of an infinite 
Other—God. Thus, the very characteristics of human consciousness that make it 
capable of overcoming alienation and of realizing its species being, also make such 
alienation possible in the first place. Overcoming alienation, then, requires the proper 
understanding and use of the characteristics and abilities of consciousness. The wish 
for immortality in cooperation with the infinite nature of consciousness drives the 
religious impulse, for to achieve the appropriate relation to consciousness and to the 
species being requires for Feuerbach the renunciation of the dream of immortality that 
accompanies the drive to religious objectification and, just as importantly, the 
acceptance of finitude.30 To overcome the alienation of religion, humans must accept 
the finitude of the individual for the sake of the realization of the species being.31  
 This logic of alienation and recovery through the reorientation to an essential 
element of human nature is repeated in the logic of the new “mortalist” humanism. 
Take, for example, Stephen White’s approach to the question of finitude. White’s 
argues that the dominant contemporary figure of the subject—the willful, autonomous 
liberal subject that he calls a “capacious” subject—is limited insofar as it does not 
adequately account for “our subjection to mortality” and the experience of finitude 
                                            
30 For Feuerbach, the realization of the species being of humans cannot be achieved by the individual, 
but only in the infinite succession of bodies that makes up the life of the species being of humanity. Joan 
Copjec criticizes Feuerbach’s move away from the individual from a Lacanian perspective—for Copjec’s 
Lacanian influenced politics, the individual and its desire remain the central focus. See Chapter 1 of 
Copjec’s Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (2002). 
31 Thus, Feuerbach, even as a left Hegelian, participates in a kind of Kantian framework of limits. For 
Kant consciousness is not, of course, unlimited, but the realization of freedom and moral perfection 
requires an acceptance of the limits of finitude. 
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(2009: 51). Under the influence of this image of the subject, “capacious” subjects tend, 
then, both to overestimate the capacities of reason/will and to fail to develop White’s 
cardinal virtues of “presumptive generosity” and “capacious dignity.”32 The inability or 
unwillingness of capacious subjects to accept the limitations on agency and the will––
as well as the limitations of natural systems and global capitalism––cause them to 
project an image of the human and the world that instead reflects perfected images of 
the traits that humans do possess, though in finite form. When this image of the 
capacious human is thwarted by the world of other people and things, people under 
the sway of this image are then prone to bouts of existential revenge, and even 
violence and exploitation. Thus, as for Feuerbach, the solution for White is acceptance 
of the condition of finitude, and the surrender of the dreams of a capacious subject; 
such acceptance makes it possible to develop the common characteristics of finite 
human subjects that for White are proper for the contemporary condition. As White 
explains, “In effect, we operatively forget one of the terms of our challenge: being 
consciously subject to death in a world without transcendent guarantees. To grapple 
adequately with this challenge, we need to embrace a response that is quietly and 
persistently effective in vivifying our sense of finitude” (2009: 67). So, as with 
Feuerbach, with White the very characteristic that most binds humans together—
                                            
32 White develops a concept of dignity that differs from the sort promoted by Michael Ignatieff’s concept 
of human dignity as a key component of human rights (see Ignatieff 2003). We could also add George 
Kateb as a contemporary liberal thinker who has continued to develop a vision of human dignity and a 
willful, capacious subject (Kateb 2011). Writing against this linking of dignity with agential capacity as 
part of vision of individuality, White argues, “Our capaciousness does indeed mean that we can master 
much in the world, but such projections always remain arrayed before a background of remaining 
inarticulacy. As capacious, we are always captive in this sense” (2009: 51). 
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finitude—can also become the trait that alienates humans from one another and from 
our own sense of mortality. For Feuerbach, the recognition of mortality can drive 
humans to locate the possibility of overcoming it in an image of the divine. With 
White, the willful subject seeks to avoid the acknowledgement of finitude by 
projecting a picture of human mastery. Whereas the willful capacious subject remains 
alienated in its avoidance of finitude and mortality, White’s ideal subject operates with 
a clear sense of mortality in order to become less alienated from the world and from 
others. Again, my criticism of this orientation is not motivated by an attempt to deny 
the fact of mortality; rather, my concern lies with the effects of this turn to finitude for 
the project of politics, which I will develop in the next section. The fact of mortality is 
one thing; the repeated invocation of this fact as political, theoretical, and rhetorical 
strategy is quite another. 
 Like the new humanists, and even Feuerbach and the early Marx, I recognize 
the fundamental and multiple conditions of alienation (including alienation from our 
own mortality and finitude) that mark human existence and experience. Alienation is, I 
contend, a key and even constitutive element of the human condition. The “Feuerbach 
problem,” as I am presenting it, is not the affirmation of alienation, when in fact we are 
not alienated. To take such a position would deny the constitutive fact of alienation. 
Instead, the problem is located in the construction of a dialectic of alienation and 
reappropriation whereby affirming the ontological fact of our alienation would serve to 
resolve that alienation, as if the only way to negotiate alienation would be to embrace 
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it. I am arguing, instead, that while we are alienated, the way to deal with our 
alienation is not simply to re-articulate and become more attuned to the fact of our 
various alienations, nor to presume that the answer to alienation will be found in its 
overcoming or in a recovery of the fully human, the unalienated human. I am trying to 
show that the fully human is the alienated human. A politics of the human must 
therefore work without a framework of recovery from alienation, yet without giving up 
on the possibility or hope that these conditions of alieanation might be ameliorated by 
changing social and political conditions. As such, a politics of the human must often 
look to the limits of the conditions of alienation––where death is more imminent, 
where the distance is greater between labor and its profits, where bodies and practices 
fall far from norms of recognition, where failure is far more real than success––not in 
order to find the “truth” of the human condition and the indomintable “human spirit” 
nor to confirm the abuses of state, capital, and heteronorms, but instead to find there 
the possibilities of life and action in spite of, and against, the force of all of these 
alienations and abuses.  
 
Breaking with Feuerbach 
 If my analysis were to end with the comparison to Feuerbach, it would provide 
only an interesting point of comparison/analysis for the new humanist turn to finitude 
and the project of alienation and recovery. However, the Feuerbach legacy is not just a 
part the intellectual history of critical thought that has been left behind. Instead, it 
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remains deeply embedded in the logic of critical thought as inherited through the 
Marxian tradition. Many “new humanists” and critical theorists may, of course, insist 
that they have nothing to do with the Marxist tradition. Be that as it may, my point in 
making this connection is to show that regardless of one’s direct connection to the 
Marxist tradition, the dialectic of alienation and recovery that was “naturalized,” so to 
speak, through Marx’s appropriation in his early work of Feuerbach remains a 
dominant paradigm for contemporary thought and analyses of life and politics in late 
state capitalism. Feuerbach’s inversion of the Hegelian dialectic as a move toward a 
certain materialism inspired and enabled Marx to make his famous argument 
concerning the alienating effects of capitalism, an argument that would become one of 
the most compelling and enduring criticisms of capitalism in the Marxist tradition, 
particularly in the late 20th-century.33 For Marx, Feuerbach’s critique of religion was 
revolutionary for the Hegelian project because it provided a material frame for 
dialectics and for the analysis of alienation. The young Marx took up the Feuerbachian 
framework as a material version of the Hegelian dialectic, one that could be put to 
work to describe the alienating character of capitalist mode of production: humans are 
                                            
33 In his work on the reception of Marx and the development of the Marxian tradition, Terrell Carver has 
worked to show how many of the key texts attributed to Marx were actually constructions from his 
notebooks, as in the case of the “1844 Manuscripts,” or from Engels’ attempt to establish a kind of 
orthodox reading of Marx, as the in case of The German Ideology (see Carver 2010 and Carver 2011). 
The implication of Carver’s textual analysis of the “1844 Manuscripts,” while tremendously important 
for how scholars might reexamine the reception of Marx, does little to affect the point of my argument 
(and Althusser’s argument) here. For Althusser, like his contemporaries, at the time had no way of 
knowing that the “1844 Manuscripts” were largely a construction. Further, Althusser’s point about how 
to read Marx holds insofar as one accepts that Althusser recognized that the humanist, Feuerbachian 
orientation of the “1844 Manuscripts” were methodologically and politically distinguishable from 
Marx’s later work. 
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alienated from their labor, other humans, and their species being through the 
alienating effects of commodification (1978a [1844]). In the debates over the stakes 
and legacy of Marxism of the 20th-century, this reading of Feuerbach becomes the 
touchstone for the explication of a humanist Marxism. 
 For the early Marx, the Feuerbachian criticism of the idealism of Hegel and his 
reappropriation of the dialectic of alienation and recovery provided a framework both 
for describing the existential experience of alienation under capitalism and, just as 
importantly, for explaining the deficiencies of theories of political economy. The 1844 
Manuscripts are just as a much a refutation of the method of political economists as 
they are an analysis of the alienating effects of capitalism. The Feuerbachian 
framework provides Marx a way of grounding Hegelianism as well as a basis for 
criticizing the problems of political economy––in particular, their abstractions and lack 
of historical sense (cf. 1978 [1884]: 70-71). For Marx, just as the Hegelian dialectic 
(particularly when imbued with a theological character) remains abstracted from the 
material conditions of existence, so too the methods of political economy are 
abstracted from the material conditions of capital: “Political economy proceeds from 
the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, 
abstract formulae the material process through which private property actually passes, 
and these formulae it then takes for laws (1978 [1884]: 70, emphasis in original). In 
order to return to the “actual economic fact” (rather than to the abstract), Marx turns to 
the Feuerbachian framework of the dialectic as a device for explaining the worker’s 
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alienation from his labor and all of the attendant effects of that alienation.34 Marx 
makes this argument by precisely repeating Feuerbach’s criticism of religion: “It is 
clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien objective 
world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he himself––his 
inner world––becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. 
The more man puts his life into God, the less he retains in himself” (1978 [1884]: 72). 
 In response to both the abstractions of political economy and to the existential 
alienation of the worker under capitalism, Marx employs the prime tool of dialectical 
critique, namely, critical unmasking (or demystification).35 As for political economy, he 
argues that by abstracting from the “direct relationship between the worker (labour) 
and production” political economy “concels the estrangement inherent in the nature of 
labour” (1978 [1884]: 73). Marx, then, sees his intervention into political economy 
here as an initial attempt to uncover this condition of estrangement (much like the new 
humanists seek to uncover the fact of vulnerability and finitude supposedly hidden 
under the image of the willful subject or behind state practices) in order that these 
conditions might be overcome. Thus, Marx finds in the idea of communism the 
overcoming both of private property and of alienation:  
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, or human 
self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human 
essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of 
                                            
34 I use the masculine pronoun here to capture Marx’s language concerning the worker. In the 
contemporary context, I would refer to the worker as she or he. 
35 These practices of unmasking and demystification have taken heavy criticism in recent critical work, 
and I take up this discussion in Chapter 5. See also Bruno Latour (2004), Eve Sedgwick (2003), Jane 
Bennett (2010), Jacques Rancière (2010), and Samuel Chambers (2013). 
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man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being...This communism, as 
fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed 
humanism equals naturalism; its is the genuine resolution of the conflict 
between man and nature and between man and man. (1978 [1884]: 82)  
 
On one hand, this statement is a remarkable completion of the (Feuerbachian) 
dialectic of alienation and reappropriation in which alienation is finally overcome and 
the the human is restored to itself through the material conditions of social and natural 
life. On the other, we can see here the kernel of what will lead Marx to break with 
Feuerbach, i.e., his focus on the social and material conditions of existence, which will 
eventually lead him away from what he ultimately sees as the idealism of the 
Feuerbachian dialectic as well. 
 Ultimately, Marx moves away from Feuerbach because he comes to see in 
Feuerbach the same kind of abstraction that he originally located in the political 
economists. Thus, in the “Theses on Feuerbach” Marx crticizes the “theoretical 
attitude” of Feuerbach's approach, which he argues abstracts from the social and 
material nature of human life, in the same way that political economy begins with the 
abstract concept of private property. And though Marx continues to accept 
Feuerbach's critique of religion, he finds the same primary problem in Feuerbach that 
he identifies in other materialisms: they begin in the abstract realm of 
consciousness/contemplation of objects and not in the practical world of “sensuous 
human activity” (2000b [1885]: 171). Marx argues that by beginning with “the fact of 
religious self-alienation” Feuerbach creates a false split between two worlds, “a 
religious world and a secular one,” which then must be resolved by the recovery of the 
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secular from the religious (2000b [1885]: 172). But Marx now sees in Feuerbach’s 
analysis an approach that mirrors the problems of political economy, which overlooks 
the social relations that are constitutive of the terms of analysis in the first place. That 
is, Marx argues that Feuerbach’s reading of religion and alienation requires him to 
posit the human essence as “an abstraction inherent in each single individual,” which 
in turn leads him to read the human essence “only as a ‘genus’, as an internal, dumb 
generality which naturally unites the many individuals” (2000b [1885]: 172). For 
Marx, this abstraction causes Feuerbach to miss the fact that both the 'religious 
sentiment' and the abstract individual engaged in such a sentiment are social products 
(2000b [1845]: 173). So long as this fact is overlooked, alienation remains, for we 
continue to be separated from our true essence, which is not individuals in relation to 
civil society, but “social humanity” (2000b [1845]: 173). Marx now emphasizes that 
the human essence, as well as the concepts we use to investigate and explain the 
human, are from the beginning products of the “ensemble of social relations” (2000b 
[1845]: 172). 
 Thus, resolving the problems of an abstract versus concrete account of the 
human and its relation to social life is crucial for Marx’s project because it determines 
how we might account for and overcome the alienating affects of religion, the state, 
capital, and private property. For example, in “The King of Prussia”––which as a text 
written in 1844 technically comes before the break with Feuerbach, already begins, I 
argue, to show Marx’s growing unease with the Feuerbachian project––Marx argues 
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against a strong notion of the will as a driver of political change/revolution, which 
contradicts Feuerbach’s notion of the will as an central aspect of the human essence 
and its ability to overcome the alienating effects of religion. Marx’s central argument in 
this text is that the state cannot effectively overcome social problems both because it 
remains too deeply bound up in the perpetuation of these problems themselves and 
because the notion of state invention depends upon an abtract notion of the state and 
civil society and of the human will. In order to make this argument, Marx points to two 
central problems with the notion that the state can solve social problems. First, such a 
view depends on a notion of “political intelligence” that is seen as a necessary 
precursor to effective political intervention into society, which would be carried out 
primarily through “administrative acts” (2000a [1885]: 134). Marx correlates the 
strength of the state with the degree of political intelligence––that is, of thinking “inside 
the limits of politics”––present within a state apparatus. “The principle of politics,” as 
he writes, “is the will.” Greater political intelligence, thus, correlates with a belief “in 
the omnipotence of the will” (2000a [1884]: 135). For Marx, this belief overlooks “the 
natural and intellectual limits of the will” and, thereby, misses the “sources of social 
evils” (2000a [1884]: 135).  
 The idea, then, of political intelligence props up a strong notion of the will that 
actually leads us away from social problems because it both begins with the abstract, 
not the concrete, individual and fails to see the socially constructed nature of the will. 
That is, contra Feuerbach’s vision of the perfection of the will, Marx reads the will as 
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necessarily produced and limited by material (social and economic) constraints. 
Second, Marx argues that the idea of the state itself is an abstracted whole developed 
from the ideal of a common human essence. Thus, an understanding of the state or any 
concept of the human must always begin not with the abstract whole, but with the 
single, concrete, real individual (and not the realm of “civil society”). This logic of the 
state and its relation to the will, then, reflects Feuerbach's critique of religion and 
Marx's response to it. Like the state, humans under the influence of the religious 
sentiment fail to see the source of the condition in which they find themselves within 
themselves and instead project it outward. Yet, whereas Feuerbach's response is to 
abolish God and turn to faith in the infinite consciousness of the human capable of 
contemplating the species being, Marx acknowledges the socially- and historically-
constructed nature of the individual and its will and seeks to locate the solution to the 
alienations of the state and capital in the realization of the social nature of humans. 
Feuerbach's “solution” for alienation remains bound up in the logic that also makes 
possible the separate concepts of the state and civil society possible, for both remain 
an “abstract whole,” separated from the social relations constitutive of the single, 
concrete individual.36  
                                            
36 It strikes me as a bit odd that Marx, in his criticism of Feuerbach, cites Feuerbach’s division of 
individual consciousness and civil society, while he too turns to a kind a dualism between the 
consciousness of humans and the material conditions of their life. For though Marx seems right to draw 
limits upon the human will that Feuerbach does not embrace, placing the “definite relations” of 
economic relations independent of human will seems to undermine our ability to play any active role in 
the overcoming of alienation in the first place. What is compelling for me about both of their projects 
(on this short reading) is that both of them seek to criticize a current view of human nature in order to 
enact a positive program for overcoming it. But we find in Feuerbach an overconfidence in the power of 
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 Again, Marx’s critique of the Feuerbach problem applies to the new humanism 
as articulated in a project like White’s today. That is, the condition of finitude in which 
White grounds his ethical approach to politics itself remains abstracted from the 
concrete conditions that give rise to the experience of finitude in the first place. As 
scholars across disciplines have pointed out, the exposure to and experience of 
mortality remain unequally distributed across geographical, racial, class, gender, and 
sexual lines. Finitude is, indeed, a fundamental fact of life, but it is, likewise, a 
socially- and historically-mediated one.37 White’s recognition of finitude and mortality 
remains an ethical preparation for politics, instead of the engagement in the practice of 
politics itself.38 Indeed, this ethical orientation can be read as an abstraction from the 
concrete engagement with politics. As such, White places too much faith in this ethical 
orientation toward the universal fact of finitude as adequate to the project of 
ameliorating conditions of existential revenge and exploitation in political and social 
life. As Jason Frank suggests, “The ‘tempered agonism’ that White advocates is settled 
within the assumed space of an updated humanism…rather than being pulled in the 
direction of political contests over the meaning of that very designation” (2010: 671). 
A politics of the human, as I am developing here, requires resisting the move to deal 
with our conditions of alienation through the turn to an abstracted essence of human 
                                                                                                                                       
human consciousness to direct itself toward its best ends and in Marx an overconfidence in the power of 
material relations to drive social change. 
37 Thus, Honig can write in a spirit that parallels Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach, “In other words, the 
vivification White recommends may be a product, rather than a precondition, of political engagement” 
(2010b: 425). 
38 Judith Butler’s approach to the problem of vulnerability comes much closer to capturing this social 




life. It may also require, as I will suggest through a brief turn to Althusser, resisting 
(more than Marx) the drive to overcome alienation in the first place, for such an 
overcoming appears more and more to be itself an abstraction from the contestations 
of politics and of the struggles of life. Existence itself is marked by ineliminable 
experiences of alienation that are socially and historically mediated. If “the human” is 
to remain anything but an abstraction, then we must look to concrete expressions of 
and claims to be human in order to see what the human might be and what it might 
become. 
 
Althusser’s “anti-humanism” and the critique of liberalism 
 Through a return to Marx’s debt to and break from Feuerbach I have begun to 
show how the Feuerbach problem manifests itself in the contemporary new humanism. 
Turning now to Althusser’s analysis of (and insistence upon the importance of) this 
break extends my argument to the problems of the dialectic of alienation and recovery 
in contemporary politics. In turning to these “anti-humanist” arguments, however, it is 
important to note that Althusser certainly never gave up a concern for human 
individuals in the struggle against alienation and repression. Althusser never disavows 
a concern for the conditions of human lives, he only rejects the foregrounding of the 
individual subject in such a way that it obscures other objects of study—in particular, 
the conditions of subjectivity and alienation/repression/domination themselves.39 Thus, 
                                            
39 Steven B. Smith offers this typical misreading of the anti-humanist tone of Althusser’s early work. 
Smith argues that Althusser’s structuralism completely abolishes the individual subject, and along with it 
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he eschews the humanist drive to overcome these forces (carried out by a return to a 
common human essence) in favor of a less abstracted account of these conditions. 
Indeed, Althusser finds in Marx the impetus for “a task for creating a new philosophy 
that does not unify under an oppressive ideological unity,” but instead creates 
“ideological conditions for the liberation and free development of social practices” 
(1990 [1976]: 265).  
 The key distinction here is that the anti-humanist approach investigates 
“structural” elements of social, discursive, and economic formations in order to 
understand their functioning and illuminate that which might escape them. In other 
words, “anti-humanists” like Althusser investigate these conditions not to provide a 
totalizing view of the subject and its conditions, but to point to ways that the human 
subject can exist alongside and perhaps in opposition to these conditions. Yet, in so 
doing, they still recognize that the various forms of human life are through and through 
products of their conditions and that these forms of life will always be conditioned by 
various limits to human life, including the materiality of economic orders, social 
norms, ideologies, and limits to the life of the human body in general.40 Therefore, 
Althusser and other anti-humanists offer no promise of escape from all conditions of 
                                                                                                                                       
agency, autonomy, etc. Further, Smith argues that this anti-humanism that was characteristic of a strain 
of French thought in the late 20th-century was a product of the influence of Nietzsche. That Smith’s 
reading depends on what I see as a flawed reading of Nietzsche is evident in my reading of Nietzsche 
and Deleuze in the Introduction. See Smith (1984). 
40 I admit that one need not take an “anti-humanist” position in order to affirm a conditioned and finite 
image of the human. In fact, the phrase “anti-humanism” now appears inapt for both theory and politics. 
I take up this language more as a artifact of late 20th-century theory. Insofar as I employ an anti-
humanist reading here through Althusser, I see it as a theoretical tool, and not a political project of 
giving up on individual human beings. 
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power, exploitation, or alienation.41 To that end, Althusser criticized what he called 
the “theoretical humanism” of Marxist theorists who argued for the primacy of the 
theme of alienation and the humanist Feuerbachican framework for understanding 
Marx’s work and the possibilities for overcoming capitalism.  
 Against this position, Althusser advanced a “theoretical anti-humanism” that 
was predicated on a reading of Marx that insisted upon an epistemological break 
between Marx’s early work, which Althusser reads as primarily humanist and 
ideological, and Marx’s later work, in which according to Althusser, Marx develops a 
proper science of the study of capital. Though it is beyond the scope of this project to 
explicate the science/ideology distinction, it does seem necessary to note that in the 
context of the disciplinary and political battles over Marx and his legacy in the French 
Communist Party, Althusser’s reading of Marx does appear as an attempt to establish a 
new Marxist orthodoxy. Indeed, the structural elements of Althusser’s thought may be 
overplayed at times, even by Althusser himself and certainly by the strain of 
Althusserian Marxism that developed in the 1970‘s. However, his “anti-humanist” 
reading of Marx is never carried out for the sake of giving up on the individual and the 
possibilities for a more liberated experience of life. Thus, whatever the problems and 
dogmatism of Althusser’s structuralism and science/ideology distinction, the underlying 
argument remains important insofar as it is a political, and not just epistemological, 
                                            
41 Interestingly, Butler criticizes Althusser in her Psychic Life of Power for providing no “enlightened 
escape from ideology” (1997:110). Though she generally takes a Foucaultian line in reading the 
conditions of subjectivity as always conditioned by lines of power, she likewise continually posits a 
longing for a state of subjectivity beyond these conditions. I will take up these issues again in Chapter 3. 
 
53 
problem. That is, for Althusser, if Marx had remained a Feuerbachian humanist, then 
his work would remain caught up in the “ideology”42 of the individual, autonomous 
human, a position that Marx himself sought to overcome in his break from Feuerbach. 
Althusser insists, then, on Marx’s break from Feuerbach as necessary for the Marxian 
project to overcome the abstractions of the humanist mode and to address the concrete 
contemporary conjuncture. As Althusser claims, “Marx’s anti-humanism comes from a 
refusal of an originating subject in favor of production relations, class struggle, and 
ideological relations” (1976 [1975]: 206).  
 Thus, Althusser’s commitment to an anti-humanism position is both 
methodological and political. Politically, he was concerned that the humanist reading 
of Marx that develops out of the 1844 Manuscripts leads to a traditionally liberal (or 
bourgeious) model of the subject in which the subject could be restored to the 
conditions of autonomous self-determination if and when the alienating conditions of 
capitalism were removed (as with Feuerbach’s vision of overcoming the alienating 
effects of religion). For Althusser, this reading of the alienations of capitalism remains 
too focused on the isolated individual. He cites Marx’s Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach to 
highlight Marx’s own break from this position: “The essence of Man is no abstraction 
inherent in the isolated individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations” 
(Althusser 2003 [1967]: 253, emphasis in original). For Althusser, the analysis of 
                                            
42 To use the term “ideology” here in reference to Althusser’s work is tricky. While he argues for a break 
between ideology and science in Marx’s work, in his ISA’s essay, Althusser develops a much more 
complex notion of ideology that functions itself as an ineliminable fact through which human 
experience is mediated.  
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capitalism cannot be a question of the individual, but of a theory of society (2003 
[1967]: 254). Thus, Athusser reads Marx as an anti-humanist in the sense that Marx’s 
analysis “begins not with man, but with a given economy (infrastructure), which is a 
relation (1976 [1975]: 199-200).43 Therefore, methodologically, Althusser argued that 
the significance of Marx’s work is that it begins to explain economic and social 
conditions not from the capacities of the human subject, but from precisely the 
reverse: a study of economic and social conditions will make possible an 
understanding of the human subject.  
 Althusser’s notion of the primacy of the economic in the last instance marks an 
attempt to determine the possibilities of life and the capacities of the human based 
upon the “structure” that produces and conditions it. To put things another way, the 
point for Althusser was to get to a theory of a process of capitalism and its subjects 
without a central, intentional subject driving it. Thus, Althusser’s criticism of humanist 
socialism is not that there is a concept of freedom from economic exploitation, but that 
the project focused on individual development and the idea of the human “becoming 
by himself what he is” (2005 [1965]: 238). The problem then is not with the goals but 
with conceptualization. In the terms of the debate as I am highlighting them here, we 
can see that just as Marx pointed out in “The King of Prussia” the insufficiency of 
solving problems of the state through the accumulation of political intelligence, for 
                                            
43 Althusser’s use of the word “economy” is tricky, too, but for a different set of reasons. As Timothy 
Mitchell has recently argued, “the economy is a recent product of socio- technical practice, including 
the practice of academic economics. Previously, the term “economy” referred to ways of managing 
resources and exercising power. In the mid-twentieth century, it became an object of power and 
knowledge” (2008: 2). 
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Althusser a socialism that begins with a given human subject and its essence is 
insufficient because it misses the socially and historically conditioned nature of that 
essence. For Althusser, the highlighting of this historically, economically, and socially 
conditioned nature is the significance of Marx’s break — a shift from the essence of 
man and a recovery from alienation to a focus on the social as the conditions for 
understanding the “essence” of man in the first place. Thus, the subject and its 
consciousness come to be seen as products of the “ideological” conditions of the 
social and economic whole.  
 In many ways, this argument could be read as a version of a standard social 
constructivist account of the (human) subject. But my return to Althusser and the 
Feuerbach problem is not done in the name of simple, so-called constructivism. 
Instead, my point here in elaborating this aspect of Althusser’s reading of Marx is show 
that Althusser makes it possible to see how the Feuerbach problem of alienation and 
recovery continues to haunt the contemporary ethical turn. For Althusser, so long as 
Marx remained within the Feuerbachian framework of alienation, then the problems of 
State capitalism could be characterized in a series of (primarily bourgeois) 
dichotomies—species being v. alienated man, reason v. unreason, commune v. State, 
freedom v. unfreedom, human v. inhuman—that could be resolved through recovery 
of the latter to the former (Althusser 2005 [1965]: 225-226). Further, Althusser argues 
that the appearance of these contradictions gives the (false) appearance that they are 
now ready to remedied: “Feuerbach’s humanism made it possible to think just this 
 
56 
contradiction by showing in unreason the alienation of reason, and in this alienation 
the history of man, that is, his realization” (2005 [1965]: 225).44 Thus, for Althusser the 
political task and the ideology of the human that emerges from the Feuerbachian 
analysis cannot escape the dilemmas of bourgeois liberalism that it attempts to 
evade.45 Under this rubric, the task of politics becomes the act of recovery instead of 
the critique of a given social order. As Althusser writes, “This new theory of man is the 
basis for a new type of political action: the politics of practical 
reappropriation…Politics is no longer simply theoretical criticism…but man’s practical 
reappropriation of his essence” (2005 [1965]: 226). As a practical activity, this 
humanist politics seems to be the kind of politics that Marx appears to advocate in his 
Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point is to change it” (2000b [1885]: 173). But as Althusser argues 
(and Marx realized) to remain focused on a human essence in this drive to change the 
world represents “a will…a hope or nostalgia, rather than describing a reality” (2005 
[1965]: 233).46 As such, this project would remain primarily an attempt to restore or to 
actualize a predetermined concept of the human essence and the political community 
                                            
44 Further, for Althusser following Marx in “The German Ideology,” this turn to human nature carries 
with it a “concealed” value judgment: “the couple human/inhuman” (2001[1969]: 236). And as Marx 
writes, “The ‘inhuman’ as much as the ‘human’ is a product of present conditions; it is their negative 
side” (in Althusser 2001[1969]: 237). 
45 Althusser goes so far as to write, “All humanists are liberals” (2003 [1967]: 223). The rhetoric of this 
statement is obviously over the top, but it makes a striking point. Althusser sees no way to develop a 
politics sufficient for taking on the problems of capitalism through the project of a liberal humanism.  
46 We can see here a resonance with the Lacanian critique of fantasy. Althusser, though never a proper 
Lacanian himself, was significantly influenced by Lacan, particularly in the development of the notion of 
interpellation (see Montag 2013: Chapter 7). For Althusser, all political projects that are rooted primarily 
in ideological frameworks are at risk of this attachment to hope or nostalgia. This reading of ideology 
becomes more problematic in light of Althusser’s later work on ideology in which he argues that there is 
never any escape from ideology. 
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proper to it. Althusser insists on the shift from ideology to science in Marx’s break with 
Feuerbach as a break with the political and epistemological problems of the liberal 
ideology of humanism and its logic of alienation and recovery. Only with this break, 
Althusser insists, can the Marxist project come to produce a theory of the social whole 
sufficient for overcoming the repressive aspects of capitalism and bourgeois liberalism. 
 To return to White’s project, we can see that it remains bound up with a similar 
problematic as that which Marx battled with the bourgeois liberal subject, even as 
White attempts to overcome it. In fact, White returns to both Locke and Hobbes in 
order to chasten the contemporary willful liberal subject, which he argues has lost 
sight of the importance of a recognition of mortality. White argues that both Locke’s 
and Hobbes’s theories employ the fact of mortality as a “range value…which provides 
restraints or a disposition that connects one human to another” (2011: 65). But in 
turning to these classical state of nature theorists, White has to pull off a difficult feat: 
affirm their recognition of shared human finitude without being captured by their 
ideologies which lead to the very model of citizens and subjects that White wishes to 
avoid. White’s argument trades on the assumption that the contemporary liberal 
subject (particularly the non-theist) is not attuned to, and in fact actively avoids, the 
figure of mortality. In fact, White argues that “orienting the ontological figure of human 
being more around its subjection to mortality is likely to be perceived by nontheistic 
liberals as a deeply threatening gesture” (2011: 64-65). Underlying this claim is the 
presumption that a certain kind of secular liberal subject has turned away from the 
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problem of mortality primarily because of the association of the mortality with the 
vision of the suffering sinner in religious practice (cf. 2011: 64). The first problem with 
such a framework is that it leaves one wondering who exactly these liberals are who 
have turned away from mortality because of the problems of religion. This claim in 
itself seems to be precisely the kind of abstraction that both Marx and Althusser 
warned about in their diagnosis of the Feuerbach problem. Second, and more 
importantly, the abstraction required to make this case calls into question the 
possibility of grounding politics and ethics in a common human experience without 
falling into the traps of the state of nature stories in the first place.47 
 White, then, attempts to draw out of both Locke’s and Hobbes’s states of nature 
an attention to mortality without the aftereffects of a move toward a willful, sovereign 
subject. For example, White takes the Hobbesian state of nature to be an important 
reminder of mortality, one that can be refigured “not as a violent death which we can 
equally threaten each other but rather simply as the death to which we are all 
inescapably subject” (2011: 64). Thus, Hobbes’s war of all against all becomes an 
ethical field for recognition of our common mortality. White does, however, 
acknowledge that Locke’s portrayal of our finitude may provide a better basis for this 
ethical development. As he suggests, “Without a range value like Locke’s which 
provides restraints or a disposition that connects one human to another, the default 
disposition of the claiming, capacious agent is one that orients it to the world as a 
                                            
47 Here Marx’s criticism of the “Robinson Crusoe” individual of liberal politics and political economy 
seems apt. See, in particular, Marx’s “‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse” (2008 [1857]). 
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material to be managed or guarded against” (2011: 65). White, we see, wants us to 
dwell longer with the ontology and experience of mortality in order to get a greater 
sense of our non-sovereignty and to develop an attitude of gratitude and dignity. But 
White’s attempt to rescue this ethical impulse from these state of nature stories simply 
does not work. First, White’s account abstracts from already abstract stories in order to 
find morality tales in these rhetorical devices that were originally written not to chasten 
us, but to justify private property and colonialism (Locke) and authoritarian rule 
(Hobbes). Further, in order to transform the classical state of nature story into a field for 
ethical development, White must leave out their violence, whose ever-present threat 
drives the recognition of mortality in these stories in the first place. For if the reality of 
violence is to be admitted––that is, if such a theory were to be concrete, rather than 
abstract––then it would have to recognize, again, that the vulnerability to violence and 
painful death is socially mediated and unequally distributed.  
 It is not that White does not recognize this problem. In fact, he attempts to 
distinguish his focus on mortality as a universal condition from a focus on 
vulnerability, which he sees as more open to the criticism of unequal distribution 
(2011: 69-71). Ultimately, White tries to escape the perils of what I am calling the 
Feuerbach problem here by eschewing the claim that mortality may have a common 
essence for all humans: “There is no plausible way to deny this cultural and historical 
variability in the meaning of death. But the force of my argument does not actually 
depend on such a denial. I am not contending that mortality has a single, universal 
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significance for all places and times. All I want to assert is that a vivified consciousness 
of mortality in late-modern Western democracies can have the sort of effect on ethical 
awareness that I have sketched” (2011: 72). By the time he has reached this last line, 
White has reduced the question of mortality down to a thin abstraction that seem ill-
equipped to take on the realities of these late modern social formations. 
 In order to fend off the charge of abstraction and to avoid the problematic of 
alienation and recovery White has to reduce the weight of his assertions to a thin 
concept of mortality that promotes a greater ethical awareness. Moreover, a project 
like White’s faces two more important challenges. First, just as Leo Bersani criticizes 
the assumption that a shared sexual orientation will somehow unite people around a 
common progressive politics, we might ask whether a common recognition of 
mortality would motivate such ethical responsiveness. Second, and relatedly, it is an 
open question whether contemporary liberals actually neglect the problem of mortality 
in their response to politics and their experiences of subjectivity. In returning to the 
state of nature stories, White reminds us that the threat of violence and death has 
always been at the root of liberal politics. Indeed, in his own recognition that “the 
default disposition of the claiming, capacious agent is one that orients it to the world 
as a material to be managed or guarded against,” White is acknowledging that the 
threat of mortality can just as easily lead us to guard against the world of others, rather 
than engage it generously. White calls upon Locke’s “range value” as a check against 
this possibility, but in so doing he deviates from Locke’s own story in which we elect a 
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common judge to manage the perils of life together and to help us guard against the 
premature realization of mortality.  Take the recent gun debates in the U.S., for 
example. One could read the fight against gun control and the insistence on the right 
to bear (any and all) arms as one expression of existential resentment against perceived 
threats to individual sovereignty. It might be. But it is also a clear response to the 
realization of human mortality and an attempt to deal with that fact. In the NRA’s 
rhetoric the gun becomes the figure of a new common judge: if everyone had one, 
then we would all be safe from one another. A similar argument can be made about 
the war on terrorism and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as responses to 9/11 
and the reality of terrorism. Here the ideology of democracy becomes the element that 
promises to protect us from one another – and especially from “Others.” In challenging 
White here, I am trying to show that the drive to a common orientation or essence for 
politics, even one of a shared fact of life leads just as easily to the opposite of White’s 
hopes, and that it too readily repeats the humanist problematic of alienation and 
recovery. 
 
Alienation without Recovery 
 From the “humanist controversy”48 of twentieth-century Marxism, Althusser 
offered a rather stark solution to this enduring problem of humanism: “The absolute 
(negative) precondition of the (positive) knowledge of the human world itself, and of its 
                                            
48 See Althusser’s The Humanist Controversy, which has been recently translated and published in the 
United States (2003[1967]).  
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practical transformation. It is impossible to know anything about men except on the 
absolute precondition that the philosophical (theoretical) myth of man is reduced to 
ashes” (2005 1965: 229). Althusser was not alone in this conclusion. Foucault, 
likewise, called for a destruction of the “anthropological frame” as the only way for us 
to overcome the the problems of the modern humanism49 (1994 [1970]: 342). The 
trouble with these responses is that they remain primarily at the level of epistemology. 
Though I have largely followed Althusser’s criticism of the Feuerbach problem, I do 
take some distance from his proposed “solution” through the focus on the 
epistemological break in Marx. In the same way that we find in Feuerbach (and the 
early Marx) an overconfidence in the power of the human to overcome alienation and 
to direct itself toward its best ends, we find in Althusser an overconfidence in the 
scientific break from ideology to provide an escape from the framework of humanism 
and alienation. As I indicated earlier, Althusser’s insistence on “the break” tends to 
become its own form of dogmatism – a dogmatism of the same sort that Althusser 
attempts to displace with his criticism of humanist Marxism.50 The power of Althusser’s 
critique lies not only in its diagnosis of the political and methodological problems of a 
humanist critique, but also in its recognition of the lure of the humanist position. That 
is, the humanist theme provides a powerful, and often, compelling account of a shared 
                                            
49 Importantly, Foucault sees the focus on finitude as a contributor to this humanist frame, rather than as 
a cure for it. Foucault discusses this point in “Man and his Doubles” in The Order of Things (1994 
[1970]). 
50 I tend to be somewhat generous to Althusser on this point, however, because insistence on this break 
carried for him a particular import in the political battles of the French Communist Party and the 
direction of anti-capitalist critique. Further, being a generation or more removed from the battles over 
structuralism perhaps allows me to return to these texts in a different light from their context in the 
disciplinary battles of the 1960’s-70’s. 
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human condition, a commonality which promises to drive progressive political 
attitudes and projects.  
 Responding to the problems of alienation, then, requires an acknowledgment 
that forms of alienation are multiple, and they are historically and socially produced 
and mediated. To turn to any one point of reference—even the undeniable fact of 
mortality—puts us on the path of a politics of recovery or reappropriation. Here 
Connolly’s advice to attempt to transfigure some forms of alienation seems apt. But to 
fully come to terms with “the Feuerbach problem” it is also important to acknowledge 
that some forms of alienation may resist transfiguration. That is, the conditions of late 
modern life require us to be attentive to forms of life that persist (and perhaps even 
thrive) in spite of often intransigent forms of alienation. Such a position is difficult to 
embrace, since the traditions of both liberal political thought and “humanist” critical 
theory have promised liberation from alienation as the end game of politics. 
Liberalism, it appears, will always want to solve the problem of alienation. The non-
liberal response that I have tried to develop here refuses to give a solution, but rather 
to think alienation otherwise. Honig, in her own diagnosis of and response to the new 
mortalist humanism, presents an alternative to the focus on mortality and to the 
possible liberation from alienation that moves in the direction of giving up on answer 
to it. Drawing on Rancière, she calls for an agonistic humanism that might activate 
both the agonistic and receptive aspects of political life, or in her words, one that 
“works the intervals...between word and cry, natality and mortality, equality and 
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singularity, and between human and animal” (2010: 22). To work the intervals is to 
remain alienated in various ways and to varying degrees, which is where we are most 
of the time anyway. It is to remain unmoored to one aspect or another of human life as 
central for political and ethical life. There are certainly times when various aspects of 
personal, political, and ethical life solidify on one side of an interval or the other. And, 
as the persistence of the Feuerbach problem suggests, there may always be a tendency 
to find in such moments either a common human essence or our alienation from it. 
The task that Marx and Althusser set before critical thought, though, is to resist this 
tendency in order to explore the multiplicity of lines that unite or divide us in any 


























The Politics of Mattering 
 
 The language of the human and of dehumanization has become in recent years 
the dominant frame for accounting for and criticizing a wide range of abuses and 
social harms: from indefinite detention to the torture of “enemy combatants” to the 
indiscriminate use of drone attacks. Judith Butler’s recent work on the concept of 
“grievability” has contributed to this discussion by providing both an important 
analysis of the conditions that we call “human,” and the promise of an ethical 
grounding for politics. As with the work of other theorists associated with the “new 
humanist” focus on finitude, Butler’s “ethical turn” toward the precariousness, 
vulnerability, and grievability of life has been simultaneously praised for its 
perspicacity as an analysis of current state practices and condemned for depoliticizing 
these conflicts in favor of the assertion of a common ground for ethical action.51 
Though I generally accept the criticisms of this ethical turn as a depoliticizing move in 
Butler’s work and as a shift way from the political possibilities of her still radical theory 
of performativity, in this chapter I focus instead on the role of the human in Butler’s 
work in order to highlight how “the human” functions in her work and in the broader 
                                            
51 This criticism of the role of vulnerability in Butler’s work is not exactly new. The weight of the role of 
wounding, mourning, and melancholy on her theories of the subject and of agency has long been 
criticized, even by her most sympathetic readers. It has been variously criticized for dragging down the 
creative potential of performativity (Adam Phillips in Butler 1997a), for contributing to a overly dramatic 
and individualized concept of performativity (Sedgwick 2003), for reifying the dichotomy between 
subversion and subjection in her models of agency and subjectivity (Mahmood 2004), and, now most 
recently, for contributing to a “new humanism” as part of the ongoing ethical turn in political theory and 
philosophy (Honig 2010). In a different mode, David McIvor (2012) suggests a reorientation of the 




discourse of human rights, both of which underline the persistence of the dialectic of 
alienation and reappropriation in contemporary political and ethical thought. 
 Butler’s use of “the human,” I argue, is particularly illuminating for this 
discussion, since we find in Butler two distinct and conflicting images of the human, 
one of which begins to move outside a politics of recognition and recovery, the other 
of which remains caught in the dilemmas of the dialectic. First, Butler, especially in 
her recent work on the “grievability” and precariousness of human life, develops an 
image of the human as a kind of subject position or status that might offer protection 
from state and social violence. With this image, Butler participates in the now-familiar 
discourse that presents the victims of violence, oppression, or the denial of human 
rights as inhabiting a space in which they are rendered inhuman, invisible, spectral, or 
derealized Here I argue that this discourse produces more problems than it solves 
because it overstates the power of the category of “the human” to protect us from 
violence and injustice; it attributes to the human a power it cannot wield. Further, it 
overlooks, and thus undervalues, the agency and worth of lives that fall outside the 
category of “the human” by beginning with an image of the human that has been 
developed by people in relative positions of privilege (theorists, politicians, and the 
like).  
 But Butler also presents a second image of the human as a dynamic category or 
experience that is always in the flux of contestation and subversion, an image that 
begins to get outside the politics of recognition and recovery. This use of the human 
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comes closer to realizing the potential of Butler’s own notion of performativity insofar 
as it conceives the human as the effect of a set of practices and not as a subject 
position that can be determined in advance. To illuminate the consequences of these 
two images of the human I take up responses to the AIDS epidemic and the way that 
the "humanness" of its victims has been portrayed in critical accounts of the epidemic. 
Instead of focusing on the potential grievability of these victims as necessary for their 
coming to matter in the public arena, I suggest that their lives, and their forms of life, 
mark a devious, dangerous expression of the human, one that matters intensely as a 
potential disruption of normative orders of sexuality and kinship. Further, I draw from 
Frederick Douglass’s self-description of the experience of the black slave alongside a 
contemporary Zimbabwean women’s movement to argue for a politics of the human 
that aims to highlight those moments where the human is contested in expressions of 
desire and agency in spite of attempts to stifle it or even snuff it out.  
 
Two Regimes of the Human 
 Carrying out this task of tracing “the human” in Butler’s work is perhaps more 
complex than it would seem, for the figure of the human plays an important, but 
deeply ambiguous, role throughout her work. This ambiguity is clearly demonstrated in 
Precarious Life, a text that, Butler asserts, begins and ends with “the question of the 
human” (2006b [2004]: 20). As she writes, “We start here not because there is a 
human condition that is universally shared—this is surely not yet the case (2006b 
 
68 
[2004]: 20, emphasis added). The central questions of this text are, as Butler puts them, 
“Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, What makes for a 
grievable life?” (2006b [2004]: 20, emphasis in original). Implied in the not yet of a 
universal human condition, it seems to me, is the wish for or fantasy of such a 
condition, one that presumably depends on the universal grievability of all (human) 
lives. This appeal to universality may strike readers of Butler as strange given her own 
criticisms of universality (2000), her advocacy of William Connolly’s concept of 
pluralization in her most recent work (2012), and, perhaps most starkly, her theory of 
performativity, which so clearly rejects a concept of a single human condition (2006a 
[1990]).  
 But even as Butler suggests the possibility for a shared human condition, she 
calls the possibility (and desirability) of such conditions into question. Later in 
Precarious Life she suggests, “We make a mistake, therefore, if we take a single 
definition of the human, or a single model of rationality, to be the defining feature [of 
the human]” (2006b [2004]: 90). In this discussion Butler is working to undermine a 
common definition of the human that would be based on a determinable set of cultural 
features or standards of rationality––features and standards that might demarcate the 
limits of what would be considered human, and therefore, grievable life. For Butler, 
the limits of the human that are revealed in the rhetoric of politicians and pundits 
wishing to determine a field of insiders and outsiders can (and should) unsettle taken-
for-granted notions of what counts as human. To take up the “challenge to rethink the 
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human,” then is “part of the democratic trajectory of an evolving human rights 
jurisprudence” (2006b [2004]: 90). In this way, Butler presents the problem of the 
human as a central aspect of political, and specifically democratic, life. Yet, she 
immediately returns to the logic of the universal by elaborating “an ongoing task of 
humans rights” is “to reconceive the human when it finds that its putative universality 
does not have universal reach” (2006b [2004]: 90). My point here is not that Butler is 
simply contradicting herself. Instead, I am trying to make clear that how we treat the 
figure and subject position of the human has critical consequences for how we 
consider the possibilities for life and difference. Further, Butler’s use of the human 
reflects the difficulty of avoiding the repetition of the trope of alienation that reads the 
ends of politics as the recovery or realization of a universal protected condition like 
“human rights.”  
 In her approach to the question of the human, then, Butler introduces two 
distinct images of the human. On one side, the human operates as a status or subject 
position required in order for one’s life to be considered grievable, and thus, for one’s 
life to be liveable, to bear political agency, and to matter on the scene of normative 
practices of politics and ethics. The possibility of being, or even becoming, included in 
the discourse of the “human” provides the grounds both for the possibility of mattering 
politically (that is, having one’s existence and desires register) and for protection from 
the potential violence with which restrictive norms and state practices threaten those 
who do not conform to them. The first problem here, to put it bluntly, is that this use of 
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the language of the human serves as too smooth an explanation for the atrocities and 
injustices we commit against one another. Under this rubric, it becomes too easy to 
explain violence as the result of an abstract process of dehumanization or as an 
exclusion (or expulsion) from the realm of the human. This problem brings with it 
another: it risks overstating the power of dominant norms to silence and incapacitate 
those who fall outside of, are excluded by, or oppose such norms and practices. That 
is, from Butler’s perspective, the definition of the human already seems to set the terms 
of the debate successfully, thus foreclosing the challenging of the limits of the human 
from the start. Thus, her account overvalues the power of “the human” to protect us 
from the harm and injustices we might do to one another. Yet, as with Deleuze’s 
critique of organic representation, this image of the human makes “the human” into a 
matter of “more or less,” as if we could determine in advance the answer to what 
makes a liveable “human” life. Like White’s turn to finitude, relying on the recognition 
of the vulnerability of the other as a means for achieving “the human” short-circuits the 
very political negotiation of the terms of the human. Further, it threatens to obscure the 
conditions under which we do violence to each other. 
 To understand how the image of the human functions in this way, we need to 
look closely at how Butler theorizes the making of the “human” and the meaning of 
dehumanization. Following a certain reading of Foucault, Butler has consistently 
argued that normative categories like the human are constructed in a “field of 
discourse and power that orchestrates, delimits, and sustains that which qualifies as 
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‘the human’” (2011 [1993]: xvii). For Butler the key to this process of defining a 
category like the human is that it occurs through “exclusionary means” that begin not 
just with what counts as human and inhuman, but with that which must both be 
excluded, and more powerfully, not allowed to be spoken or to exist.52 Thus, as she 
writes, “the human is not only produced over and against the inhuman, but through a 
set of foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the possibility of 
cultural articulation” (2011 [1993]: xvii). As such, the category of the human is defined 
against a “constitutive outside” that is not merely the inhuman, but a form of life that is 
“derealized,” “spectral,” “deconstituted” (cf. 2006b [2004]: 34, 91). Dehumanization, 
then, takes on a function in Butler’s work that differs from the common trope that reads 
dehumanization as an effect of violence and injustice. Instead, for Butler 
“dehumanization” occurs first. In other words, the very defining of the human requires 
the production of a zone of dehumanization that then makes possible the practice of 
violence and injustice against those who already find themselves “derealized” or 
“deconstituted” by the normative category of the human from which they are excluded 
(2006b [2004]: 34). As she writes, “dehumanization becomes the condition for the 
production of the human” (2006b [2004]: 91). 
 Butler’s understanding of the human and the dehumanized then makes possible 
her now well-known account of “grievability.” In Precarious Life she presents a case in 
                                            
52 As I argue in Chapter 5, this reading of the formation of normative categories/subject positions is very 
different from Deleuze’s reading of Foucault (and we could argue from Foucault’s own account of 
subject formation, at least in his late work) in which the outside of discursive practice is not defined only 
by exclusion but also by the eluding and escaping that very outside. Thus, the outside is granted an 
agency or power that Butler seems unable to allow. 
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which the San Francisco Chronicle in 2002 refused to publish obituaries for two 
Palestinian families who had been killed by Israeli troops. For Butler, this refusal marks 
the unwillingness, or perhaps inability, of the West to recognize these lives as 
grievable, and thus human, lives. Their exclusion from the public realm (at least in the 
form of this particular newspaper) is, for Butler, a result of the prior dehumanization of 
Palestinian lives in the very construction of the normative definition of the human, 
which then blocks our ability to connect to them in a shared experience of 
vulnerability and grievability. That is, they simply do not show up for us, and thus they 
do not matter. Butler argues that “if there were to be an obituary there would have had 
to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that 
qualifies for recognition...It is not just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is 
unmarkable” (2006b [2004]: 35). The key to overcoming these conditions, then, would 
be to recognize and respond to the vulnerability and grievability of the other––to see 
that we share in the condition that she calls “precarious life.”  
 On its face, Butler’s insistence on the grievability of all lives as an ethical ideal 
for politics seems difficult to dispute. Yet, as I have been arguing here, the problem 
with this perspective arises from the way that Butler accounts for the relationship 
between the human and its others (as dehumanized, derealized, etc.). Butler’s image of 
the human relies upon a model of visibility and invisibility, of the real and the 
derealized. In this way, Butler’s position presumes that the solution to the problems of 
violence and injustice depends upon the recovery, recognition, and making-visible of 
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the humanness of the other. The result, however, is that Butler overlooks, for instance, 
both the ways that her “dehumanized” others do in fact appear in the public realm and 
the possibility that this analysis itself devalues the struggle of those whose lives are 
read as derealized and spectral.53 As such, the power to determine these conditions 
appears to rest with a dominant, or even hostile, other. 
 Yet, from another perspective, Butler also offers a view of the “human” as a 
more dynamic field of contestation where the political and ethical terms of the human 
are dramatized and played out. Butler’s call to “rethink the human” provides 
inspiration for challenging “the normative notion of the human, a normative notion of 
what the body of a human must be” (2006b [2004]: 33). Drawing upon the impulse of 
her development of the concepts of iterability and citationality, in Undoing Gender 
Butler moves toward a language and understanding of the human that exceeds the 
framework of recovery and that turns instead on the contestation of the normative use 
of the “human.” There she considers what it would mean to disrupt the language of the 
human and human rights, which she reads as masculinist and racial constructions, by 
resignifying human rights as, for instance, “women’s human rights” or “lesbian and gay 
human rights” (2004: 38). Her response moves out of the normative frame of the 
human: “It says that such groups have their own set of human rights, that what human 
                                            
53 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick makes a related argument in a discussion of alternatives to a hermeneutics of 
suspicion. She writes: “While there is plenty of hidden violence that requires exposure there is also, and 
increasingly, an ethos where forms of violence that are hypervisible from the start may be offered as an 
exemplary spectacle rather than remain to be unveiled as a scandalous secret. Human rights controversy 
around, for example, torture and disappearances in Argentina or the use of mass rape as part of ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia marks, not an unveiling of practices that had been hidden or naturalized, but a 




may mean when we think about the humanness of women is perhaps different from 
what human has meant when it has functioned presumptively as male” (2004: 38). 
Here Butler’s mode of political contestation depends not on the acts of recognition and 
making visible a shared condition, but in contesting the notion of a shared condition as 
the basis for politics and for human rights in the first place. In moments like these, the 
notion of the human does serve as the ground of subversive political action, but it also, 
paradoxically, promises to be a safe harbor from the vicissitudes of that very political 
life. This tension drives Butler's work—a tension between a focus on survival and a 
desire for subversion as the primary aim of feminist and queer politics and theory. The 
focus on survival has come to mark the starting point for ethics, whereas the 
orientation toward subversion motivates the more radical political dimensions of 
Butler's thought. But if the figure of the human can truly remain politically salient, I 
argue, this latter dimension of dynamism and contestability—of the human at the 
limits—must be our focus. If there is to be a rethinking of the human as Butler suggests, 
it must arise here, where settled concepts of the human are already being challenged 
by lives no less human for not being called human. 
 
What is a Liveable Life? 
 The rhetoric of universal rights, in which Butler’s ethical turn is rooted, contains 
within it an assumption that we can fail to see others as humans, or at least that we are 
able to dehumanize others in order to allow for their being treated as other than 
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human. However, I contend that to defend this claim as Butler (implicitly) does, runs 
the risk of foreclosing the question of the human by turning the issue of particular 
practices and their effects into a general problem of recognition. I draw inspiration for 
my claims about the human in this chapter from a reading of Stanley Cavell’s 
contention in The Claim of Reason that we cannot fail to see other humans as human 
(see Cavell 1979: Part IV). Cavell challenges the familiar argument that atrocities from 
slavery to war crimes to abortion (from the perspective of those who oppose it) can be 
attributed to some humans seeing or treating some other humans as less than or not at 
all human. In making this argument Cavell is not suggesting that people never claim to 
fail to see some others as human. Instead, he, on my reading, is making two other, 
related points. First, Cavell argues that when we claim to fail to see the other as human 
we can mean “nothing definite” by this claim (1979: 376). That is, claiming to fail to 
see some other as human can only be meant relatively or perspectively. The effects of 
this way of seeing may be disastrous for some lives, but from this Cavellian 
perspective, it does not saturate or fix the scene of possibilities for those other lives as 
Butler’s theory of norms seems to do.   
 Second, Cavell argues that the moral or ethical response to the other is not a 
matter of knowledge or recognition, particularly of their humanity. Responding to 
another, for Cavell, is not a matter of knowledge or recognition in which I might be 
shown something about the other that might make me come to see her humanity. If 
there is something missing here, it not the recognition of the other’s humanness. 
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Instead, the exclusion of the other is more an exclusion from the realm of justice 
(1979: 377). Thus, for Cavell, the ethical dilemma of slavery, torture, and so on is not 
that we fail to see some others as humans. On the contrary, “The anxiety in the image 
of slavery [we could include other atrocities that fall under the banner of abuses of 
human rights]…is that it really is a way in which certain human beings can treat 
certain others whom they know, or all but know, to be human beings. Rather than 
admit this we say that the ones do not regard the others as human beings at all” (Cavell 
1979: 377). Attributing the violence and harm we do to others to their 
dehumanization, instead of sharpening our view of these practices, relieves us of the 
anxiety we might feel about what some humans are capable of doing to others they 
“all but know” to be humans. The appeal to a failure to see the other as human marks 
an evasion of these actual conditions and practices. Cavell, thus, offers a different 
conception of what it means to respond to, or acknowledge the human: “What is 
implied is that it is essential to knowing that something is human that we sometimes 
experience it as such, and sometimes do not, or fail to; that certain alterations of 
consciousness take place, and sometimes not, in the face of it” (1979: 379). This 
experience of the human as something that attempts to acknowledge the uncertainty 
and inconsistency of how we understand and respond to the other is much closer to 
the image of the human as alienated that I began developing in the previous chapter.  
 Here Cavell radically inverts the typical logic of the human by suggesting that 
even our experiences of failing to see the other as human (and our processes of 
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dehumanization) are part of what it means to know and respond to the human. That is, 
Cavell’s analysis reveals that the violences we do one another, far from erasing the 
humanness of the other, can (and should) provoke us to see that the humanness of the 
other is what is at stake at every turn. Take, for example, Frederick Douglass’s 
description of the relationship between the slave and the slaveholder. Certainly, in his 
autobiography, he often highlights the experience of slavery as an attempt to 
undermine or deny his humanness. However, in “What to the Slave is the Fourth of 
July,” he argues that his humanness was never in question, even to the slaveowners, 
and thus puts into question a reading of slavery as institution built upon something like 
a prior zone of dehumanization:  
Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded 
already. Nobody doubts it. The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it 
in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it 
when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. There are 
seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia which, if committed by a 
black man (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the 
punishment of death; while only two of the same crimes will subject a 
white man to the like punishment. What is this but the acknowledgment 
that the slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being? (2000 
[1852]: 195) 
 
In these lines Douglass calls attention to the fact that slaves and blacks are abused not 
because they are subject to a kind of erasure or derealization that then allows for their 
being abused. Instead, in this reading, Douglass points out that the institutions of 
slavery and oppression are in fact violent, cruel responses to an expression of the 
human itself. These institutions might aim to undermine, or even eradicate, the agency 
of these “other” humans, but they ultimately cannot. In fact, the institution itself 
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reinforces that the humanness of the other is always at stake, even when it is read as 
dangerous and worthy of control or even death.  
 Butler’s view of the human as a kind of norm of recognition constructed upon 
the dehumanization and derealization of marginalized groups then misses the political 
point that arises from Cavell’s reading of the human and from Douglass’s self-
description. For her argument takes for granted that to remain outside dominant orders 
of recognition or a position of abjection will mean that one’s agency and worth will be 
denied. But the examples from Cavell and Douglass bring this image of the human into 
question. To make this point clear, it is helpful to return to the discussion begun above 
on the construction of the figure of the human to see what Butler and her interlocutors 
see as missing in the “extra-human and extra-juridical sphere of life” (Butler 2006b 
[2004]: 91). Addressing the question of the human in Butler requires that one take up a 
constellation of key concepts that appear in various forms throughout her work. In the 
1999 Preface to Gender Trouble Butler writes that her attempt to denaturalize gender 
came from “a desire to live, to make life possible, and to rethink the possible as such” 
(2006a [1990]: xxi). Throughout her work, she variously characterizes the fulfillment of 
this possible life as “livable” (2006a [1990]: xxiii) and “intelligible” (2006a [1990]: 
22). Conversely, an unlivable life is “foreclosed” (2006a [1990]: xxi), “false unreal, and 
unintelligible” (2006a [1990]: xxv), “illegible” (2004: 5), and “less than” (2004: 2), or 
“not human at all” (2004: 2).  
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 For Butler, then, the less-than-human or unintelligible primarily lack recognition 
and visibility, or categories of recognition in which to realize oneself that are not 
already characterized by repressive norms (cf. Butler 2004: 3). From this perspective 
this lack of visibility, in turn, seems to imply that those who fall outside recognized 
norms simply do not matter. As Chambers and Carver explain this point, the 
unintelligible lack the agency of a subject because they are not received into 
intelligible discourse. They write, the “terms of intelligibility” that grant one visibility 
and legitimacy as a subject may not allow “the 'I' that appears in deviant gender, racial 
or sexual form. . .to 'appear' at all” (2008: 88). On Moya Lloyd’s reading, the lack of 
social, legal, and political validity means that those who fall outside normative 
recognition “simply will not matter” (2007: 33). Conversely, a liveable life, according 
to Lloyd, is one having “value and legitimacy” (2007: 33). Similarly, Chambers and 
Carver construe a liveable life as being dependent on being a “recognisable 
subject...thought through the idea of a ‘received subject’ that involves being 
recognized as intelligible” (2008: 78). Thus, it appears that in order to matter, one must 
be able to appear in the realm of intelligibility and the human, even if the intelligible is 
already determined by the terms of exclusive norms.  
 All of these perspectives focus on the repressed (or the impossibility of) visibility 
of lives and forms of agency that fall outside established norms and practices, thus 
allowing for their systematic exclusion and repression. The question, then, is how to 
account for norms that can be simultaneously totalizing in the exclusion of non-
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normative lives and open to contestation by these very inhuman, unintelligible, 
unlivable lives. Butler has provided answers to this question throughout her work, even 
she has simultaneously undermined and covered over that position by reifying the 
power of norms and the violence of the subject formation.54 As Butler argues through 
her development of the concept of citationality, the bounds of the unintelligible and 
the invisible are always already being challenged. In her discussion of the category of 
gender in Gender Trouble Butler contends that normative categories are always 
incomplete; thus, they are always open to being filled in by contestable meanings 
(2006a [1990]: 21). Likewise, the notion of personhood as regulated by gender and 
sexuality norms of intelligibility is always already contested by persons who fail to 
conform to these norms (2006a [1990]: 23). Because of these discontinuities and the 
overflow of subjectivity from the bounds of intelligibility, breaking or expanding these 
boundaries is always a possibility already in play (2006a [1990]: 40). She further 
argues that the making invisible of both dominant norms, and those they exclude, 
requires performative repetition from the subjects of these (gender) norms, and because 
the performance of norms is always incomplete and unsuccessful, norms always 
remain open to contestation. Deviant expressions, then, may promise to expand the 
range of legitimacy to more kinds of subjects, but they do not do so easily. Obviously, 
the visibility of deviant expressions is one of the primary instigators of violence against 
marginalized people. Yet, the incompleteness and boundlessness of categories and 
                                            
54 For Butler’s most complete account of subject formation, see The Psychic Life of Power. I take up a 
discussion of her account of subjectivity in the next chapter. 
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expressions of gender, sexuality, and the human has important effects for thinking 
about the livability and intelligibility of lives and the possibilities for political agency.  
 
Always, Already Human 
 As becomes apparent in Butler’s account of the functioning of norms, far from 
making invisible those who do not conform to norms, we see that their lives make 
them more visible as aberrations from dominant normative practices. To illustrate this 
point, consider the reciprocal, reiterative process that works to make invisible (always 
incompletely) both norms and those who conform to them. In describing the working 
of gender norms, Butler argues that “gender is the effect of a regulatory practice that 
seeks to render gender identity uniform through compulsory heterosexuality” (2006a 
[1990]: 43). This attempt at uniformity works to restrict and regulate aberrant 
expressions of sexuality, thus exposing such expressions all the more. If we look from 
the other direction at this description of normativity, we see the Foucaultian point that 
these discursive practices, rather than aberrant expressions of them, are precisely what 
are always being covered over; when dominant norms are enforced, awareness of their 
normative function can slip out of view.55 Thus, Chambers and Carver can claim, 
following Butler, that “to do gender 'right' is to remain unmarked by societal gender 
norms” (2008a: 89). Read this way, it appears that if there is a place where some 
subjects fail to see others as human, it is within the functioning of norms of 
                                            
55 As both Foucault (2002 [1978]) and Butler (2002) suggest, the role of critique, then, is to bring these 
norms back to visibility.  
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intelligibility themselves. To be able to be unmarked by societal gender norms is to be 
able to forget the contingency and incompleteness of these normative practices (and 
one’s own identity insofar as it remains within safe distance of norms of behavior). The 
regulative practices of the normative system take over the responsibility of relationship 
that would be demanded of us if contingency were made visible. As with Cavell’s 
reading of the language of the human, the relative invisibility of norms (so long as 
things are going smoothly) allows us to forget, or ignore, the contingency, and at times 
arbitrariness, of normative practices.  
 If conforming to norms makes one less visible, then, we can see that the 
possible disruption of a given normative order is the very reason that expression of 
gender deviance (or claims for justice, equal treatment, and so on, where such claims 
are not welcome or are even forbidden) is so dangerous—it reveals our anxiety about 
our practices and marks deviance for violence. As Chambers and Carver put the point, 
“To do our gender ‘wrong’ is to open ourselves up to normative violence because we 
mark our gender and sexuality as potentially non-normative” (2008a: 89). That is, we 
have made ourselves visible or spoken up in the face of normative order that knows, or 
all but knows, that we are already present and human, even if it wishes for things to be 
otherwise. The response of normative violence is not the result of dehumanization or a 
life rendered unintelligible, but rather a response to the very expression of the human 
itself. Expressing oneself deviantly seems to be the very thing that marks, or reveals, 
one as human, that is, as a contingent, discontinuous, overflowing expression of 
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subjectivity in relation, but not in lockstep, with a set of norms. Deviant expression 
makes visible the contingency of normative structures in/on the body of the subject. 
We cannot fail to see that human as human. The punishment for this expression may 
be swift and harsh, but it cannot be because I fail to see you as human. Your life is too 
livable; your life (contra Lloyd’s reading of Butler) matters too much. In it I see the 
unpredictable ways humans are capable of living.  
 Like a moment of Heideggerian breakdown, these moments of disruption of 
normative practices reveal our involvement with the world and with others. When 
things break, or fall out of their ordinary role in everyday ways of being, they stand out 
and reveal our relationship to them (Heidegger 1962). Heidegger’s discussion of 
“breakdown,” though staged in the context of the ‘equipmentality” of Dasein’s 
existence, can provide a helpful lens for examining the functioning of norms. For this 
purpose, we can consider two forms of breakdown that Heidegger discusses: the 
broken tool and the obstinate tool. In both cases, Heidegger argues that the breakdown 
of the everyday context allows us to become aware of our “normal” relations by 
disrupting them. In the case of the broken tool, the implement becomes conspicuous 
as an unworkable tool that must either be repaired or be replaced in order to return to 
“normal” relations. The obstinate tool, on the other hand, gets in the way of work and 
stands out as an impediment to the normal functioning of the everyday. In the context 
of norms, I suggest, we can read the aberrant expression of the human as somewhere 
between the broken and the obstinate. Deviant expressions appear both as unworkable 
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in terms of established norms and as obstinate refusals to go along with accepted ways 
of being. These expressions produce trouble because they threaten both the 
functioning of established orders and the contingency of these orders that their smooth 
functioning covers over. 
 Moments of breakdown—as deviant or unacceptable performances of identity 
and as eruptions of resistance to and violence against such expression—reveal the 
anxiety that we feel about the real possibilities for the human as various subjects push 
against established norms and their limits. For as always already human (in deviant 
forms), marginalized subjects are always already engaged in the logic and mechanism 
of subversion.56 Butler, too, turns to Heidegger in a similar way in Antigone’s Claim, 
noting that for Heidegger “participation in what is non-living turns out to be something 
like the condition of living itself” and that “proximity to being involves estrangement 
from living beings even as it is the ground of their very emergence” (2000: 92-93, n.4). 
Norms seem to operate in this experience of estrangement at the ground of experience, 
which makes them both powerfully violent as attempts to cover over this anxiety and 
powerfully modifiable as always already contestable. The human is revealed at this 
moment of uncertainty at the limits of the norms and zones of intelligibility that give 
shape to our subjectivity. As Butler writes, “we cannot precisely give content to this 
                                            
56 It is important not to suggest a glorified image of the work of subversion or downplay the suffering of 
those who do not conform to heteronormativity, who are the subject of indiscriminate bombings, or 
who are tortured in the name of national security. As Butler convincingly argues: “to veer from the norm 
is to produce the aberrant example that regulatory power may quickly exploit” (2006b [2004]: 52). 
Indeed, to deviate from the norm marks one for violence, and the regulatory power of the norm can 
“foreclose the thinkability of its disruption” (2006b [2004]: 43). 
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person at the very moment that he speaks his worth, which means that it is precisely 
the ways in which he is not fully recognizable, fully disposable, fully categorizable, 
that his humanness emerges” (2008: 73). 
 The political salience of this emerging humanness is at least twofold. 
Negatively, it can be addressed violently as an aberrant articulation to be punished in 
the name of reinforcing the norm. Positively, as Lloyd points out, Butler uses this kind 
of moment to show how challenges to the norm are intrinsic to the norm itself (Lloyd 
2007: 152). Thus, we can begin to provide an answer to Butler's question of how to 
think of “the one with no place who nevertheless seeks to claim one within speech, 
the unintelligible as it emerges in the intelligible” (Butler 2000: 78). This emergence, 
on the account I have been trying to give here, is not from not mattering to mattering 
or from invisibility to visibility. The limits of norms are always contestable sites where 
the human—the one we can accept and the one that we try to cover over—is always at 
stake. How this emergence occurs—and how it is presented and received—will 
determine whether it shows up as a kind of ethical recognition of a common humanity 
or as a political intervention into the order of dominant norms.  
 
The Human, Politics, and Ethics in the AIDS Crisis 
 To illustrate this point more fully, consider Leo Bersani’s reading of the response 
to the AIDS epidemic in “Is the Rectum a Grave?”. Bersani begins by pointing out the 
apparently obvious claim that the US government’s (specifically, the Reagan 
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administration’s) lack of response to the growing epidemic and the increasing number 
of deaths of homosexual men illustrates that the life, suffering, and death of gay men 
did not matter and failed to warrant intervention. But Bersani goes on to show how this 
logic of not mattering is actually evidence of its opposite. Bersani argues that in 
investigating the (now seen as early) responses to the AIDS epidemic we must pay 
attention to the “fantasmatic logic” that attends it. As evidence he points to a report in 
the New York Times that attributed to the mayor of Arcadia, Florida, where a family’s 
home was torched because three boys who lived there were rumored to have AIDS, 
the following position: “a lot of local people, including himself, believed that powerful 
interests, principally the national gay leaders, had pressured the Government into 
refraining from taking legitimate steps to help containing the spread of AIDS” 
(Nordheimer 1987: A1; quoted in Bersani 1987: 210). Bersani points out both the 
fantastical argument (at that time) that any gay leaders were powerful enough “to 
pressure the federal government to do anything at all” and that somehow those “hit 
most heavily by AIDS want nothing more intensely than to see it spread unchecked” 
(1987: 211). More powerfully he shows how this assumption implies that “those being 
killed are killers” (1987: 211). Further, “the presumed original desire to kill gays may 
itself be understandable only in terms of the fantasy for which it is offered as an 
explanation: homosexuals are killers” (1987: 211).  
 Here, the fear of the spread of HIV/AIDS figures gay men, not as lives that do 
not matter, but as larger-than-life perpetrators of sexual deviance and carriers of 
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disease and death. Gay men appear on the scene of the HIV/AIDS crisis as an 
expression of the human that the social order cannot yet process or handle. If their 
lives were not yet grievable in Butler’s terms, it was not because their lives did not 
matter. Instead, their lives mattered intensely, and it is only as human that their lives 
show up as deviant and dangerous. Following Foucault, we might say that their lives 
must be disallowed to the point of death (Foucault 1994 [1978]: 138). But we must not 
read this disallowing of life as a response made possible by a prior process of 
dehumanization, for that risks forgetting the politics of the social order that made such 
suffering possible by turning a specific political conjuncture into a generic process of 
dehumanization.   
 Bersani’s portrayal of the AIDS crisis and of queer responses to it additionally 
warns against an easy amelioration of these damaging conditions through expanded 
social recognition of identities and practices. Bersani worries about what he calls the 
“redemptive reinvention of sex” (1987: 215, emphasis in original) that has arisen from 
“contemporary discourse that argues for a radically revised imagination of the body’s 
capacity for pleasure” (215). Bersani is particularly concerned that a celebration of the 
pleasures of the body that might arise out of a particular reading of Foucault will cover 
over our ongoing anxieties about various sexual practices. That is, a quick move to a 
generic pluralist embrace of multiplicity can overlook the importance of the specificity 
of lives and practices.57 The political ends to which Bersani directs this critique are 
                                            
57 It should be noted that it was much easier to imagine a more generic pluralism in 1986, when Bersani 
wrote this essay, than it is today, given the development of theories of pluralism. Of particular 
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different from my own here, but his criticism is important nonetheless.58 For if we 
make the AIDS crisis and the response to it into a simple story of the recognition of the 
vulnerability, the grievability, and thus the humanity of gay men and their sex 
practices, which has led to their redemptive admission into the world of political 
mattering and agency, then we lose the sight of the political salience of their lives, and 
their agency, before, during, and after the gay rights revolution. This story would 
become an ethical one of recovery, rather a political one that required the 
reconfiguration of norms through the disruption of and intervention in the normative 
order. 
 The turn to the ethical task of mourning, as Honig points out in her reading of 
Douglas Crimp, “was unavoidable in the face of devastating losses [of so many lives to 
AIDS] but it was also dangerous: it threatened to absorb the much-needed political 
energies of a nascent movement” (Honig 2013: 75). The work of mourning, as Honig 
points out, does not necessarily stifle the movement’s political energy, though it can 
too easily slide in that direction. In her discussion of controversy of the AIDS Names 
Project quilt, Honig juxtaposes the more political response of Crimp’s ambivalent 
attitude toward the quilt with Butler’s embracing of it as “exemplary, ritualizing and 
repeating the name itself as a way of publically avowing limitless loss” (Butler 1997: 
                                                                                                                                       
importance to this development is William Connolly’s notion of pluralization as an ever on-going 
process of working for a more plural world (Connolly 1995). Butler turns to this concept of pluralization 
in her critique of Zionism in Parting Ways.  
58 In “Is the Rectum a Grave?” Bersani points to the more negative aspects of what he see as the 
masochistic impulse inherent in (sexual) desire. This focus has led to the portrayal of his queer politics 
as primarily anti-social (cf. Halberstam 2011). In this way, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” takes a more 
negative tone in comparison to the more redemptive view of masochism in The Freudian Body, where 
Bersani declares that “masochism serves life” (1986: 54).  
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188 quoted in Honig 2013: 61). Crimp, as Honig writes, “worries that the quilt undoes 
the passion and anger of activism.” Further, “Making gay male deaths grievable, Crimp 
worries contra Butler avant la lettre we might say, is less an achievement than making 
gay male lives acceptable” (2013: 62, emphasis in original).  
 To put the point a bit differently: the issue here is not to make gay men 
grievable so that they might matter, but to make gay men matter in such a way that 
their deaths may cause us grief and also provoke us to anger (or even rage). This shift 
in emphasis from Butler’s concept of grievability more clearly foregrounds the way 
that, in this case, gay men mattered (and mattered intensely) politically before the 
widespread mourning of their suffering and deaths. Further, the political movement 
provoked by the outrage over their suffering focuses attention on the specific ways that 
they were actively ignored and excluded: not because they did not matter or were 
considered inhuman, but because their expression of humanness threatened the given 
order. The move to public grief over the AIDS crisis, most notably in the AIDS quilt 
and the red ribbons campaign, threatens to obscure the responsibility we bear for the 
violence and harm caused by the social order. Our anxiety over these conditions, in 
the act of mourning, can be too easily ameliorated by the ability to mourn publicly 
together. We need only to see the act of holding vigils and announcing our grief on 
social networking sites as evidence of the depoliticizing power of these kinds of acts of 
mourning. For once the grief and outrage has been expressed collectively via these 
collective acts of mourning, it often quickly fades from view. Thus, Honig can write, 
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“The risk is that we let go of the rage and righteous anger that feed political protest, 
activism, and self-organization. ‘We Have Turned Our Anger into a Piece of Quilt and 
Red Ribbons” read one ACT UP poster (Sturken 1997: 173)” (2013: 62).  
 
Survival or Subversion? 
 The tension in responses to the AIDS crisis between mourning and activism 
parallels the dichotomy in Butler’s work between a politics of subversion and an ethics 
of grievability. This tension manifests itself perhaps most starkly in Butler’s theory of 
the subject, particularly as it is articulated in The Psychic Life of Power. There Butler 
wants to interrogate what pre-subjective entity or drive might cause us to turn to 
becoming subjects, to give ourselves over to terms of existence that we do not author. 
The basic answer for Butler is survival. That is, there must be some kind of Spinozan 
conative drive for existence and persistence that pushes us to accept the (mostly 
unhappy on Butler’s reading) terms of becoming a subject (Chambers 2003: Chapter 5 
and Lloyd 2007: 102).  This drive reinforces the vulnerability of the human because, as 
she argues, “the desire to survive, ‘to be,’ is a pervasively exploitable desire” (Butler 
1997a: 7). To be a subject, then, originally means to be vulnerable, manipulable, 
repressible because our desire to be forces us to take up the conditions of existence 
that we do not determine. The “factical” story behind this condition, for Butler, is the 
fact that we all begin as children and, thus, are always at the mercy of another. For 
Butler, the basic terms of subjectivity, then, involve an originary vulnerability and, 
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indeed, “unfreedom.” Moreover, to be a subject is to be caught in the “the bind of self- 
expression” (Butler 2006a [1990]: xxiv) in which the subject is never able to speak in 
her own voice, but only in the terms by which she has been conferred subjectivity.  
 Even so, Butler argues that, again, the phenomenon of iteration makes it 
possible that the agency that comes along with subjection can to some extent outrun 
the terms of our subjection. Further, she suggests that we can loosen the knot of 
subjection, even if we cannot untie it or break the (apparently vicious) circle. One way 
to loosen these binds is to form a kind of passionate attachment to the terms of our 
subjection that grants some increased agency in determining which ways of life we 
live (Butler 1997a: 66). This account of the subject, then, requires an ability to 
manipulate “the gap between the originating context or intention by which an 
utterance is animated and the effects it produces” (Butler 1997b: 14), which the notion 
of the conative drive works to provide. The problem here is that for Butler the 
possibility of escaping these terms of subjectivity requires a new form of spectral 
existence. She suggests that turning away from the normative forms of existence calls 
for a form of agency that can resist the norm’s “lure of identity, an agency that outruns 
and counters the conditions of its emergence. Such a turn demands a willingness not 
to be––a critical desubjectivation––in order to expose the law as less powerful than it 
seems” (Butler 1997a: 130). This turn to desubjectivation as an alternative to the binds 
of subjectivity, we can now see, parallels Butler’s understanding of the human in 
relation to the power of norms. For on Butler’s account the alternative to recognition or 
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inclusion in dominant norms is a life of spectrality or unreality from the perspective of 
the dominant normative order. The difference here is that the unreality, which 
previously featured as an unhappy condition of abjection and invisibility, now shows 
up as potentially felicitous condition for the reclamation of the terms of subjectivity 
(and perhaps of subversion of dominant norms as well). Butler’s own attachment to the 
melancholic, on her account, conditions of subjectivity, however, continues to 
threaten to drag down this more disruptive impulse in her theory of subjectivity.  
 Despite the spectrality of this state of being, in Antigone’s Claim Butler argues 
that there is an important, if peculiar, form of agency here. She suggests that the body 
of the abject exists in an ontologically suspended mode where it persists “in spite of its 
foreclosure” by dominant norms (Butler 2000: 78). In this way, the human always 
exceeds the terms of normative recognition and its attendant images of human identity. 
Therefore, it marks the site of desire that can exceed and persist in spite of repressive 
normative practices. This ecstatic persistence serves as a fecund source of political 
agency because even in this basic persistence, the subject has the possibility of 
subverting and recasting the possibilities open to it. As Butler suggests, this persistence 
allows for the possibility of an “aberrant unprecedented future” through the possibility 
of fantasy (Butler 2000, 82; also see Butler 2004: 27). From this perspective the agency 
of the human emerges in the fantastical ability to make the “impossible claim” of 
acting and speaking “as if you were human,” in spite of the foreclosure of those 
possibilities in reality (Butler 2004: 27-30).  
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Here Butler’s example of “women’s human rights” comes into view as an 
“impossible claim” that has become a reality as a call to political action against the 
injustices done to women in our masculinist social order. By putting together these 
terms together in an apparently “inappropriate” way, the possibility of disrupting the 
normative force of “women,” “human rights,” and a whole constellation of terms is put 
into play. Agency emerges, then, in spite of its foreclosure by the normative image of 
the human and intelligibility. As Butler writes, “If there is an operation of agency, or, 
indeed, freedom in this struggle, it takes place in the context of enabling and limiting 
field of constraint. This ethical agency is neither fully determined nor radically free” 
(2005: 19). It is uncertain whether a reader like Honig would find this “ethical agency” 
sufficient for the task of politics, but I find in its emphasis on a potential for agency 
(one that lies between determinism and radical freedom) an important recasting of the 
figure of the human and the agentic possibilities open to it. I hold on to the 
significance of this casting despite the fact that Butler herself slides back toward a 
focus on the unhappy conditions of being a subject, when she notes that this freedom 
“is made possible, paradoxically, by the persistence of this primary condition of 
unfreedom” (Butler 2005: 19). We come closer to capturing the experience of 
alienation and agency (or even alienated agency) when we remain with the notion of 
agency between determinism and freedom. When we turn back to an abstracted initial 
condition of unfreedom, then we risk returning to a project of recovery, or at least 
melancholy, of a primary freedom that cannot be. 
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A Politics of the Human 
 Given the ethical and normative pull of the concept of the human, it remains an 
open question whether we can have a politics of the human (or of a humanism). 
Honig’s response to this dilemma is to call for an “agonistic humanism” that privileges 
natality and contestation over vulnerability and mortalism (Honig 2010: 4). The 
presumption of agonism, however, is that one can simply struggle. The ambiguity (and, 
indeed, inconsistency) of Butler’s treatment of the human calls into question the 
presumption of struggle by privileging the problem of survival that surely attends the 
lives of the abject. Must struggle and survival, and the political and ethical, remain 
opposed? The question might be whether there are also forms of mattering and agentic 
capacities that can emerge from the need for and the conditions of survival, those in 
which we are always given over to (and potentially undone by) others. The persistent 
mattering of the human that I have been advocating in this chapter offers the possibility 
of seeing the kinds of agency and potential for politics that endures in the concept of 
the human. Here I offer one more example of (alienated) human expression that is 
suspended between the drives for struggle and survival. In recent years, a Zimbabwean 
women’s movement, Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), has developed in response 
to the abuses of the Mugabe regime. The women often demonstrate in the streets even 
though they are typically quickly arrested, detained, and intimidated. One way of 
theorizing these conditions might be to read them as a result or practice of 
dehumanization in which these women are being made invisible by the ongoing 
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repression of the Mugabe regime. But I think it is crucial to listen to their own self-
description here. In an interview on Public Radio International one woman described 
the protests as an expression of the human: “When we go to the street and 
demonstrate, we are human beings enjoying our freedom. They will never take away 
the beauty, the joy, and the celebration of those moments when we are on the street” 
(The World: 22 April 2013). As witnesses of experiences like these, it is crucial that we 
not take them as lives that have been derealized and caused not to matter. These 
protests and other like expressions of subversion present a complex of the human as a 
form of life that at once is free and restrained, oppressor and oppressed, and perhaps 
even human and inhuman. In the case of the WOZA women, subversion and survival 
are intimately linked.  
 To develop this point, I turn to Jacques Rancière’s reading of “the rights of man” 
in which he offers a criticism of the rhetoric of the rights that parallels my account of 
the human here (Rancière 2004).59 Rancière resists Arendt’s claim that there are those 
who are rendered inhuman and, thus, denied human rights, and in so doing he pushes 
the claim of the univeralism of human rights to its limit. Against the idea, put in 
Butler’s terms, that the putative universalism of human rights is “not yet the case,” 
Rancière offers this provocative restatement of the logic of human rights: “The Rights of 
                                            
59 For a discussion that focuses more particularly on the relationship between Arendt and Rancière’s 
reading of her concept of “the right to have rights,” see Andrew Schapp (2011). Many words have been 
written on Arendt’s conception of human rights. Those that have been important for my work here 
include James Ingram (2008), Frank Michelman (1996), Honig (2005). Joe Hoover has, likewise, taken 
up an analysis of the language of the “human” in human rights, focusing on the ambiguity of the 
“human” through the work of William Connolly and Bonnie Honig (Hoover 2013). 
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Man are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights 
that they have not” (2004: 302). That is, the putative universalism of human rights 
necessarily implies that everyone already possesses them. Therefore, in their inability 
to enact these rights, the excluded illustrate the limits of the power and accessibility of 
human rights, for they “possess” them but cannot utilize them. In this way, Rancière 
refuses the logic that those people who fall outside of a given regime of “the human” 
(or of the police) are simply dehumanized or are somehow excluded from the possible 
universality of human rights. As he notes, “this attempt [at dehumanization] 
depopulates the political stage by sweeping aside the always-ambiguous actors” (2004: 
301). Against this move, Rancière affirms the universalism of human rights in a very 
particular way by showing that those who are denied these rights can and do continue 
to claim them, drawing upon the universality of human rights that putatively extends to 
everyone. As he suggests, “The Rights of man are the rights of those who make 
something of that inscription who decide not only to ‘use’ their rights but also to build 
such and such a case for the verification of the power of the inscription” (2004: 303). 
Human rights on Rancière’s account are universal only insofar as anyone can claim 
them and attempt to make use of them. The human, and human rights, then, cannot be 
determined in advance by a set of norms and the limits that they draw. “Politics,” as 
Ranciere puts it, “is about that border” (2004: 303). The possibilities for politics, 
dissensus, and agonism become less available when we accept or affirm in advance 
what counts as human, as mattering, as struggle, or even as the political or ethical. The 
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desire and struggle for survival itself may contain within it certain modes of politics 
that we might be able to locate alongside given regimes of the human and of ethics 
and politics. 
 Perhaps there is another way to frame my question of the always-already 
human: lives persist in spite of being closed out, and their persistence, even if they do 
not know what they are doing, continues to challenge the hegemony of dominant 
social and normative orders. In continuing to live lives even outside the normative 
structure of the police, these lives are always already beginning to construct a new 
scene (Rancière 1999 [1005] and 2001). Despite the ontological suspension of their 
state of being, in Butler’s terms, they are nonetheless never completely wiped out. A 
politics of subversion might work this way: take the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay who 
were systematically named “detainees” in order to cover over their claims for basic 
human rights. From one perspective the state has worked to strip them of humanity in 
order to indefinitely detain and even torture them. But on the account I have been 
trying to give, the state and its norms of the human cannot fully determine the 
situation, for there is an ever-ongoing contestation of the prisoners' status. As Rancière 
puts it, “These rights are theirs when they can do something with them to construct a 
dissensus against the denial of rights they suffer. And there are always people among 
them who do it” (305, emphasis added). Despite the foreclosure of the detainees right 
to speak, many of them through their hunger strikes and other acts of resistance, along 
with their lawyers and outside voices of families, communities, and activists, continue 
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to deviate and attempt to establish a new scene for their staging of “the wrong” of 
these practices.60 The persistence of deviant forms of life requires a constant revision of 
limits of the human and the practices these limits allow. 
 On Butler’s terms, the issue at stake here is whether we can come to recognize 
the vulnerability and grievability of these people. But the central political issue is not 
that these people may or may not be grieved––grievability is not the issue here. 
Instead, the task is to illuminate and contest both these unjust conditions and the 
persistence of these people in spite of these injustices. The movements of these 
humans at the borders of what we might call human work to subvert—sometimes 
slowly eroding, and sometimes violently challenging—the power of certain norms to 
regulate our lives. This account works to relieve the problem of accounting for those 
who might be considered unintelligible or inhuman to find a way to cross the 
seemingly impossible epistemological, agentic gap into the terms of the livable, the 
intelligible, and the human. For, if the deviant is part of the structure of the norm itself, 
subversion is always already in play. In Butler’s words, “It [the norm] is overcome, in 
part, precisely through the repeated scandal by which the unspeakable nevertheless 
makes itself heard through borrowing and exploiting the very terms that are meant to 
enforce its silence” (2000: 78). To realize this latter impulse, then, may require a 
politics of the human that prioritizes the experience and expression of struggle over the 
                                            
60 The enactment of the political requires that those who have no part make use of this contingency to 
express themselves and make manifest the inequality of the current situation – in Rancière's words to 
declare “a wrong” (Rancière 1999: 39). As Samuel Chambers explains the function of the wrong for 
Rancière, “Politics is the declaration of wrongs, the staging of disagreements that serve to constitute the 
very parties of politics” (2012: 155).  
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desire for a common essence through which the “mattering” of all human beings will 
be made visible. The alienated condition of (human) life likely means that we cannot 
do away with the desire for or dream of a common essence in which to ground 
politics––the dialectic of alienation and recovery persists as a possibility for life and 
politics. The human, as one expression of difference in the world, is not a question of 
loss and recovery; instead, the human is always-already a process of a difference and 
repetition, human and inhuman, acknowledgment and betrayal. If we are to ameliorate 
the often brutal conditions of human life, then it cannot be a matter of moving from 
“the shade to the light, the inhuman to the human” but a matter of responding to the 






Interpellation and the Dilemmas of Subjectivity 
 
 In the previous chapter, I highlighted Butler’s characterization of the desire “to 
be” as a “pervasively exploitable desire,” and I mapped the implications for Butler’s 
portrayal of the human and the problem of vulnerability. This position has profound 
effects for how we understand the relationship between the subject and the forms of 
power that condition its life and the possibilities for it. The turn to the shared 
vulnerability of human life tends to foreground the experience of wounding and 
violation in the life of becoming and being a subject. Such a position overplays the 
experience of being an “unhappy subject” and overemphasizes the power of certain 
conditions of subjectivity to determine the possibilities for experience that exceed 
these conditions. Further, this position expresses a drive to recover a freely chosen 
state of subjectivity that can never fully be, and, thus, moves toward a mode of 
reactive critique that stifles a politics of difference. In this chapter, I begin to develop a 
different image of the human (and of subjectivity) and its relationship to social and 
state power, and I reconsider the role of vulnerability and finitude in the description of 
and response to these forms of power.  
 To do so, I take up Louis Althusser’s theory of interpellation, particularly in 
relation to the apparatuses of ideology and the state. I turn to the question of the state 
here because the state is often viewed as a recalcitrant partner (or leader) in the 
enforcement of dominant norms, and I find in Althusser an understanding of the state 
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and its relationship to subjectivation that can begin to reconfigure our experience of 
the conditions of subjectivity. I begin here with Butler’s reading of Althusser’s notion of 
interpellation because I find in it an important starting point for moving into a reading 
of Althusser’s notion of subjectivity and the state as an understanding of interpellation 
and subjectivity that gets around the primary focus on woundedness and vulnerability. 
Althusser and Butler ostensibly share the same political goals, though their approaches 
to the experience of subjectivity part ways after sharing a similar starting point. Butler’s 
theory of subjectivity is motivated by the hope of “opening up of the possibility of 
agency” even as the subject is largely determined by conditions the subject cannot 
control (1997b: 15). Likewise, Althusser’s project is motivated by a desire to create the 
“ideological conditions for the liberation and free development of social practices” 
though he posits the inevitability of ideology in general (1990 [1976]: 265). Thus, it is 
not surprising that Butler finds in Althusser’s theory of subjectivation the beginnings, at 
least, of a theory of the subject that is open to the processes of resignification that she 
views as crucial to the prospects of having agency, particularly subversive agency 
against repressive forms of subjectivation.61 However, she ultimately rejects his theory 
for, on her reading, foreclosing the possibility being a “bad” subject in this way. In this 
chapter, however, I argue that Althusser has an answer to Butler’s criticism––one that 
can overcome the grief over the lack of a self-determining subject and one that is 
better suited to respond to the alienating conditions of late-modern life and possibility 
                                            
61 In Butler’s words, Althusser’s theory of ideology and interpellation at least begins to offer the 
possibility of “the misappropriation of interpellating performatives that is central to any project of the 
subversive territorialization and resignification of dominant social orders” (1997b: 154) 
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of a humanism at the limits. Althusser’s model of subjectivity and the state provides 
resources for understanding how we might challenge the terms of political life that 
emerge out of the conditions of subjectivity themselves, rather than as a recovery (or 
even a hope or wish for recovery) of a self-determining subject or a common essence 
for politics. By affirming the alienated conditions of subjectivity, rather than grieving 
them, Althusser presents a model of the politics of the subject, ideology, and the state 
that reconfigures the dilemmas of structure and agency without further entrenching 
them. In other words, Althusser’s theory of ideology and interpellation provides an 
opening for avoiding the abstracting and reactive forces of alienation and recovery by 
locating the agency of the subject within the terms and conditions of particular 
conjunctures of ideology and the state, even when these take on more repressive 
forms. 
  
A Sorry Bind 
 Butler’s theory of the subject is most clearly indebted to Foucault and Freud, but 
she also draws heavily from Althusser despite her strong criticism of him. From all 
three she derives a model of the subject that she sees as in a “sorry bind” in which one 
must draw one’s possibilities from the very terms that condition and restrict one’s life 
(1997a: 79). As with her analysis of the figure of the “human,” she reads the conditions 
of subjectivity and the construction of identity as always made possible by that which 
 
103 
is excluded, abjected, and derealized.62 From Foucault, she takes an account of 
regimes of power-knowledge, which she often figures as norms of recognition that 
precede the subject and condition its formation.63 From Freud, she draws an image of 
the “psychic” dimension of subjectivity through an account of identity formation as 
part of melancholic process in which identity (gender and sexuality, in particular) is 
constructed by a disavowal of other desires and possibilities and the inability to mourn 
them. Finally, Butler draws heavily from Althusser’s model of interpellation to give an 
account of how the subject is named and called into being. Following a certain 
reading of Althusser, she presents a process of subjectivation in which the subject is 
named by a set of interpellating norms that precede the subject and to which the 
subject must respond in order to be recognized as a legitimate subject. As she 
describes this process, “Paradoxically, the discursive condition of social recognition 
precedes and conditions the formation of the subject: recognition is not conferred on a 
subject, but forms that subject” (1997b: 171, emphasis in original). The process of 
interpellation, then, continues throughout one’s life as one attempts to navigate the 
field of social norms that have made one’s existence and identity possible. Take, for 
                                            
62 As she writes of Althusser’s theory of interpellation: “We may think that to be addressed one must first 
be recognized, but here the Althusserian reversal of Hegel seems appropriate: the address constitutes a 
being within the possible circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection” (1997b: 5). 
In this way, Butler’s approach to identity differs from one like William Connolly’s notion of 
identity\difference. For Connolly, the creation of identity always requires a marking out of difference, 
but unlike for Butler, this construction of difference does not necessarily constitute an realm of abjection 
or spectrality (see Connolly 2002). 
63 Contra the argument I am making in this dissertation and will develop in Chapter 4, Butler reads 
Foucault as indebted to the dialectical logic of Hegel’s lordship and bondage. Against readings of the 
figure of the figure of the master and slave as a liberation story, Butler suggests that Hegel sees the move 
out of bondage to the lord to a new bondage to a world of ethical norms. Thus, the subject is not set free 
through its “liberation” from the master. Therefore, because Foucault’s subject is never entirely free of 
the norms that condition its existence, Butler sees his work as developing from this Hegelian dialectic.  
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example, the “sexing” and “gendering” of a child through the interpellation, “It’s a 
girl!”. Butler describes this process as an ongoing one: “That ‘girling’ of the girl does 
not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various 
authorities and throughout various intervals of time to reenforce or contest this 
naturalized effect” (1997b: xvii). For Butler the initial act of subjectivation that carries 
with it the possibility of being recognized as a “human” is both an empowering and a 
violating one that one must (melancholically) negotiate in terms that are never one’s 
own. 
 In many ways, this image of the subject parallels the account of alienation and 
the human that I have been developing in this dissertation, but there are important 
differences. First, though Butler recognizes that the subject gains its agency through the 
norms and conditions that precede it, she gives to the condition of subjectivity––being 
a subject––a negative valence. Being a subject is always a sorry bind for Butler 
because, as she argues, citing Gayatri Spivak, the act of subjectivation is “‘an enabling 
violation’64 through which the “I” draws what is called its “agency” in part through 
being implicated in the very relations of power that it seeks to oppose” (1997b: 83). 
For Butler, then, the act of being interpellated may grant one agency and the possibility 
of “mattering,” but it likewise marks a transgression or disturbance. However, such an 
                                            
64 In Giving an Account of Oneself Butler shifts somewhat from her earlier focus on violation and guilt. 
There she writes, instead, of the subject’s “primary impressionability” rather than its primary 
vulnerability (to the “enabling violation”). See Butler (2005: esp. 77-81).but she still sees the act of 
subject formation as one that is “exploitable” as she did in Psychic Life. As I have been arguing in this 
dissertation, there is an important difference in how one presents this process of subject formation––
either as primarily violating or enabling. 
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account, requires to answer the question of what or who is originally violated. Butler’s 
account presumes a notion of a pre-subjective entity that is somehow pristine before 
this inaugurating violation, and it likewise suggests a mourning or longing for that prior 
state. In the case of the “girling” of the girl, then, Butler’s account suggests that 
somehow there exists a body or subject that has not yet been violated. However, in the 
account of the human that I have been developing here, it makes more sense to 
suggest that the subject is called into being and then finds itself at odds with the 
systems of power that mark the conditions of its existence––that is, as alienated from 
them and from a sense of self-same identity. If there is no doer behind the deed, as 
Butler affirms with Nietzsche (Butler 2006a [1990]: 33; Butler 1997b: 45; Nietzsche 
1989 [1887]: 45), then there can be no original violation, for there is nothing prior to 
the act of interpellation that could be violated or impinged. Althusser, as I will argue, 
provides a model of ideology and interpellation that better captures this experience of 
interpellation.  
 Second, Butler’s reading of the condition of subjectivity requires her to argue 
that one can resist the terms of subjection only through a rejection of them and a 
willingness not to be recognized, which for Butler marks the move into the realm of an 
abject or spectral mode of being. She suggests that the subject can only resist the terms 
of its subjection through a process of “critical desubjectivation” or a “willingness not to 
be” in order to expose the inability of normative interpellations to saturate the scene of 
the human, even as we acknowledge our desire to be recognized and our complicity 
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in reproducing the these norms (1997a: 130). This point marks a key difference from 
my reading of the alienated conditions of life. For the ability to resist infelicitous 
interpellations may require a rejection of those norms, but it does not mean that one 
must be undone. Instead, as Althusser suggests, it may require that we answer other 
interpellations present in any given social order. Butler comes closer to this position 
through a reading of Agamben in which she suggests that we “reread 'being' as 
precisely the potentiality that remains unexhausted by any particular interpellation” 
(1997a: 131). As I argue in this chapter, Althusser’s theory of ideology and 
interpellation points to this very potentiality that Butler finds lacking in his account. 
Her misreading, I suggest, emerges from her emphasis on the vulnerability and 
violation in the experience of subjectivity and for her mourning for a recovery that 
cannot be.  
 
Minding the Gap 
 Butler finds two related problems with Althusser’s account of interpellation and 
subjectivation. First, she identifies what a “psychic problem” in Althusser’s account: 
she claims that his theory of the subject fails to account for what comes prior to the act 
of subjectivation or what compels the subject to turn to an interpellation in the first 
place. Second, Butler argues that this problem leads to a pointed political problem: 
Althusser’s account closes off and tames the possibility of being a “bad” subject 
(1997a: 109), a possibility that she see as key to the resistance and resignification of 
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normative structures (particularly violent ones) in general. Here I take up the psychic 
problem largely in terms of Butler’s critique of Althusser in The Psychic Life of Power 
before turning to the political problem as she poses it in the context of Excitable 
Speech. 
 My reading of Butler’s critique of Althusser in Psychic Life focuses primarily on 
her analysis of two important “scenes of interpellation” in Althusser’s essay on 
ideologies.65 First, Butler takes up Althusser’s famous scene in which an officer hails a 
person on the street, calling out for her to turn around. For Althusser, responding to 
such a call constitutes an individual as a subject insofar as one recognizes herself to be 
the subject of that call. Indeed, as Althusser points out, the hailing, the turning, and the 
act of subjectivation all occur together: “These things happen without any succession. 
The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects 
are one and the same thing...What thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be 
precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology” (Althusser 2001 [1969]: 163). 
Second, Butler criticizes a correlative implication of this scene: the theological 
dimension of many of Althusser’s examples of interpellation, which she finds 
characteristic of his theory of ideology in general.66 Butler objects to Althusser’s 
rendering of these scenes because, on her account, they collapse the various processes 
                                            
65 “Scenes of interpellation” are Butler’s words, not Althusser’s. Samuel Chambers has criticized Butler’s 
use of this phrase for its abstraction from the “social formation” in which interpellation always takes 
place (Chambers 2012). 
66 These examples play an ambiguous role in Althusser’s work. For while he gives these examples, he 
makes clear that in both cases, they should be taken as just that--examples of how interpellation works, 
which must be viewed within the larger context of his theory of ideology. For example, Althusser 
qualifies the case of the officer in an important way: by acknowledging the “‘special’ form in the 
practice of ‘hailing’ which concerns the hailing of ‘suspects’” (2001 [1969]: 163, n. 18). 
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of subjectivation into one moment. Here Butler finds a totalizing system of ideology 
that provides no space for things to be otherwise. For example, Butler argues that when 
figured through the officer’s hailing the person on the street, the process of becoming a 
subject/establishing an identity requires a prior complicity with the law.67 Thus, this 
scheme puts anyone who would possibly resist the hail in an ambiguous position of 
being “undone by the critique that he or she performs” (1997a: 108). 
 This dilemma is only made worse, from Butler’s perspective, because the 
dominant State ideology for Althusser requires subjects to master the State’s practices 
through the process of their subjection to it, a process that further entraps subjects 
within it. She writes, “The more a practice is mastered, the more fully subjection is 
achieved. Submission and mastery take place simultaneously” (1997a: 116). The 
problem for Butler is that she wants to resist the possibility that the interpellation of 
State ideology can saturate the scene of subject-formation and the scene of identity to 
such an extreme. Thus, the prospect of such domination by the law, she suggests, 
represents “a theological fantasy of the law” (1997a: 130), in which the Law speaks too 
univocally, collapsing any space between subjects (as sites of subjectivation) and their 
formation through ritual, ideological practices. For Butler, with that distance goes the 
possibility for critique. Here Butler’s reading highlights the problem of conceptualizing 
what comes prior to the subject, particularly if becoming subject requires some initial 
                                            
67 In Psychic Life Butler also claims that Althusser’s scheme requires from an individual a primordial 
acceptance of guilt in order “to become” a subject. I have passed over this criticism for two reasons. 
First, Butler later reconsiders her focus on “this punitive scene of inauguration of the subject” in Psychic 
Life. See Giving an Account of Oneself  (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 15-19. Second, 
the implications that she draws from this scene are still clear without dwelling on the theme of guilt. 
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willingness to turn (1997a: 117, 124). For Butler if there is no distance (temporal, 
spatial, conceptual, or otherwise) between the “individual” and the processes that 
render it a subject, then there is no way to think that which precedes subjectivation 
and that which can resist it. Yet, as we will see Althusser has an answer—a particularly 
Marxian one that is unlikely to satisfy critics like Butler. He contends that that which 
comes prior to the subject is the concrete individual bound up in the processes of the 
reproduction of the relations of production (cf. 2001 [1969]: 142). That said, Butler’s 
critique here also points to an important aspect of the process of subject formation 
common to both Butler and Althusser, one that recognizes the inability to strictly parse 
out the temporal or genealogical relationship between the “mechanisms” of 
subjectivation and the subject itself (1997a: 117). Though Butler seems unsatisfied with 
Althusser's use of the concrete individual as a placeholder for the pre-subjective entity 
(1997a: 117), she sees in this conceptual problem a place from which to begin to think 
the kind of liberatory project she wants to enact.68 
 Though Butler does not follow Althusser in declaring that there is no outside of 
ideology and that we are always already subjects,69 she does acknowledge the 
importance of interpellation in the creation of “the possibility of agency” (ES 26). 
                                            
68 Indeed, Butler runs up against the difficulty of giving an account of the pre-subjective in both Psychic 
Life and Excitable Speech. For her account she turns to a Spinozist “conative” drive for survival. Yet, 
Butler’s turn to the conatus has been criticized for its positing a pre-discursive universal desire for 
survival. Not only does this pre-discursive universal betray Butler’s own work to break from such 
categories, but it also fails her own political project by positing an pre-discursive entity seemingly 
immune to political intervention. See Samuel A. Chambers, Untimely Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003), Chapter 5 and Moya Lloyd, Judith Butler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 101-
102. 




Moreover, Butler finds some promise in pursuing the notion that the subject does 
indeed seek (and even enjoys) its own subjection, and it is here that Butler locates her 
own agenda of seeking some kind of “liberation” from ideological interpellation. 
Following Dolar she writes, “Dolar's suggestion that love might be 'beyond' 
interpellation is an important one. Althusser would have benefitted from a better 
understanding of how the law becomes the object of passionate attachment, a strange 
scene of love. For the conscience which compels the wayward pedestrian to turn 
around...appears to be driven by a love of the law which can be satisfied only by ritual 
punishment...Such love is not beyond interpellation; rather, it forms the passionate 
circle in which the subject becomes ensnared by its own state” (1997a: 128-129). 
Butler opens here another possibility for beginning to think otherwise about the nature 
of ideology through this appeal to passion. Passion, she argues, as prior even to the 
love of the Law that drives one to submit to it, necessarily exceeds interpellation and 
causes it to fail both “fully to constitute the subject it names” and “to determine the 
constitutive field of the human” (1997a: 129).  
 For Butler, such a passion––which both comes prior to subjection and exceeds 
it––is necessary for the possibility for a subject to be otherwise than what the Law 
demands, to be a “bad subject” (1997a: 119). She claims that Althusser’s failure to 
account for it (or perhaps some equivalent “drive”) causes him to elide the “bad 
subject” and the possibility for acting otherwise. More forcefully, this possibility, she 
argues, cannot exist in his system at all because the “mechanism” for subjectivation 
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requires the individual to turn to the Law in order to become a subject in the first 
place. Thus, on Butler’s account of the subject, a failure or resistance to turn to the hail 
marks the failure of one yet “to be” a subject at all (1997a: 119), a possibility Althusser 
himself denies in his claim that we are always already subjects (2001 [1969]: 164). 
Butler ultimately attributes to Althusser’s notion of subjectivity a kind of Nietzschean 
slave morality in which “it is better to 'be' enslaved in such a way than not to 'be' at 
all” (1997a: 130).  
 Again, Butler’s argument here depends upon a dialectic of being/nonbeing that 
the subject must negotiate in relation to the interpellations that make its existence 
possible. This move keeps her tied to a model of alienation and recovery this time 
thought through the notion that the subject might become derealized in order to 
become realized anew in a more felicitous subject position. If such transformations are 
possible (and I believe that they are), I argue that they must happen not through a 
process of desubjectivation, but through the responses and challenges to the 
inescapable difficulty of both felicitous and infelicitous norms and forms of life. 
Butler’s argument, again, remains caught in a version of “the Feuerbach problem” as I 
have described it, for this hope for a process of desubjectivation implies that one could 
(at least theoretically) escape the forces of subject formation in order to challenge 
them. However, on my reading of these conditions of subjectivity, there is no 
possibility for an escape from them or a recovery of a self, or even a passion, prior to 
the process of coming to be. We, as subjects, may find ways to respond differently to a 
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nexus of interpellations or hails, but it seems unlikely that we can escape them. 
 We can now turn more directly to the implications of Butler’s reading of 
Althusser for the articulation of her approach to the state and state politics. In Excitable 
Speech Butler seeks to intervene in the issue of hate speech legislation, arguing that we 
ought not legislate the regulation of hate speech through the state because state 
regulation can work both to sediment the injurious quality of those words that are 
deemed (and indeed are) hurtful and, thus, to foreclose possibilities for resignifying 
such injurious speech (and for reshaping the social orders from which they arise). 
Legislation of the “wrong” of hate speech mistakenly links the speech with the action 
that it performs and thus closes the space for resignification (ES 14). For Butler this link 
is the result of a misconstruing of the temporality of a speech act in which a word or 
speech act is viewed as a singular, transitive act that creates a particular effect upon its 
utterance without the possibility of it acting or signifying otherwise. Against this view, 
she contends the following:  
A ‘act’ is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal 
horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it 
occasions. The possibility for a speech act to resignify a prior context 
depend, in part, upon the gap between the originating context or 
intention by which an utterance is animated and the effects it produces. 
(ES 14) 
 
Thus, she claims that even if a certain interpellation causes injury as it produces the 
subject, it also brings that subject “into a temporal life of language that exceeds the 
prior purposes that animate that call” and “it may also produce an unexpected and 
enabling response” (ES 2). For Butler, then, the simultaneity of interpellation and 
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subjectivation in Althusser’s account produces the same political problem––there is no 
space for the subject to act otherwise than through the previously sanctioned practices 
of the dominant social order. Althusser’s subjection, on Butler’s account, becomes 
“descriptive” rather than “inaugurative” in that it produces the subject through 
ideological recognition or identification rather than through the reiteration of norms 
that can create some form of agency (1997b: 33-38).  
 Butler’s political project hinges on the capacity to hold open this “gap” between 
the act of interpellation and the inauguration of subjective agency. For it is only here 
that we can hope for “opening new contexts, speaking in ways that have never yet 
been legitimated” (1997b: 41). Ultimately, the success of such a project will depend 
on “whether the improper use of the performative can succeed in producing the effect 
of authority where there is no recourse to prior authorization” (1997b: 158). It is here 
that Butler’s hope bears an important resemblance to Althusser’s project, for as 
mentioned at the outset, the goal of his Marxist project is to create the “ideological 
conditions for the liberation and free development of social practices” (1990 [1976]: 
265). In the rest of this chapter I give a reading of Althusser that responds to the kinds 
of criticisms that Butler makes; I do so in order to think a way to resist oppressive 
ideologies even while still admitting the impossibility of  escaping from ideology in 
general. At times such possibilities will require the kind of critical desubjectivation that 
Butler suggests and at others they may involve passionate attachment to ideological 
practices, not as an acceptance of guilt, but as felicitous attachments and even fierce 
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resistance through which subjects can realize new possibilities for themselves. In the 
end, I hope to show that such a position, rather than foreclosing, can enhance a 
project like Butler’s that seeks to proliferate and legitimize new possibilities for 
subjects and social practices, in spite of the inescapability of the terms of subjectivity 
that always precede and exceed us. 
 
Multiplying Interpellations 
 Much of what I do in reading through Althusser in this way is simply to try to 
take his writing on its own terms––as an attempt to think philosophy as an ideological 
practice, but one that finds its purpose in working toward liberatory possibilities within 
a particularly Marxist framework.70 Yet, I turn to Althusser after this reading of Butler 
because my rereading of Althusser finds its leverage against the kind of (mis)reading 
that Butler gives. Thus, to enact this reading of Althusser that identifies the conditions 
of state repression but also some possibility for contesting it, I will have to read 
Althusser against both against Butler and against himself. Althusser (much like Butler) 
often says one thing while describing or enacting another. Therefore, I will take up a 
tactic that Althusser often uses with Marx: to read him “in his limits” to see how to see 
how his theory extends possibilities that his own and others’ readings of his theory 
                                            
70 Althusser indicates this aim of his project in a number of his later works. For example, see (Althusser 
1990 [1976]: 256) and (Althusser 1976 [1975: 200-204).  
 
My own terms are not so committed to a Marxist worldview, but as I suggested in Chapter 1, this 
framework still informs much of critical work and still has much to teach us. 
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might seem to foreclose or to overlook.71 My reading turns on how Althusser’s theory 
of the state overcomes its own limits to reveal a multiplicity of forms and functions 
operating within the apparatuses of ideology, interpellation, and the state. To do so, 
with Althusser I will map out the complicated relationship between ideology and the 
state. To describe that relationship in the starkest and most direct terms, we can say 
that Althusser was not seeking to overcome ideology by getting outside it; rather, he 
wanted to develop a theory for the overcoming of class society (and hence repressive 
ideology in the hands of a repressive state apparatus) within ideology (and its 
inevitability) itself. Thus, Althusser’s theory of interpellation and ideology was aimed 
primarily at explaining the reproduction of modes of production; it was not a theory of 
the subject per se. Particularly in his work in the late 60's and throughout the 70's, he 
saw his project as one that was pushing beyond Marx's infrastructure/superstructure 
model (even as he continued to employ that language to some extent) that could 
facilitate philosophy's contribution to the overcoming of class society.72  
 Althusser, as I indicated in Chapter 1, finds in Marx an important “refusal to 
root the explanation of social formations and their history in a concept of man with 
theoretical pretensions, that is, a concept of man as an originating subject” (1976 
                                            
71 In a recent conversation Sam Chambers has helped me to see how this kind of “limit reading” is 
similar to Derrida’s technique of deconstruction, which seeks to find the limits of texts to see where they 
deconstruct not in order to bring them down, but in order to push past those limits to see what 
possibilities a text holds. Drucila Cornell portrays deconstruction as “the philosophy of the limit” in a 
similar way in her Philosophy of the Limit (1992). 
72 In an essay in which he offers a tentative look at the relationship between Althusser and Deleuze, Ted 
Stolze provocatively declares, “Neither Gilles Deleuze nor Louis Althusser was ever a structualist.” 
Stolze then goes on to begin to examine the relationship between Deleuze and Althusser particularly 
through their correspondence on the nature of structuralism around the time that Deleuze was writing 
Difference and Repetition. See Stolze (1998). 
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[1975]: 205). Butler, too, refuses such a notion of the subject, but the implications of 
her refusal lead to very different conclusions than for Althusser. Althusser views his 
anti-humanism as a means to uncover the political, class, social, and economic 
relations which are always already abstractions from concrete individuals, even as they 
“determine and brand men in their flesh and blood” (1976 [1975]: 204, 206).73 
Ideology, as a means for abstraction from concrete individuals, also functions as the 
mechanism for exploitation so long as ideology is dominated by the capitalist 
bourgeois (1976 [1975]: 203-204). Yet, unlike Butler in Psychic Life, Althusser does 
not locate the undoing of exploitation in the “liberation” of pre-subjective 
individuals.74 Instead, Althusser’s approaches the plight of individuals as always 
situated within the frame of class struggle—itself bound up in the complex relations of 
the state and ideology. Althusser seeks to understand these state ideology relations not 
in order to undo them or escape them, but to challenge and unsettle the repressive 
State apparatus. For Althusser, if we always already find ourselves subjected to 
ideological relations that abstract from us as concrete individuals even as they 
condition us as such, then we cannot simply leave subjectivation behind. Herein lies 
the political problem for Althusser (like Butler): how can we account for the possibility 
of challenging these conditions without being able to escape or turn away from the 
                                            
73 For another reading of the relationship between ideology and anti-humanism for Althusser (and his 
relationship to Foucault) see Warren Montag (1995). In this essay, Montag notes the deeply paradoxical 
nature of Althusser’s ideology and suggests that its paradoxes causes Foucault to reject the vocabulary of 
ideology altogether. Yet, despite this difference, Montag notes, Foucault and Althusser draw on similar 
criticisms for their rejection of an original subject.  
74 Of course, as I have noted, in Excitable Speech (and elsewhere) Butler does not focus on such 
liberation either. Again, she wants to preserve the possibility/agency of a subject to be otherwise. 
 
117 
powers of subjectivation in general? 
 To begin to answer this question, we should turn briefly to Althusser’s theory of 
ideology. Althusser takes two more important steps away from Marx in the central 
thesis of his theory of ideology, both of which lend themselves to some potentially 
“emancipatory” possibilities even without admitting an outside of ideology. First, he 
asserts that it is possible to hold two apparently contradictory positions concerning 
ideology: ideology in general has no history while ideologies in particular do have a 
history. Concerning the former, Althusser on the one hand accepts Marx's claim in The 
German Ideology that ideology is pure illusion and that “all its reality is external to it” 
(2001 [1969]: 150). On the other hand, he inverts the negative sense of the claim that 
all reality/history is external to ideology by asserting that ideology is only a-historical to 
the extent that it is “an omni-historical” reality (2001 [1969]: 151). Yet, Althusser resists 
the claim that ideology can, thus, be transcendent to history; instead, he asserts that 
ideology has no history insofar as it is omnipresent throughout history, always existing 
in the same form (2001 [1969]: 152). Thus, he can assert that ideologies in particular 
are historical as they take on different forms throughout the history of class struggle, 
even as they exist under the form/structure of ideology in general. Further, the forms 
that ideology in general will take cannot be determined in advance––they are 
manifested materially through the particular forms of ideologies in particular. 
 Althusser then seeks to modify Marx’s theory that “ideology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (2001 
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[1969]: 153). Again, he insists on maintaining this traditional Marxist perspective on 
ideology, while attempting to move in a more materialist, historical direction. Here he 
argues that we must understand the imaginary not as an ideational construct, but as a 
material one in which ideology is manifested in particular actions, practices, and 
rituals within ideological apparatuses. Thus, “Ideology has a material existence” (2001 
[1969]: 155). For Althusser, ideology represents the relations of our existence in an 
imaginary way only insofar as these relations are conditioned by practices within 
particular ideologies and ideological apparatuses. Yet, because we can only know 
those “real relations” through ideological practices, it seems that the real relations exist 
only as a placeholder, much like Althusser’s “concrete individual.” Again, through 
these moves Althusser is trying to create a space in which he can posit an “anti-
humanist” reading of Marx that continues to reveal the real, material effects of 
ideology/ideologies in the lives of “'individuals' who live in ideology” (2001 [1969]: 
156). In this light his use of Pascal's “kneel and pray” example now takes on a new 
force, for the subject who enacts the ritual whether motivated (or compelled) from 
within or without is in reality impacted by the ritual practice, even if the ideology of 
the Church (or any other ideological apparatus) presents “only” an imaginary 
relationship to the real conditions of existence. Here the imaginary and the real cannot 
be rendered as a dichotomy because they always retain a relation to one another and 
often blur into one another.  
 Further, by separating ideologies from ideology Althusser can show how some 
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ideologies remain outside the dominating reach of the state, allowing for their 
mobilization by repressed classes in the class struggle. First, as I have been arguing, 
Althusser insists that there are multiple dominant (and, we must assume, repressed) 
ideological apparatuses which function as sites of the class struggle. The state rarely, if 
ever, has the power to unify these ideologies for its own ends. Second, Althusser 
claims that the subject of ideology and ideology itself are co-constitutive, a formulation 
that resists models that posit ideology as a totalizing field of subjectivation. For 
instance, in the case of Pascal's potential believer, an ideology “needs” the subject to 
recognize its call as much as the subject “needs” the ideology to call out to him. 
Finally, he makes a distinction between repressive ideologies of the state from the 
various ideologies that function in other capacities throughout our lives. Herein lies the 
key point for this discussion: we are multiple subjects, subjected to a multitude of 
ideological practices. Both ideologies and we (as their subjects) are embodied in 
material practices, ranging from religion to education to family roles to economic 
practices. Further, despite the fact that Althusser argues that ideology is ineluctable and 
we are always already interpellated subjects, he also admits some reflexivity between 
ideologies and their subjects. In fact, he suggests that there is a “double constitution” 
of ideologies and their subjects––that is, ideologies need subjects to answer their calls, 
a provocative claim that seems to open the possibility for our ability to refuse some 
calls in favor of others and for ideologies to fade away (2001 [1969]: 160). Thus, 
contra Butler, we can see that failing to respond to a hail might undo not just the 
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individual's being as subject, but also the integrity of a particular ideology itself. For if 
those subjected to repressive ideology are to resist it, the possibilities for resistance for 
Althusser must be found within ideology––where those very individuals find 
themselves––not outside it or in their own undoing. Indeed, Althusser himself offers 
such a possibility in his use of the example of God as “the Subject par excellence” 
(2001 [1969]: 167). He writes, “As all theological reflection proves, whereas 'He' 
could perfectly have done well without men, God needs them, the Subject needs the 
subjects, just as men need God, the subjects need the Subject. Better: God needs men, 
the great Subject needs subjects” (2001 [1969]: 167).  
This example offers a way for us to think beyond a model of ideology and 
subjection as totalizing and always repressive, for insofar as that which calls us 
depends upon our response, we see that we might resist it and allow it to whither, 
rather than ceasing to be ourselves. To highlight particular ideologies as contingent 
upon our response to them makes possible an understanding of positive response to 
interpellations as part of the subject’s choice to heed some calls and not others––much 
like Butler’s notion of a passion that causes us to seek our own subjection. Thus, the 
importance of Althusser’s insistence on the existence of multiple forms or modes of 
ideologies becomes most clear: for individual subjects to become otherwise than 
oppressed, they must be able to turn to more felicitous forms of ideologies not in 
which they are forced to answer the call, but in which they might more happily 
recognize themselves. Here we can begin to see how Althusser’s position does allow 
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for the kind of agency in subjection that Butler thinks it forecloses. Indeed, Althusser 
locates the site of subjectivation and the inception of agency at the point of confluence 
of various ideologies. He sums up this position in the following: 
The interpellation of the individual as subject, which makes him an 
ideological subject, is realized not on the basis of a single ideology, but 
of several ideologies at once. Such ideologies [“local,” “regional,” 
“national”] are initially inherited from the past, the tradition. What 
results is a play and a space of multiple interpellations in which the 
subject is caught up, but which (as contradictory play and as space) 
constitutes the ‘freedom’ of the individual subject, who is simultaneously 
interpellated by several ideologies. (2006 [1986]: 241, brackets in the 
translated text) 
 
This play and space that makes agency possible functions for Althusser like the "social 
place" that is created by interpellation and that makes performativity possible for 
Butler. Moreover, because ideologies and their interpellations are multiple and none is 
ever totally dominant, subjection can always happen otherwise, opening space for 
creative, rather than reactive, critique in responses to some calls rather than others. As 
Althusser continues, “This multiplicity explains the ‘free’ development of the positions 
adopted by the subject-individual. Thus the individual has at his disposal a ‘play of 
manoeuvre’ [jeu de manoeuvre] between several positions, between which he can 
‘develop’, or even, if you insist, ‘choose’, determine his course [se determiner]” (2006 
[1986]: 241, brackets and French spellings in translated text).  
 Thus, from this perspective, to answer “Yes, it really is I” to the hail of an 
ideology is an expression of who I understand (or wish) myself to be, rather than a 
turning against myself from the start. Thus, the possibility of our turning (or not) to the 
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call of various ideologies shapes them as much as it does us, for though they are 
“initially inherited” from tradition, ideologies become otherwise as they are taken up 
by subjects. A refusal to answer might provoke a more violent response from an ISA or 
directly from an RSA, but it also marks a turn toward the undoing of such repression in 
favor of more positively appealing ideologies. Overall, this perspective begins to 
relieve some of our anxiety about ideology in general as we see that it only becomes 
manifest in particular instances as ideologies, which are always contestable and are, 
under some conditions, able to be ignored.75 
 However, I must also identify potential pitfalls in emphasizing too strongly the 
possibilities for subjects’ self-determination. First, Althusser does qualify the extent to 
which the subject is constitutive of ideology: “The category of the subject is only 
constitutive of ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 
'constituting' concrete individuals as subject” (2001 [1969]: 160). And, importantly, 
we are “always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of 
ideological recognition” (2001 [1969]: 161).  Second, it may seem that to focus on an 
individual subject's ability to resist unhappy interpellations in favor of others is almost 
to lose sight of Althusser's specifically Marxist project. We must remember that for 
Althusser  the focus remains on the class struggle and the conditions for the 
reproduction of the relations of production. For Althusser “the reality in question in this 
mechanism [of subjectivation], the reality which is necessarily ignored in the very 
                                            
75 Butler, too, points to the potential of multiple ideologies and interpellations, but again she emphasizes 




forms of recognition is indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of 
production and of the relations deriving from them” (2001 [1969]: 170). Ideologies are 
“realized in institutions, in their rituals and their practices, in the ISAs” which are in 
turn installed through the domination of the ruling class in the context of class struggle 
over control of State power and its attendant apparatus.  
 Given this account, it may seem strange to turn to Althusser to address the 
question of how the violent and repressive aspects of the modern state may be 
mitigated through both more traditional and more radical forms of political action. 
Althusser’s theory of the state seems to reify a monolithic image of the state, reducing it 
to one set of functions that foreclose the possibility of finding in state politics any 
approach to the problems of social and political harm. Althusser often presents the 
state monolithically as a “class state” that has one primary function: to produce power 
for the domination of the dominant class over the working class (2006 [1994]: 106). 
Thus, the basic nature of the state for Althusser is repression and exploitation. Further, 
for Althusser the state is separate from society (and the class struggle) and must remain 
separate as a tool for the bourgeois to enact this repression (2006 [1994]: 77).76 On 
their face, these characterizations mark the state as inextricably bound up with 
violence (and not just constitutive or structural violence, but the active violence of 
policing and repression), and thus thwart any attempt to find relief from it except 
                                            
76 As Althusser conceives it, a tool or instrument must remain separate from its user in order to be an 
object of its use, in the way that a hammer as a instrument can separate from the hammerer. Thus, the 
bourgeois, even as the master user of the state, remain vulnerable to it insofar as it remains separate. (cf. 
2006 [1994]: 69) 
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through the revolutionary overthrow of the state by the repressed. So, Althusser’s 
characterization of the state as violent and repressive is not one that can be blithely set 
aside. 
 Yet, even here where the focus is shifted from the individual subject to the class 
struggle, the ideologies remain crucial sites of the political struggle that challenges the 
dominance of any apparatus, including the state. As Althusser notes, the ideologies 
that the dominant class installs over the oppressed, as well as the ideologies that the 
repressed might use against the State, always exceed them because of the 
transhistorical character of ideology in general (2001 [1969]: 172). Thus, as Althusser 
writes, the struggle over ideology must always be seen from the perspective of class 
struggle, “Ideologies are not ‘born’ in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the 
class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the 
struggle, etc.” (2001 [1969]: 173). Though individuals in this scheme are partially 
obscured in the class struggle, their particular actions in relation to ideology (through 
the larger mechanisms of the history of class struggle) are constitutive of it. 
 
Disentangling the State 
 To resist the tendency to see the ideologies as always under the control of a 
repressive state, Althusser attempts both to modify and to develop Marxian theories of 
the state by distinguishing between state power and the repressive state apparatus. In 
the ISA's essay, Althusser attempts to move beyond what he calls Marx's “descriptive 
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theory” of the State because he finds in it only the beginning of an understanding of the 
repressive State apparatus. Here he makes an important distinction between the State 
apparatus, which “may survive political events which affect the possession of State 
power,” and State power itself, which must be the focus of class struggle (2001 [1969]: 
134). This distinction provides a clue to how the proletariat (or any repressed class) 
might hold State power even as they work to undo the State apparatus. Althusser wants 
to allow the possibility of one (State power) without the other (an RSA). Next, he posits 
the notion of Ideological State Apparatuses as another attempt to move beyond the 
“descriptive” theory of Marx (2001 [1969]: 132). The introduction of ISA's is significant 
because they provide another site within and sometimes beyond the state apparatus for 
thinking the class struggle as well as the reproduction of the relations of production. 
Moreover, they provide a theoretical distinction that identifies the multiple ways that 
the ruling class functions and through which the ruling class could be challenged. For 
Althusser, an RSA functions primarily (though not exclusively) by violence through 
repression, whereas an ISA functions by ideology that may or may not be repressive 
(2001 [1969]: 138).  ISA's become repressive to the extent that they are controlled by 
the ruling classes and implemented for the means of conserving the State power of a 
repressive State apparatus.  
This distinction allows Althusser to respond to a twofold burden that is placed 
on a Marxist theory of State repression that understands the State as exploitative from 
the start. First, there is the question of how one can think any ameliorative, much less 
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revolutionary, potential within such a system, particularly once the dream of a 
recovery of the species-being has been given up.77 Second, there is a question of how, 
if the repressed class(es) were to take to control of state power, they could successfully 
dissolve the repressive state power. For Althusser, the state functions in various way: as 
an instrument, an apparatus, and a machine. From the point of view of that the state as 
an instrument, it is an entity or tool used by the dominant class to establish domination 
over the other classes (2006 [1994]: 70). Viewed as an apparatus, it is composed of 
components––both ideological and repressive––that act as a machine or in a 
machinic78 mode that facilitates the state’s action of dominating the other classes (2006 
[1994]: 69). Finally, as a machine, the state converts one kind of work or force into 
another as a machine that both runs on the energy and forces produced in class 
conflict and converts these forces into the legal power that it uses to maintain the 
dominance of the ruling class (2006 [1994]: 108). According to Althusser, the state, 
which is in the “possession” of the dominant class, acts like a machine that transforms 
the never-ending excess of forces produced through class struggle in order to attempt 
to maintain some kind of balance of power that keeps the dominant class in control of 
the machine. As he describes it, “What counts is the dynamic excess of force 
                                            
77 Althusser rejects this humanist dream of the pre-1845 writings of Marx because he argues both that 
Marx made a decisive break from this humanist perspective and that this break makes an enormous 
impact on the political effects of Marxist theory in moving from the abstraction of the species being to 
the concrete analysis of the contemporary social formation. 
78 I take this notion of the machinic from Deleuze and Guattari. They use the term to try to capture the 
sense in which an apparatus can act as a machine as an assemblage of heterogeneous parts that come 
together to function in a particular way. They invoke the term “machinic” however to distinguish this 
functioning from the functioning of a mechanical machine that produces certain pre-determined outputs 
based upon certain pre-determined inputs. The machinic is neither designed nor fully predictable (cf. 
1987 [1980]: 79). 
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maintained by the dominant class in the class struggle. It is this excess of conflictual 
force, real or potential, which constitutes energy A, which is subsequently transformed 
into power by the state-machine: transformed into rights, laws, and norms” (2006 
[1994]: 109, emphasis in original).  
To take an example, consider disputes over the working day that Marx often 
discusses in relation to the notion of surplus value. An Althusserian reading sees the 
conflicts over the working day as productive of a certain kind of political energy that 
challenges the power of the state (under the control of the bourgeois). Such conflict 
would seem to challenge the hegemony of the state, but insofar as the state is an 
effective machine for converting or domesticating this energy by channeling it into 
“legitimate” forms of rights, laws, and norms, it is able to maintain (and tighten) 
control. Thus, in the example, if the state apparatus is able to meet the demands of the 
workers through the granting of rights or other concessions, it not only maintains 
control, but also strengthens it power through the production of laws that makes it 
easier for it to transfer/process the ongoing energies of the class struggle. For these 
rights, laws, and norms become part of the apparatus of government allowing it to 
extend its reach over various social roles. We can begin to see, then, that the modern 
state accrues potentially repressive power not only by traditionally repressive means, 
but by the capture and conversion of political energies into manageable political forms 
that help determine the roles and and activities of its subjects. 
Yet, the contrast between ISA's and RSA's allows Althusser to open a space for 
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seeing the multiplicity of sites of class struggle, rather than a unilateral application of 
repressive power through ideology and interpellation. For whereas the dominant RSA 
tends to be viewed as unitary or monolithic, ISA's are multiple. Althusser gives many 
examples of this multiplicity ranging from schools to family to cultural institutions 
(2001 [1969]:137). The plurality of ideologies suggests an important distinction 
between ISA’s and ideology in general and will provide a site for the ‘agency’ of the 
subject. For though ISA's tend to function under the ideology of the ruling class, they 
do not necessarily do so (2001 [1969]: 139). Thus, the multiplicity of ideologies seems 
to proliferate sites for subjects to act outside of state control. Moreover, the process of 
establishing a dominant ideology takes a long time (1009 [1976]: 258). More radically, 
in his correspondence with Fernanda Navarro, Althusser writes the following:  
Historical periods marked by a dominant ideology that is truly one and 
truly unified is rare...It would be preferable to speak in terms of the 
(contradictory) tendency of an ideology which seeks to constitute itself as 
a (non-contradictory) unity and aspires to domination over ideological 
elements inherited from the past, elements which it never succeeds in 
truly unifying as a unique, dominant ideology. (2006 [1994]: 239, 
emphasis in original) 
 
Therefore, even as the ISA's seem to be almost inextricably bound up in the repressive 
actions of the SA, Althusser maintains that the ISA's become a site of class struggle 
where the repressed classes can find an effective ground for contesting them. 
Althusser's uses as his key example here the Church, which was the site of an 
ideological class struggle not only through the Reformation, but also as a target in the 
French Revolution (2001 [1969]: 143-144), which demonstrates how a dominant ISA 
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is contested both ideologically through the Reformation and physically through the 
violence of war. Thus, we begin to see an Althusserian response to a critique like 
Butler's: ideology and the practices of interpellation are not in themselves repressive or 
violating and need not be applied repressively. Ideology gains its repressive character 
through the enactment of particular ideologies over time under a repressive state or 
social apparatus that always remains contradictory to some extent. As Butler 
recognizes, not all names are unhappy to answer to. 
 On this account, the state is not identical with nor reducible to its apparatuses 
(repressive or ideological). Nor can the state be identified with any abstracted notion of 
state power disembodied from its apparatus. Instead, the state seems to be an entity 
that is the effect of the convergence of these forces and apparatuses. But even as an 
effect it still has a very real existence. That said, the actual body of the state is one of 
the most paradoxical elements of Althusser’s account of the state. For though the state 
seeks to remain separate from the class struggle, the body of the state is made up of the 
very elements of that struggle and the relations of production that keep that struggle 
moving. The state and the class struggle are composed of “men, weapons, techniques 
and practices, buildings and land as well, and all the instruments required to ensure 
their functioning. But, first and foremost, it is men” (2006 [1994]: 111). Because the 
body of the state is made up of the very people that it functions to exploit and repress, 
it must work even harder to repress or neutralize the fact of their class origin through 
the ISA’s (2006 [1994]: 113). Yet, the contrast between ISA’s and RSA’s allows 
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Althusser to open a space for multiplying the sites of political struggle outside of the 
apparatuses of the state that are typically associated with the the primarily repressive 
apparatuses of militaries, police, bureaucracies, etc. For the various ideologies that 
make up and exceed the ISA’s can become sites of contestation themselves.  
 
The Encounter of Politics 
 Althusser developed a model for thinking the political possibilities for this 
theoretical approach through his work on his notion of “the encounter” of aleatory 
materialism, as contained in his reading of Machiavelli. Though I have noted that this 
project may be fraught with uncertainty I want to add to his project by considering the 
state as an important site for the amelioration of social wrongs,. Indeed, one way to 
understand Althusser’s turn to the aleatory is through the difficulties of reading history 
and politics through his Marxist perspective.79 Indeed, a theory of overcoming 
repressive ideologies is conditioned by a certain impossibility. This uncertainty in 
Althusser marks an important connection back to the kind of concern that Butler (and 
others) share about the prospects for potentially enacting or resisting interpellation and 
subjectivation. The act of subjectivation––whether undertaken by the potential 
“believer” in Pascal’s example or imposed by a (potentially) repressive ideology––
always remains uncertain from the start and requires a kind of faith on both sides that 
                                            
79 Althusser proved himself to be a bad reader of the possibilities for social revolution in his 
denunciation of the ’68 riots. This reading of Althusser is not meant to be an apology for his (rather 
conservative) action at that point. Instead, as I suggested at the beginning of the chapter, my reading of 
Althusser attempts to read him “at his limits,” which can often mean reading against him.  
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things will turn out in the desired way. As Butler claims, “We must neither first believe 
before we kneel nor know the sense of words before we speak. On the contrary, both 
are performed ‘on faith’ that sense will arrive in and through articulation itself” (1997a: 
124). Perhaps we can only know our prior desire or passion for interpellation in how 
we find that we have answered it. The question, then, is acute: how might a new 
political formation as a response to previous wrongs actually come about? 
 Althusser articulates this problem in his reading of Machiavelli’s attempt to 
establish the political project of the New Prince. His reading of Machiavelli speaks 
directly to the political problem that he and Butler pose. Althusser locates in the figure 
of the New Prince an “aleatory space” for the enactment of a new political act (2001 
[1995]: 20-21).  That is, the New Prince figures as the possibility of a new political 
ideology or interpellation made possible from the “play and space” of the multiple 
ideologies and interpellations already at work within the social and political world.80 
In these terms, the figure of the Prince seem to directly echo Butler’s conception of the 
function of a political ‘act’ in Excitable Speech, quoted above as “a certain nexus of 
temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it 
occasions” (1997b: 14). Indeed, Althusser is working, in his own terms, on a question 
like one that Butler poses in Excitable Speech: how we might “succeed in producing 
the effect of authority where there is no recourse to prior authorization” (1997b: 158). 
For Althusser, success will require an encounter between the New Prince who issues a 
                                            
80 Following Stephen Gill, Adam Holden and Stuart Elden describe this New Prince “as a plural and 
differentiated ‘set of potentials’” (Holden and Elden 2005: 27).  
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new call, a new interpellation to which a people will respond. This project always 
remains uncertain; for “the Prince is a pure aleatory possibility…an individual 
indefinable in advance” (2001 [1995]: 26-27), for there is no historical necessity for his 
arising (2001 [1995]: 26) and there is no guarantee that his call will bring people to 
respond. For example, we can think of the emergence of new rights claims as an 
aleatory moment that potentially calls into being political subjects to identify with and 
take up the terms of the rights claim (or not).81  
 The encounter enacts the play of virtu and fortuna where the possibility of a 
new political space requires both the skill of the political agent and a set of felicitous 
circumstances for the action or call to endure. The success (Althusser might even say 
the very existence) of the New Prince instead depends upon his ability to project a new 
possibility for interpellation/subjectivation that will appeal to existing 
individuals/subjects as more felicitous subject positions. For only in the material 
enactment of an ideological interpellation can we see its effects. According to 
Althusser, Machiavelli “hails us from a place that he summons us to occupy as 
potential ‘subjects’ (agents) of a potential political practice” (2001 [1995]: 32). We 
must be able to recognize ourselves as potential occupiers of that space – its sustained 
existence depends on our subjecting ourselves to it interpellation. Both the particular 
ideology as political practice and its potential subjects rise and/or fall together in a 
particular historical/political conjuncture. Its success will be determined by its ability 
                                            
81 William E. Connolly discusses in a related way the emergence of new rights as a kind of encounter in 
his Ethos of Pluraliztion (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 178-188. 
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to appeal to individuals who may or may not answer the call. Ultimately, in Althusser’s 
reading of Machiavelli, the ideology of this New Prince, even as it functions as a state 
ideology, will no longer be repressive, but will instead function as a regulatory ideal 
for the people. 
 The turn to the aleatory finally gets to a crucial point in how we can think 
resistance to repressive powers––be they SA’s, ISA’s, or ideology in general. On the 
one hand, such a turn reveals the contingency that conditions both existing and 
potential forms of identity, subjectivity, community, as well as the alienation that we 
experience there. On the other, it highlights the potential itself––not just that we can 
find new ways for identifying ourselves and living together, but also that we can find 
that some modes of subjectivation that function repressively now need not be seen as 
inherently so. Althusser presents a way of thinking such possibilities and shows us that 
maintaining a robust theoretical/political framework need not undermine attempts to 
overcome current forms of social repression and inequality. In fact, an approach that 
works critically within such a framework may provide as many possibilities for 
resisting repression as one that seeks to imagine new possibilities outside/beyond any 
“structural” framework at all. 
 In closing, I would like to offer an example in order to make this point more 
concrete. In the last episode of the network television show Boston Legal, the character 
Denny Crane, who is a rich partner of the law firm in the show and who has fallen into 
some trouble for his behavior as he begins to succumb to Alzheimer's disease, asks his 
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best friend and law partner, Alan Shore, to marry him. His reasons for asking him are 
many and complex, and they do clearly involve the legal privileges provided by 
marriage: Denny wants to be able to give Alan all of his money when he dies without 
being taxed by the state. He also wants the legal protection that Alan will not be able 
to testify against him (because of spousal privileges) if he gets into any more trouble 
because of his condition. But there is another matter as well: Denny tells Alan that he 
always wanted to get married again before he slips too far into Alzheimer's, and as he 
says to Alan, "Like it or not, you're the man I love."82 Alan accepts, and what follows is 
an interesting legal battle in which a local LGBT group seeks an injunction against the 
marriage on the grounds that the couple only wants to get married for monetary 
reasons. The judge rules for the couple both chastising the plaintiff for reinforcing the 
arguments against gay marriage that made it illegal for so long in Massachusetts and 
arguing that the state has no right to question why a couple, who is legally eligible, 
chooses to seek marriage. 
 This example provides a very complex relationship to the argument that I have 
been trying to make here. On the one hand, one could rightly argue that such a case 
reveals the way in which certain important privileges, like inheritance rights and some 
cases of legal immunity, remain bound to a particular set of state-sanctioned social 
arrangements. On the other hand, from the perspective I have been developing, we 
can also read this example as an outcome of rights-granting that none of the parties 
involved in the battle of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts ever expected. In opening 
                                            
82 http://popwatch.ew.com/2008/12/09/boston-legal-1/. Accessed 02/26/2010. 
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up the possibility for same-sex marriage, other possibilities for kinship relations within 
the state were also unlocked (even if only realized fictionally––so far as we know) 
through two characters on television. New interpellations have been issued that 
individuals may or may not take up as felicitous subject positions and that can shift our 
perception and our practices regarding marriage, love, friendship, and even rights in 
general. In this way, a new right can actually loosen the hold the state has over a range 
of social practices, even as it appears to more fully capture another form of social 
relationship. Of course, such felicitous outcomes are never guaranteed. Such are the 
experiences of alienation that make up a human life marked by friendship, unequal 
privilege, exclusive rights that both include and marginalize us, and so on. My claim 
here is only that making claims for identity-based rights can change our (ideological) 
practices beyond the repressive mechanisms of the state and dominant normative 
orders even as such claims must pass through these orders to achieve their ends. The 
state and dominant normative orders remain important sites for political contestation. 
Of course, appealing to the state for amelioration of social injuries remains a risky 
practice; it carries no guarantee that such claims will either relieve or reinforce the 






Warming Up to the Cold Monster 
 
The Trouble with Marriage/The Problem of the State 
 To begin this chapter I want explore with the issue of same-sex marriage for a 
moment longer. I remain here with the “problem” of same-sex marriage because, for 
more than two decades, the debate over the desirability and possibility of legal same-
sex marriage has been a nodal point for contentions over the political and theoretical 
stakes of feminist and queer theory and because the issue of marriage so clearly 
highlights the dilemmas and alienation of life in the late modern neoliberal state 
regime. Public debate over same-sex marriage has revealed implications of marriage 
beyond the more straightforward question of the extension of civil rights and have 
fueled discussions about the relationship between the state, marriage, and the 
problems of immigration, family, patriarchy, church-state relations, and so on. At the 
heart of these debates, then, has been the question of the role of the state in 
ameliorating or reinforcing exclusive norms, practices, and protections. At the risk of 
caricature, I contend that these debates over the character and role of the state have 
too often ossified into a false choice between a smooth story of liberal progression or a 
disquieting story of the growing hegemony of the state and heteronormativity.83 My 
                                            
83 This “problem” of the state is not, of course, anything particularly new. The question of reform or 
revolution has always been part of Marxian and other left critical theories (cf. The King of Prussia). 
Georg Lukács captured this dynamic well in History and Class Consciousness in which he identified the 




argument in this chapter is that such approaches to the problem of the state and power 
of norms are insufficient for the alienated conditions of late modern life and both risk 
positing an impossible solution to these conditions. In making this argument, I consider 
the state and its potential both to enhance and to inhibit efforts to deal with the 
alienations of contemporary life, and I argue for a theoretical approach that resists the 
tendency of critical thought to find the answer to such dilemmas only in their 
overcoming. With these issues in mind, I first want to turn to a personal anecdote to 
illuminate some of these contemporary dilemmas so starkly highlighted in the problem 
of marriage. 
 Last year two friends of mine asked if I would be willing to be the officiant for 
the signing of their marriage certificate. In order to be recognized by the state as an 
officiant, I had to be ordained, so I visited the website for American Marriage 
Ministries and became “official” with a few clicks of the mouse. These friends are an 
opposite-sex couple who had never planned nor wanted to be officially married, but 
they needed to get married for the typical reasons that immigration presses onto 
people: to be recognized by the state as a legitimate couple in order to be granted to 
permission for both of them to stay in the country while one of them pursued a job 
opportunity. The situation is an unfortunately familiar one and embodies the dilemmas 
of living in late (neo)liberal state capitalism and of acceding to the demands of the 
neoliberal state. These dilemmas were heightened further in this case as the couple 
found themselves asking a gay man and his partner, who themselves were barred from 
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legal marriage at the time, to take up the duties of marrying them into an institution 
they only entered under the coercion of the promise of bureaucratic privileges. We 
agreed because we wanted their relationship and their legal status to be secure in this 
country. Yet, because we all felt some reluctance about the institution of marriage, we 
wanted to make the day meaningful beyond the state-bureaucratic actions of the 
signing of documents and somehow transgressive of the heterosexual limitations of the 
institution. So, we put together a ceremony that involved drag, a collection of religious 
icons (though none of us is particularly religious), a cutout of Karl Marx, poetry that 
mocked family values, and statements of conscience. In the end, though, the marriage 
still required that I sign the state documents verifying that the man and woman whose 
names were printed on the page were not related by blood as far as I know, that they 
had agreed to be married, and that I had the legal standing to marry them by the 
authority of the non-denominational ministry I had joined two days before. Now that 
gay marriage has since been legalized in many states (and is recognized by the federal 
government), my partner and I face the same pressures our friends once faced—
whether to enter into an institution that seems to reinforce both the state’s ability to 
regulate the legitimacy of forms of association and that upholds the heternormative 
model of kinship—now just made more widely available.  
 This story highlights (at an admittedly personal and small-scale level) the 
difficulties of negotiating the power and privilege of the state and normative definitions 
of sexual identity, desire, and kinship. It puts on stark display some of the alienated 
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conditions of contemporary life: our friends’ alienation from the demands of marriage, 
our alienation from the institutional protections that they were seeking, our collective 
alienation from our intentions to transgress the normalizing power of marriage even as 
they entered into it. Yet, a decade ago the terms of the debate over same-sex marriage 
and its relation to both the state and heteronormativity seemed to be more clearly 
drawn. On one side we had Michael Warner’s powerful argument warning us about 
the power of normalization to reinforce heteronormative models of relationships and 
strengthen lines of exclusions (Warner 1999). The call was to reject marriage for the 
sake of preserving the queerness of non-heteronormative relationships against the 
normalizing forces of these social and political practices. Warner’s argument remains 
powerful and difficult to deny as we have continued to see the intransigence of 
masculinist, heteronormative structures in our domestic and foreign policies, our social 
lives, and the military, in spite of recent gains in marriage rights for same-sex couples. 
Yet, for many of us, Warner’s critique has become more difficult to insist upon as 
marriage rights are beginning to be made more widely available, especially as we see 
basic decencies like hospital visitation, medical power of attorney, and the tax-free 
inheritance of common property being extended (to many, but not to all) through the 
institution of marriage. Certainly there persists a strong argument against these 
privileges being tied to marriage in the first place, but the issue has become more 
difficult to parse as the political landscape has shifted. On the other side, we had 
Andrew Sullivan’s more triumphalist argument that universal approval of same-sex 
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marriage would be the key to full inclusion of gays and lesbians into the body politic 
(Sullivan 1989 and 1995). Though it might be tempting to suggest that Sullivan seems 
to be proven right by the dramatic shift in attitudes toward gays and lesbians, the rise 
in anti-gay hate crimes, the ongoing debate over protections for transgendered persons, 
and the persistence of misogyny and gender discrimination at all levels of society make 
it likewise difficult to make a hard case for this more conventional liberal progressive 
view.  
 To explore this kind of dialectic between a politics of rights or their rejection, I 
first turn to Eve Sedgwick’s critique of the tendency of critical thought to turn into 
“strong theory” that moves toward totalizing approaches to a given problematic and 
risks foreclosing the possibility or viability of a more subtle take (or a multiplicity of 
takes), and thus, limits the possibilities of the project of critical theory. Following 
Sedgwick, I argue that strong theory is most effectively challenged not by a competing 
strong theory, but by the production of “weak” alternatives that attempt to multiply 
possibilities rather than produce universalizing criticism. To demonstrate this position, 
I turn to two perhaps unlikely sources—Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari. I call them 
unlikely sources because their work has often been taken up as resources for strong 
(and often paranoid) theories of the state, as a source primarily of repression and of the 
propagation of capitalism. Yet, as I read both of them, while offering a criticism of the 
repressive conditions of state and capitalism, they employ a “strategic” or anticipatory 
position that addresses specific conditions of the contemporary conjuncture rather than 
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producing a strong or universal theory of the state or capitalism. At stake here is the 
question of whether critical theory can be employed to produce a weak theory of the 
state that is more appropriate to our contemporary condition, for the challenges of our 
current conjuncture can not be captured by the promises of strong theory. Likewise, 
the dilemmas of life in neoliberal state capitalism cannot be ameliorated through the 
project of reform or revolution alone. Pursuing a weak theory of the state and state 
politics, helps hold open the question of whether and how the state contributes to the 
propagation of exclusive norms and privileges or to their amelioration. This approach 
might, too, help us see more clearly whether in the marriage scene above anything 
happened in the end besides the reinforcement of the hegemony of the state over 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of association and the possibilities of state 
recognition. Put bluntly, did these private acts of transgression amount to anything 
other than an attempt to add a dose of sugar to the swallowing of a bitter pill?  
 
Strong Readings and Paranoid Politics 
 Both sides of the dialectic of a progressivist or more radical approach to the 
state (and marriage) doubtless capture powerful aspects of the dynamic of the norms 
and conditions of state power. Yet, the trouble with such arguments, I suggest, is that 
they tend toward what Sedgwick, following Silvan Tomkins, calls “strong theory” 
(Sedgwick 2003). With Tomkins, Sedgwick defines a strong theory by the “size and 
topology of the domain that it organizes” (2003: 133). Strong theories become 
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problematic not because they are ineffective in explaining and ordering their “domain” 
nor because they are simply too general. Instead, strong theories “grow to be only too 
effective” as they capture and organize all aspects of a dynamic into a unified whole 
that limits (or may even eliminate) the possibilities of seeing things otherwise. In the 
example of Warner and Sullivan above we can see how their positions could employ a 
version of strong theory in analyzing the case of marriage with which I began. From a 
position like Warner’s we could read the case simply as a reinforcement of 
heteronorms; from a position like Sullivan’s we could focus on the expansion of 
marriage rights to same-sex couples at the state and federal level as evidence of the 
almost inevitable march toward full recognition and equality.  
 Sedgwick’s (and my) point in introducing the idea of strong theory here is more 
than marking the more or less obvious intractability of liberal and non-liberal political 
thought—or what Horkheimer calls traditional and critical theory (1975 [1937]). 
Instead, Sedgwick’s argument for a distinction between strong and weak readings 
emerges from a reaction to the dominance of what she calls the “paranoid” position in 
left critical thought. For Sedgwick this paranoid position has emerged from the 
privileging within critical theory of the methods of hermeneutics of suspicion (cf. 
Ricouer 1970) and of demystification as a promise of escape from repressive forms of 
power.84 We see this kind of paranoid reading in Butler’s theory of the conditions of 
subjectivity that, on her reading, while enabling, are also violating. Sedgwick argues 
                                            
84 With this argument, Sedgwick joins a growing list of thinkers challenging this approach to the project 
of critical theory, including Bruno Latour (2003), Jacques Ranciére (2009), Jane Bennett (2010), and Sam 
Chambers (2013). I will turn to this discussion later in this chapter. 
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that this kind of paranoid position can become a strong theory of the worst kind when 
it excludes the validity of anything but a suspicious reading. The imperative to employ 
suspicion and paranoia stems from a presumed faith amongst critical theorists that to 
expose structural inequality, violence, and oppression necessarily lead to political 
action to counter such practices. Yet, as Sedgwick suggests, “for someone to have an 
unmystified, angry view of large and genuinely systematic oppressions does not 
intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or 
narrative consequences” (2003: 124).85  
 The paranoid position endures, however, through what it promises as a method. 
As a strong theory, paranoid reading becomes self-reflexive and self-reinforcing to the 
point of allowing, for instance, for the “paranoid” theorist to uncover violence and 
oppression in almost any instance of political and social life. As a method, Sedgwick 
then argues, paranoid readings can become both self-reflexive and mimetic, making it 
all the more effective and teachable (2003: 143).86 The advancing imperative of the 
paranoid position, then, brings with it the presumption that “to theorize out of anything 
but a paranoid critical stance has come be seen as naïve, pious, or complaisant” 
                                            
85 Sedgwick’s argument recalls Bersani’s argument that we tend to draw a fallacious connection 
between someone’s sexual orientation and their political orientation. See Chapter 2. 
86 This mimetic quality can be seen in the way that Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and 
governmentality have been taken up and applied to almost every imaginable condition that is marked 
by the state and its relationship the body. See, for instance, Beyond Biopolitics (Clough and Willse: 
2011) that extends the reach of biopolitics as much as it works to get beyond it. Likewise, Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of bare life (as a reading of biopolitics) has become too easily applied to any 
condition of oppression. Here see João Biehl’s Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment (2005), in 
which he reads communities like that of Vita as the equivalent of bare life in “the camp.” My point is 
not to overlook the suffering of those in the camp. Instead, I want to highlight the way that such readings 
overlook the ways that people in the camp have set up their own forms of community and resistance in 
order to survive (and more) there.  
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(2003: 126).87 Under these conditions, the paranoid position of critical theory becomes 
hegemonic in a way that parallels the hegemony of the structures that the paranoid 
reading is meant to undermine. For Sedgwick the real trouble with this development in 
critical theory is that it circumscribes the potential for other interpretive methods that 
might offer alternative modes of political struggle.88 As Sedgwick puts it, the critical 
tools that were born from the tools of the “hermeneutics of suspicion” have had “an 
unintentionally stultifying side effect: they may have made it less rather than more 
possible to unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of 
knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or 
teller” (2003: 124).89 In other words, as a strong theory, the paranoid reading tends to 
foreclose the possibility that the theorists will see other, non-negative or dangerous, 
affects and phenomena within a given problematic, and thus obscure, rather than 
illuminate, the multiple and contingent elements with a given problematic, scene, or 
social order. To again return to the marriage scene, a paranoid reading may miss the 
                                            
87 cf. Jodi Dean’s The Communist Horizon (2012). 
88 Sedgwick herself is interested in the possibility of reparative readings that would not be considered 
“mere” repair in the face of the serious work of paranoid readings. There has been something of a turn 
to the reparative in political and critical theory since the time of Touching Feeling. Such readings are 
important for offering alternatives to the paranoid approach. There are, of course, dangers in this 
direction as well. For one risks glorifying mundane practices (cf. James Scott 1990) or even practices that 
reinforce gender inequality and oppression (cf. Saba Mahmood 2005) in the search for everyday forms 
of resistance. 
89 It is important to note that Sedgwick’s tone in this essay is a bit conflicted. She recognizes that the 
project of demystification has been effective in revealing a host of repressive and exploitative social 
structures, and she recognizes that she, too, has taken part in the project of a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Her impatience, then, with the paranoid style has more to do with its hegemony in left critical thought 
and the stultifying effects of its dominance. She wants to open the door for more reparative readings that 
are not immediately viewed as ineffective or naive. In his essay “Unlike Eve Sedgwick,” Jonathan Flatley 
examines Sedgwick’s conflicted tone in relation to her other work, particularly in relation to her “Queer 
and Now” (Flatley 2010; Sedgwick 1993). 
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aspects of subversion, the creation of affects of joy and delight in the celebration of our 
friends’ relationship, and so on.  
 Sedgwick’s criticism of paranoid reading is motivated by the desire to render 
such affects politically and theoretically important–-that is, to make possible reparative 
readings that might counter the growing hegemony of strong, paranoid readings. From 
Sedgwick’s position, the naivety associated with a non-paranoid reading has led to a 
place where reparative readings are considered insufficient for the task of critical and 
political theory.90 In response, Sedgwick takes up Melanie Klein’s concept of 
“positions,” which are meant to break up the reading of psychoanalytic conditions as 
more or less permanent states of being. For Sedgwick, Klein’s positions provide a way 
to “describe changing and heterogeneous relational stances” (2003: 128). As such, a 
theorist might at times inhabit a kind of paranoid or reparative position, but not be 
required to stay there in an attempt to provide a total critique. Likewise, various 
subjects, actors, and actants can be seen as inhabiting various positions within a given 
situation or social whole, as in the marriage scene with our friends. Repair in this sense 
is unlike the dynamic of alienation and recovery that I have moved away from in this 
dissertation––repair here is not the recuperation or recreation of a prior state of 
wholeness. Reparative readings, then, aim at opening up and recognizing moments of 
life that resist or elude the repressive and stultifying aspects of norms and power. To 
carry out such a project requires the pursuit of “weak” theories as alternatives to the 
                                            
90 We can see this dynamic in a number of different quarters where affect theory or new materialisms 
are criticized for supposedly giving up the issues of power, judgment, and responsibility. See Ruth Leys 
(2011) and Sharon Krause (2011). 
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tendency to produce more totalizing theoretical work. The marriage story presents 
such an opportunity in its combination of coercive state power, joy amongst friends, 
and attempts at subversion, none of which fully captures the scene.  
 Strong readings, though, threaten to close such pursuits done in large part 
because they remain so tantalizing in their ability to provide a different way out. As an 
example, Sedgwick turns to Foucault and the peculiar quality of his work that has 
helped promote a paranoid application of his work to the problematics of subjectivity 
(and, as I suggest, to the state as well). First, as Sedgwick shows, Foucault’s attempt in 
The History of Sexuality to “think around” the repressive hypothesis, which he first 
identifies and then criticizes, ultimately ends up propagating it (2003:10). As she 
argues, because Foucault insists on the relationship between the exercise of power in 
the name of the suppression and propagation of expressions of sexuality, his work in 
Volume 1 has too often been taken up as “the heroic, ‘liberatory,’ inescapably dualistic 
righteousness of hunting down and attacking prohibition/repression in all its 
chameleonic guises” (2003: 10). When taken up in this way, Sedgwick suggests, 
Volume 1 can produce a taxonomy of misunderstandings that all begin with the 
paranoid form of “Even beyond the repressive hypothesis, some version of prohibition 
is still the most important thing to understand.” (2003: 11). For Sedgwick, then, 
whatever follows from this opening clause will always tilt toward the production of 
false dichotomy of repression and liberation and turn Foucault’s project into one that 
hypostasizes the “hegemonic and subversive” (2003: 12). In a similar way, Foucault’s 
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later lectures on governmentality and biopolitics have provided tools for making them 
into the form of quasi-transcendent sovereign power (cf. Agamben 1993) or the 
seeming infinitely applicable tool for explaining the practices of the neoliberal state (cf. 
Brown 2003).91 From such a perspective the possibility of achieving positive gains 
through state politics is foreclosed because the state has already won the day, and any 
engagement with the state only serves to strengthen its hold. Rancière describes this 
phenomenon as left-wing melancholy and right-wing frenzy: “Left-wing melancholy 
invites us to recognize that there is no alternative to the power of the beast and to 
admit that we are satisfied with by it. Right-wing frenzy warns us that the more we try 
to break the power of the beast, the more we contribute to its triumph” (Rancière 
2009: 40). 
 Rancière’s diagnosis emerges from his own criticism of critical theory as a 
method that depends upon the logic of inversion. As Sam Chambers has argued, in 
Rancière’s early Althusserian period, he saw inversion as a product of the problematic 
of alienation in a similar in way similar to my approach in this dissertation––as a 
problem of abstraction lodged in a dynamic of alienation and recovery. Rancière 
writes, “Inversion is produced through alienation: the generic life of man becomes the 
means of his individual life” (Rancière 1989: 85 quoted in Chambers 2013: 132). In 
                                            
91 On my reading of Foucault, this reading of biopolitics and governmentality as means to explain nearly 
all repressive aspects of contemporary state capitalism is not an inherent part of Foucault’s text. In other 
words, this reading of biopolitics and governmentality emerges from his work in much the same way 
that certain (bad) readings of The History of Sexuality gave rise to the “paranoid” impulses that Sedgwick 
describes. Foucault’s work on identifying and analyzing the development of various forms of power 
opens up the temptation apply his themes in these universalizing ways. However, Foucault himself, as I 
argue here, resists this impulse even as he identifies and develops these concepts in order to analyze 
forms of power in neoliberal capitalism. 
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contrast to Sedgwick, Rancière focuses less on the methodological problems of this 
approach than on their political ramifications. For Rancière the problem with a critical 
theory that relies on inversion, unmasking, and an ontology of surface and depth is that 
it creates a stratified model of “the philosopher and his poor” in which the philosopher 
is imagined to possess the hidden knowledge which the poor (or the workers or the 
oppressed) need to be given in order that they might free themselves from these 
conditions. As such, critical theory presumes that “the poor” must have a blind, 
unenlightened relationship to the conditions of their existence.92  
 Drawing on Rancière’s argument, Sam Chambers points to a two-fold response 
that emerges from Rancière’s analysis problem of inversion. First, Rancière’s argument 
suggests that we reject the presumption of depth insofar as the topos of surface and 
depth produces a critical project that is meant to uncover what is hidden in these 
depths. Second, following the rejection of depth, we can presume instead that the 
oppressed do indeed know what is happening within these systems of oppression. As 
he writes, “Thus, it would be assumed that the incapable are capable; that there is no 
hidden secret of the machine that keeps them trapped in their place” (2009: 48).93 As 
                                            
92 As Chambers shows, in a different context Rancière explains this dynamic in terms of a model of 
archipolitics and metapolitics: “Rancière purports to distinguish between archipolitics and metapolitics 
in terms of health: the former offers the medicine that will make the community truly whole, whereas 
the latter “presents itself as symptomology’ that always and unceasingly uncovers only untruth, only 
disease. Put simply, ‘Metapolitics is the discourse on the falseness of politics.’” (see Rancière 1999: 82 
and Chambers 2013: 137) 
93 As Chambers points out, in an earlier version of his essay, Rancière calls this assumption a “foolish” 
one insofar as it rejects the taken-for-granted perspective that emancipation is about the recovery of a 
lost essence. I like that formulation because it points out a necessity for the theorist to be willing to play 
the fool in the face of the “everyone knows” and proposed naïveté of those who do not practice 
paranoia and inversion. Cf. Bennett, Adorno, Deleuze, and Beckett in chapter 3. 
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Chambers constructs this position, along with the assumption, Rancière suggests an 
alternative version of the concept of emancipation, one in which emancipation is no 
longer associated with “liberation with a lost unity” and instead associates 
emancipation with “the construction of new capacities” (2009: 43).  As such, 
Chambers suggests, “A new critical dispositif could therefore reject the dream of 
guaranteed revolution without thereby abdicating democratic politics” (2013: 156). 
Sedgwick’s reparative readings and Chambers’s and Rancière’s emancipation need not 
entail the recovery of a lost essence or the exposure and expelling of the enemy 
(whether individual or structural) lurking beneath the surface, but the taking up of a 
new framework for taking on these enemies, of dealing with the experiences of 
alienation. 
 
 The State and Subjection 
 In the rest of this chapter I take up an alternative to the strong, paranoid 
approach to the dilemmas of state politics through the work of Foucault and Deleuze 
and Guatarri. Even though their work has been used as fodder for the development of 
these kinds of strong critiques of the state and of incremental state politics, I argue that 
these writers themselves resist the kinds of strong readings that their work can inspire.94 
Instead, through the development of a “strategic” logic, they offer the possibility of an 
analysis of the state that is local, non-paranoid, and perhaps even “weak” in 
                                            




Sedgwick’s sense of the term. Instead, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari present a 
view of the state and its relationship to capitalism and to subject formation that is 
neither necessary nor inevitable, a view that offers an alternative to the dilemma of 
reform or revolution. 
 I take my point of departure from Deleuze’s essays on Foucault, “What is a 
Dispositif?”. I begin here because in this essay Deleuze takes up the important issue of 
subjectivation in Foucault’s work, an issue that remains of central importance 
throughout Foucault’s work from beginning to end, and one that has been productive 
of some of the strongest and most paranoid theories derived from Foucault’s work.95 In 
his essay, Deleuze makes the perhaps counterintuitive claim that Foucault develops his 
notion of subjectivation in order to avoid, rather than produce, a totalizing image of 
power within the various apparatuses that he investigates. That is, the production of 
subjects marks a site of the potential overcoming of apparatuses of power, rather than 
only a site of its most rigid and totalizing power. The radical nature of this claim about 
Foucault’s method is not that it finds emancipatory potential, but that it counters so 
much thinking (and indeed anxiety) about the repressive nature of the processes of 
subjectivation/subjectivation. Indeed, much of this recent anxiety stems from readings 
                                            
95 The use of the term “subjectivation” is important here because it relates to a significant shift in 
Foucault’s vocabulary of the subject from his earlier and to his later work. As Sam Chambers has shown, 
because of inaccurate and inconsistent translation of the term assujettissement (often translated as 
subjection or subjectivation, but best translated as subjectification) this shift in Foucault’s work has been 
under appreciated. Foucault himself made the switch from assujettissement to subjectivation because the 
former was too closely associated with the aspect of subjection, and not the enabling aspect of 
becoming and being a subject. The move to subjectivation was meant to emphasize the double aspect 
of the experience of being a subject and even to highlight the latter dimension of subjectivity that can 
account for the ability of the subject to work upon itself. For more discussion of this point see Chambers 
(2013: 99-103) and Milchman and Rosenberg (2007).  
 
151 
of Foucault’s work on neoliberalism and the rise of biopolitics, as well as readings of 
Deleuze & Guattari that focus on the state as an “apparatus of capture.” In such 
readings, the state and capitalism seem already to have won the day, having turned us 
into biopolitical agents who are only capable of understanding ourselves and each 
other in terms of our potential economic productivity. 
 In “What is a Dispositif?” Deleuze argues that Foucault does not mean for an 
apparatus to be fully determining of what can show up for us—it does not completely 
structure the conditions and possibilities of our existence—even as the dynamic, 
interacting forces within an apparatus do constitute these conditions. Thus, though he 
outlines the familiar argument that for Foucault an apparatus at its most basic is an 
ensemble of interacting lines of force of knowledge, power, and subjectivity that 
produce effects on what is seeable and sayable (2007 [2001]: 159-160), Deleuze 
suggests that Foucault holds apart these lines of force within an apparatus in order to 
avoid viewing them as an immutable force. Therefore, on Deleuze’s reading of 
Foucault, rather than the pre-determined outcome of these convergent lines of force, 
the subject provides the break in them. For Deleuze, Foucault turned to this reading of 
the subject as a response to “a crisis” that threatened to make his work on the social 
apparatus into a strong structuralism in which “unbreakable lines of force would 
impose definitive contours” (2007 [2001]: 161). Hence, for Deleuze, Foucault’s “Self” 
which is produced in a social apparatus is “neither knowledge nor power” but a 
“surplus-value” to the lines of knowledge and power that produce it (2007 [2001]: 
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161). The lines of subjectivation make possible our seeing the possibilities of the break 
or transformation of a social apparatus giving way to another, “which itself may not yet 
exist” (2007 [2001]: 162). As an illustration, Deleuze considers an emergent subject 
like the liberated slave. Under the apparatus of slavery, the individual (as slave) is 
determined in her position in the apparatus of slavery, but that very apparatus 
simultaneously produces the possibility of its undoing (the liberated slave) even as it 
does not prepare in advance the social conditions of this new possibility. The freed 
slave, then, must come to find herself in a social world devoid of pre-existing social 
roles for her. As such, this is not a story either of an essential subjectivation nor of a 
recovery of a common humanity. Instead,  here the emancipated must come to take 
part in shaping “new forms of power knowledge” (2007 [2001]: 161). 
 On Deleuze’s account, this loosening up of the sense of necessity in these lines 
of force, also allows Foucault to develop a non-linear account of history that pursues 
the multiple ways that time and history fold into one another. The task of the theorist 
then involves identifying not only past and present processes that are productive of our 
current experience (including those that we may believe need critical unmasking), but 
also the possibilities for newness that the past and present make possible. For Foucault, 
according to Deleuze, “each apparatus is defined in terms of its newness content and 
its creativity content, this marking at the same time its ability to transform itself, or 
indeed, to break down in favour of a future apparatus, unless it concentrates its 
strength along its harder, more rigid, more solid lines” (2007 [2001]: 163-164). Here 
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subjectivation seems to be capable of producing these transformative effects that will 
lead to creative innovations and the eventual undoing of current apparatuses. Thus, the 
subject appears in its current state neither as a complete manifestation of the past and 
present nor as a projection toward some determined future actualization. Instead, in 
this scheme only what is past is actual (though not inactive or inert), and the current 
situation is always in a process of becoming. As Deleuze describes it, “The newness of 
an apparatus in relation to those which have gone before is what we call its actuality, 
our actuality. The new is the current. The current is not what we are but rather what 
we are in the process of becoming - that is, the Other, our becoming-other” (2007 
[2001]: 164). Thus, Deleuze sees Foucault working on several fronts: Foucault engages 
both an analytic project of investigating how the actuality of the past acts on the 
present and a diagnostic project of examining these current conditions present a 
capacity for creativity (2007 [2001]: 165).  
 Rather than a strong theory of the subject and a paranoid reading of state and 
social power, Deleuze finds in Foucault a project aimed at identifying the forces that 
work against such a strong reading. He comments, “If a diagnostic was found in 
Foucault, it was in the need to locate, for each apparatus, lines of breakage and fissure. 
Sometimes these were situated on the level of powers; at other times on the level of 
knowledges. More generally, it should be said that the lines of subjectivation indicate 
fissures and fractures” (2007 [2001]: 167). Read this way, Foucault’s identification of 
the rise of biopolitics and a governmentality of security is not intended  to add another 
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tool to the critical toolbox that can then be wielded to unmask the countless instances 
of biopoliticization. We must not become limited by this aspect of his analysis. 
Instead, we might use his work to develop positive alternatives to the neo-liberal 
regime that go beyond paranoid criticism alone. But to draw such a position from 
Foucault requires a shift of focus from the conclusions of his study (important as they 




 To do this work, both Foucault and Deleuze & Guattari develop what might be 
called a “strategic,” or anticipatory, logic of causation that analyzes the present in 
terms of a continuum between past and future in which neither past, present, nor 
future are fixed in relation to one another.96 This strategic approach resists a strong 
reading of the relationship between past, present, and future. For Foucault, the past 
bears on the present and the present on the future, but the relationships between these 
temporal moments is not fixed; any of three may impinge upon the other in new and 
unexpected ways. For Foucault, this strategic logic allows him to analyze 
heterogeneous elements within social and historical moments as distinct entities, even 
as they act together to create powerful effects. In this way, Foucault resists collapsing 
various heterogeneous powers of an apparatus (governmental, economic, social) into a 
unified bloc, even as he seeks to analyze the power and effects of their interaction. 
                                            
96 For a discussion of this dynamic within in the context of becoming see Connolly (2011 and 2012). 
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Foucault’s logic of strategy, then, functions as a kind of weak theory in that it resists the 
push to a totalizing theory. Further, it seeks to identify and analyze heterogenous 
elements in a way that multiplies the appearance of effects without resolving them into 
a strong theory. As he puts it, “a logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms 
within a homogeneity [as does dialectical logic] that promises their resolution in a 
unity. The function of a strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between 
disparate terms which remain disparate” (2008 [1978]: 42). This logic, therefore, 
allows Foucault to hold together seemingly disparate elements in economy and state 
government to see how they influence each other without becoming one. Moreover, 
such a logic frees up future possibilities without collapsing them into a situation with 
an inevitable outcome—such as a totalizing process of subjectivation or the necessary 
growth of state power. Thus, Foucault’s analysis of the development of neo-liberalism 
will avoid essentializing any particular configuration of the many interacting elements 
that constitute it, allowing new possibilities to be imagined from it. 
 Hence, in his analysis of neoliberalism, Foucault resists a model of 
neoliberalism as simply a reactivation of liberal policies in the current political 
situation. As he writes: 
The problem is to let knowledge of the past work on the experience of 
the present. It is not at all a matter of coating the present in a form of a 
simple repetition that is undoubtedly what is to be avoided at any cost, 
and that is why I stress this problem of neoliberalism in order to try to 
detach it from these critiques made on the basis of the pure and simple 




Similarly, Foucault rejects a critical theory of the state that views various forms of the 
state as inherently related and therefore to be praised or feared for the same reasons. 
He thus criticizes what he calls an “inflationary” critique of the state that would posit a 
universal notion of the state, particularly as an all-consuming power, which is a crucial 
danger to avoid for a critical project that seeks to criticize certain state practices 
without falling into a universalist critique of state power. Falling into such a trap risks 
putting critical theory on the same footing as the neoliberal critique of the state (not to 
be confused with the critique of the neoliberal state) in which the state is viewed as 
overweening in its involvement in social and economic life, even as neoliberalism 
works to reinforce the power of the state through biopolitics. Strong theories of the 
state that rely on inversion and unmasking often fall into such a trap.  For Foucault 
such an analysis of the state (from either side) both collapses various 
incarnations/imaginations of something called “state” that do not necessarily share a 
common essence and occludes the particularity of these apparatuses (and, we might 
say, the particularity of the possibilities for breaks or fissures within them).  
 Foucault first identifies the “inflationary mechanism” of “state phobia” in the 
German ordoliberal response to the problems of fascism in the 20th century (2008 
[1978]: 185ff.). Such an approach makes a series of mistakes in relation to an 
understanding of the state. First, it attributes to the state “an intrinsic tendency to 
expand” its scope and power such that it will inevitably take over the realm of “civil 
society” (2008 [1978]: 187). Yet, such a reading of the state repeats the same problem 
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that Marx identified with the state and civil society in The King of Prussia. That is, this 
reading posits an abstract line between the state and civil society, taking them to be 
clearly separate entities. As such, a theory of state and civil society can give way to a 
strong reading that overlooks the constructed quality of these various elements as well 
as the multiple ways that they interact. Thus, second, Foucault locates within this state 
phobia a tendency to generalize a certain “genetic continuity or evolutionary 
implication between different forms of the state” (2008 [1978]: 187). That is, 
unspecified criticism of the state in the name of the autonomy of civil society can lead 
to a blind attribution of hostility toward civil society to a wide range of very different 
incarnations of governmental practices (or governmentality).  
 The implication of such a critique, as with a dialectical logic that abstracts from 
the concrete, is that “there is inflation in the sense of an increasing interchangeability 
of analyses and a loss of specificity” (2008 [1978]: 188). Again, this position makes the 
development of a strong, even paranoid, reading of the state much more likely. Take, 
for example, Agamben’s theory of homo sacer that when combined with his 
appropriation of Foucault’s concept of biopower makes it possible to locate within any 
version of the state the inevitable road to a certain kind of fascism and the camp. Such 
a loss of specificity distorts the reality of the particular workings of the state as well as 
limits the possibility of finding alternate ways in which the state might act. Foucault’s 
warning against state phobia here seriously challenges the viability of such a 
(paranoid) approach to the dynamics of state power, for this kind of analysis only 
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works once the theorist has abstracted from the concrete dispositif. Thus, Foucault 
claims that this state phobia “enables one to avoid paying the price of reality and 
actuality inasmuch as, in the name of this dynamism of the state, something like a 
kinship or danger, something like the great fantasy of the paranoiac devouring state 
can always be found” (2008 [1978]: 188). Foucault, then, directs our attention back to 
the concrete conditions in which the state functions and exerts various forms of power 
(and in which there are always powers of resistance as well). The point, then, is that 
these abstractions, as with the problem of alienation, create a politics that remains 




 It is important to note here that Foucault resists taking civil society as an 
empirical given that necessarily stands against or outside of the state. Foucault instead 
prefers to speak of categories like the state, civil society, freedom as “transactional 
realities” that are real only insofar as they produce effects in a system of relations (an 
apparatus) (2008 [1978]: 297).97 The concept of civil society, like those of ordo- and 
neo-liberalism, is a product of a particular historical conjunction and appears in 
relation to the development of a particular state apparatus. Transactional realities 
possess two key characteristics: first, they have not always existed (thus, they have 
                                            
97 cf. John Dewey and Arthur Bentley who originally developed the concept of transactionalism in the 
context of epistemology and psychology (1960). 
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been created through a process of a system of relationships); second, they are real and 
produce powerful effects (2008 [1978]: 297). With such a view of the elements of 
various modes of governmentality and social life Foucault avoids logics of critique that 
posit a desired good (such as a certain vision of freedom or democracy) as an abstract 
or ideal reference point against which various governmental policies are judged or 
which we must recover. Instead, transactional realities of this type “are born precisely 
from the interplay of relations of power and everything that constantly eludes them, at 
the interface, so to speak, of governors and governed” (2008 [1978]: 297).  
 Thus, framing the effects of state capitalism within a strategic logic that analyzes 
transactional realities reveals (at least) two possibilities for this discussion. First, that 
these realities are born from relations of power indicates that they must be seen as 
specific to a particular set of relations. And even when those relations are in a 
particular formation for a period of time, they are still dynamic and fluctuating, rather 
than static. Further, at certain points, as the dynamics of particular power relations shift 
so does the reality which they produce. For example, as William Connolly has shown, 
when the evangelical Christian right entered into political-social policy relations with 
neoliberal economic policies, new possibilities became available to the Bush 
administration in terms of logics of war, terrorism, economy, education, civil rights, 
and so on (Connolly 2008). This confluence (or transaction of power relations) indeed 
shifted the very “nature” of war, terrorism, interrogation and the subjects who enact 
and resist these terms and practices. Likewise, as a growing number of evangelical 
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Christians have come to embrace some forms of environmentalism as part of God’s 
command to act as stewards of the earth and as some evangelicals have moved away 
from the demonization of homosexuality, new possibilities are opened for what 
constitutes our understanding and policy making toward the environment, social and 
familial relations, etc. Indeed, we could say that evangelicalism itself is becoming 
something other than it was before. The same might (hopefully) be said of the 
relationship between marriage and the state as same-sex marriage become more 
widespread. The conservative fear that same-sex marriage will change the “traditional” 
institution of marriage just may prove to be right. 
 Second, and perhaps most importantly for this discussion, Foucault notes that it 
is not only the “interplay of relations of power” that create these transactional realities, 
but also “everything that constantly eludes them” (2008 [1978]: 297 emphasis added). 
Here Foucault is trying to show both that something always escapes the relations of 
power of dominant governmental or societal apparatuses, which in itself may not be a 
particularly powerful insight, and that these things that escape the apparatus are 
themselves a constituent element of the apparatus itself. Thus, an apparatus and its 
effects are constituted both by what the relations of power capture and define as well 
as by that which escapes them. This insight is crucial for warding off both the tendency 
to develop strong theories and the problematic of alienation and recovery, for it rejects 
any essential benchmarks (for freedom or democracy, for instance) even as it seeks to 
lay bare the constituent elements of a given apparatus and it effects. The point 
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becomes clearer when we turn to Foucault’s example of liberalism and its relation to 
freedom. For Foucault, liberalism is one mode of govermentality that powerfully 
produces freedom. But importantly, Foucault resists analyzing freedom as a universal 
that is actualized in better or worse ways at particular moments in history. Instead, 
“[f]reedom is never anything other—but this is already a great deal—than an actual 
relation between governors and governed” (2008 [1978]: 63). Thus, to understand 
freedom in relation to liberalism for Foucault, we must understand what freedom is 
and how it functions in relation to liberalism’s mode of governing and the subjects that 
it governs. In this regard, he claims that liberalism is both a powerful producer and 
consumer of freedom—that is, it must produce the conditions of freedom which it then 
make available for “consumption” through various techniques of organization and 
management (2008 [1978]: 63). Certain modes of freedom (of the market, property, 
certain civil rights, etc.) then are seen as “required” in order for liberalism to function 
according to its own logic. And because such freedoms are not universals waiting to 
be actualized we must see both that they are and how they are produced. Further, that 
these freedoms must be organized and managed precisely through security indicates 
the paradox at the heart of the liberal model of freedom (2008 [1978]: 63-65). 
 Indeed, for Foucault, definitive of liberalism is the “economy of power” 
constituted by “this interplay of freedom and security” (2008 [1978]: 65). Further, that 
liberal and neo-liberal regimes have been so concerned with issues of security indicate 
a tacit awareness of “that which eludes” them. For the fact that something always 
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escapes it produces the very need for security in the first place. This point might 
somehow feel self-evident: of course security concerns exist in relation to the fact that 
something always escapes and potentially threatens us. Yet Foucault shows not only 
that our modes of governmentality are constituted in part by things beyond our control 
but also that they create that which eludes them––even as it eludes them. For example, 
since 9/11 a powerful part of the United States’ self-awareness has been constituted by 
the creation of a set of subjects (phantasmatic though they may be) who “hate 
freedom” and “oppose our way of life.” And even as we can identify these others, it is 
crucial that they remain forever beyond us, elusive, uncapturable. For only in this way 
can our experience of freedom be sustained in this mode in opposition to those who 
would change or destroy it. This point may even appear as counterintuitive for the 
marriage case, because same-sex marriage could be read as part of the state’s attempt 
to capture what is increasingly becoming acceptable in the realm of civil society. But 
here it is important to remember Rancière’s argument that such a reading depends 
upon the assumption of a naive class that blindly accepts the state’s control. In 
Foucault’s terms, this reading of the state’s capture of marriage demonstrates the kind 
of state phobia he resists. Further, it allows us to read the phenomenon of marriage as 
a continuous, given reality, rather than a transactional one. 
 Foucault also demonstrates a similar dynamic in his Security, Territory, 
Population lectures given in 1977-78, one year prior to The Birth of Biopolitics. There 
he frames the logic of the co-constitutive dynamic of an apparatus and that which 
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escapes it in terms of “counter-conducts.” He writes, for instance, “The history of 
raison d'Etat, the history of governmental ratio, and the history of counter-conducts 
opposed to it, are inseparable from each other” (2007 [1978]: 357). Moreover, these 
counter-conducts serve as “the stake” of the state - that they motivate state policy and 
action (2007 [1978]: 357). Thus, Foucault suggests that one of the conditions of 
possibility for the (re)production of the state of governmentality is the existence of its 
particular rivals that seek its undoing. Likewise, as our mode of governmentality shifts 
so does our response to it. Thus, we might see that a certain version of liberal 
democracy in some way depended on various versions of left critiques of it. The two 
are even co-constitutive as both they, and the possibility for their grounds of 
contestation, emerge together. For Foucault there is no pure outside of apparatuses of 
power (in this case the state apparatus) and the possible forms of contestation are 
always-already inflected by the apparatus in advance. Of course, we must guard 
against the danger of viewing the state as possessing an endogenous power “growing 
like a huge monster or automatic machine” (2007 [1978]: 354). The co-constitutive 
nature of the state and its counter-conducts instead highlights the contingency of both - 
they can come into being, evolve, and pass away. 
 Yet, in these earlier lectures Foucault explores more deeply the power of the 
state to shape us and our view of the world. Here he describes the state variously as 
the “principle of intelligibility,” the “strategic schema,” or the “regulatory idea of 
governmental reason” (2007 [1978]: 286). As the principle of intelligibility the state far 
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exceeds the basic notion of government as a practice of the state. Here we see the 
depth of Foucault’s notion of governmental rationality (or governmentality)—not just as 
mechanism for governing through security or discipline but as a powerful orderer of 
rationality itself. For example, he suggests that the shift in the understanding of the 
state marks a change in government, and, more powerfully, “the transformation of 
Western reason” that culminated in a new way of “thinking, reasoning, and 
calculating” (2007 [1978]: 286, emphasis added). The result has been a rethinking of 
the state and of history and temporality, in which universality is abandoned for a view 
of history that rests on a concept of “an open time and a multiple spatiality” (2007 
[1978]: 290). Therefore, the opening up of history required and made possible by the 
shift to governmentality makes visible the contingency of this very apparatus of power 
and, thus, gives rise to a plurality of counter-realities, even as they share the same 
conditions of possibility for their existence. 
 
Anticipation and Massification 
 I turn briefly now to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the state in A Thousand 
Plateaus, because there they pursue more extensively than Foucault the conditions 
under which the state becomes more consolidated, even as they work, like Foucault, 
against an endogenous account of the growth of state power. In A Thousand Plateaus 
Deleuze and Guattari take up the distinction between state and non-state entities, and 
in order to avoid an evolutionary account of the rise of the State they contest the idea 
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that non-state entities are pre-State in origin. Instead they claim that non-states are 
“counter-State societies organizing mechanisms that ward off the State-form, which 
make its [the State’s] crystallization possible” (1980 [2005]: 429). This claim, like 
Foucault’s critique of an inflationary reading of the state, works against a model of the 
development of the state and capitalism as the inevitable evolution of society from the 
primitive to the more complex. Moreover, this analysis of the state and counter-State 
movements allows them to argue against a Marxian argument that would presume that 
the overcoming of capitalism requires the overthrow of the State. Instead, Deleuze and 
Guattari find in non-state societies a series of practices and tendencies, which 
simultaneously work to move society in the direction of the state form and to ward off 
the state form from taking hold on their society (1980 [2005]: 430-431). Further, they 
suggest that that which the State or non-state seeks to avoid may not yet exist in any 
definite form; that is, the mechanisms of a social formation are always at work to ward 
off these anticipated deviations. As they write, “To ward off is also to anticipate” (1980 
[2005]: 431).  
 However, for Deleuze and Guattari, as for Foucault, the State can indeed enact 
a powerful set of effects that rigidify certain forms of social and economic order. 
Indeed, they argue that the State functions by mechanisms of overcoding, which may 
also be described as processes of stratification. States operate by drawing lines of 
various types (geographical, legal, etc.) that segment society into various functions 
while simultaneously causing these segments to resonate with each other across 
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various strata of society. States (and other social organizations) operate more or less 
rigidly depending on the degree of resonance they generates between its various 
sections (cf. Althusser’s “teeth-gnashing harmony”). Powerful, centralized states, for 
instance, have the power to generate resonance powerfully across diverse segments of 
the society. For example, they argue that in a rigid society, “The face of the father, 
teacher, colonel, boss, enter into redundancy, refer back to a center of significance 
that moves across the various circles and passes back over all of the segments” (1980 
[2005]: 211). Further, they suggest that capitalism works paradoxically in relation to 
the State for whereas the state tends toward the practices of stratification, capitalism 
tends also must work to against such stratification in order to increase possibilities for 
growth, conglomeration, and the increase of capital. Insofar as capitalism works 
against the stratification of the State it (somewhat paradoxically given the current 
conditions of state-capitalism) also works as a kind of counter-State movement. As they 
write, “Everything changes depending on whether these flows connect up with a war 
machine or, on the contrary, enter into conjunctions or a general conjugation that 
appropriates them for the State” (1980 [2005]: 459). In the USA, for instance, 
neoliberal capitalism has entered into powerful conjunctions with the State that creates 
a complex set of drives in which the State and capitalism often have competing ends 
even as they push one another to particular actions and policies.  
 Despite the power of this State capitalism resonance-machine, which seems to 
capture all that might escape it, Deleuze and Guattari, like Foucault, maintain that 
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“something always gets away” (1980 [2005]: 471-472). To make this point they draw a 
distinction between macro and micropolitics and molar and molecular levels of 
analysis. An analysis of the macro or molar level of an apparatus will focus on the the 
large scale forces that compose an apparatus, perhaps focusing on “state” or 
“capitalism” as unified entities. The micro or molecular, on the other hand, identifies 
the multiplicity of drives and practices that actually produce phenomena that then 
show up on the macro level.  On the level of micropolitics “a society is defined by its 
lines of flight” (1980 [2005]: 216). Lines of flight, as practices that work against the 
stratifying effects of the state, share some relation to Foucault’s notion of the various 
elements—practices, subjects, entities—that elude the capture of an apparatus by 
resisting or fleeing it. Like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari see these lines of flight as 
co-constitutive of an apparatus, at least at the micro level. Yet, paradoxically Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest that the more rigid a society becomes, the more possibilities it 
creates for escape (lines of flight). For in order to become rigid an apparatus also has to 
become segmentary—it must multiply the number of functions it controls - and each 
segment opens the possibility for something to escape. Take the example above of the 
various roles (of the father, teacher, colonel, boss) that resonate together in a rigid 
society. Each of these roles is linked up to macro dimensions of society that relate to 
the roles of the household, workplace, citizen, and so on, and to the micro dimensions 
of these relationships where drives and practices that reinforce or resist these roles play 
out. Thus, each role or segment provides a site for deviance from the prescriptions of a 
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given norm. For Deleuze and Guattari, state capitalism ends up maximizing both the 
possibilities for rigid control and the possibilities for lines of flight as it multiplies the 
number of roles taken on by each individual. 
 Despite the possibilities of escape intrinsic to the very structures of state 
capitalism––structures that would purport to foreclose such possibilities––it is 
important to mark the oppressive characteristics of state capitalist regimes as well. 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari take seriously the very real coercive and 
potentially violent consequences of these regimes both for individual and collective 
life and for the possibility of overcoming these consequences. These negative effects 
are in part a result of the very possibility of escape that they create. We can think of 
this mechanism of anticipation, or warding off, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense: state 
capitalist regimes work not only to maximize the increase of capital but also to ward 
off in advance unknown factors that might disrupt their smooth functioning. Both 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari identify this work as a massification, a process of 
subjectivation in which individuals are produced as individuals, but in such a way that 
they can be dealt with en masse as members of identifiable groups that are countable 
and able to be regularized. Thus, individuals become interchangeable and only 
“count” insofar as they are able to be fitted within determined groups.  
 Massification, then, opens the possibility not only for the erasure of the 
individual (in their interchangeability) but also for the atrocities of fascism. For 
Foucault this massifying power of the state makes possible the rise of biopolitics by 
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considering humans as part of a species that can be segmented into individuals within 
a population. He argues that the focus of biopolitics and population is on “a multiple 
body, a body with so many heads that, while they might be infinite in number, cannot 
necessarily be counted. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as 
political problem” (1975 [2003]: 243). Biopolitics works like Deleuze and Guattari’s 
segmentation in which society multiplies roles so individuals can be better managed 
by the state for the productive aims of capitalism. Thus, individuals can be normalized 
through discipline and regulation along a number of lines - sexuality, health practices, 
procreation— in terms of their productivity for society (1975 [2003]: 252-253). Thus, 
we get the introduction of the “enterprise society” in which individuals are encouraged 
to be and measured in terms of their success in being entrepreneurs for their lives and 
prosperity (2008 [1978]: 147). Foucault notes how racism enters here as a means to 
make life “healthier” and purer (1975 [2003]: 255), and we could easily add various 
other categories that have been deployed to these ends—many of which he has 
mapped out for us, including madness, sexuality, disability.98 Likewise, Deleuze and 
Guattari identify the massification of individuals as a reaction of power centers (be 
they the State, capitalism, or something else) to their inability to control the flows that 
are always moving to escape. Yet, they caution against seeing the lines of flight as 
inevitable or unstoppable escape routes from repressive forms of subjectivation. They 
write:  
                                            
98 This is the kind of “drop dead gorgeous” theory, as Sedgwick calls it, that Foucault can produce. But, 
as seductive as it is, we must resist making it into a strong theory. 
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“It would be oversimplifying to believe that the only risk they fear and 
confront is allowing themselves to be recaptured in the end, letting 
themselves be sealed in, tied up, reknotted, reterritorialized...instead of 
connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, 
turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of 
abolition.” (1980 [2005]: 229) 
 
In other words, the desire for abolition can lead down a destructive path that could 
undermine the attempt to escape the current regime. Indeed, at the end of this 
destructive path lies fascism for the lines of flight just as it does for the regimes of 
power that produce them. 
 
No Exit 
 Thus, both Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari appear rather ambivalent about 
the possibilities of real escape, for such a possibility would produce another kind of 
strong theory that their project work against. Indeed, to speak of escape or 
emancipation seems too strong on the account given here. Other than his warnings 
against endogenous readings of state power Foucault, as Deleuze notes, gives little 
indication in much of his work of what might be done to ameliorate the repressive 
conditions of subjectivation under State capital forms of governmentality,. For as we 
have noted, he resists accounts of the state and society that judge them in terms of 
better or worse or more or less freedom per se. Every apparatus produces effects that 
both restrict and produce the conditions of existence. On the other hand, Deleuze and 
Guattari seem to be slightly more hopeful about the possibilities for lines of flight out 
of the regimes of State capitalism, at least from one perspective. They seem to place 
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some hope in the increasing minoritization of the world under the global capitalist 
axiomatic. For as this axiomatic works on the one hand to massify and make us 
manipulable as countable sets, it also produces the proliferation of minorities which 
remain non-denumerable. As they write, “At the same time as capitalism is effectuated 
in the denumerable sets serving as its models, it necessarily constitutes 
nondenumberable sets that cut across and disrupt those models” (1980 [2005]: 472). 
As nondenumberable, these minorities are also “nonaxiomizable” and constitute 
“multiplicities of escape and flux” (1980 [2005]: 470).  
 The state (and capitalist institutions), of course, also works to neutralize the 
power of the minority by creating axioms that will effectively deal with them (1980 
[2005]: 470). In Foucault’s terms, the state can hope to make them another population 
to be regularized. Internally, the minority must fight the tendency to seek integration as 
a solution to its problem of being unrecognizable to the state (1980 [2005]: 472). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, “The power of the minorities is not measured by their capacity 
to enter and make themselves felt within the majority system...but to bring to bear the 
force of the non-denumerable sets, however small they may be, against the 
denumerable sets, even if they are infinite, reversed, or changed, even they if [sic] 
imply new axioms or, beyond that, a new axiomatic” (1980 [2005]: 471). Ultimately, 
they suggest, “It is by leaving the plan(e) of capital, and never ceasing to leave it, that a 
mass becomes increasingly revolutionary and destroys the dominant equilibrium of the 
denumerable sets” (1980 [2005]: 472, emphasis added). But on Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s own terms this never-ceasing escape is not really a possibility because, as 
they argue, all of these forces of capture or flight (or at least the anticipation of them) 
exist simultaneously within all of the various apparatuses that make them possible. It 
seems that on their own account, the minorities can no more continually leave the 
plane of capital any more than capital can halt the escape of minorities working 
against the consolidations of capital. 
 That said, to be ambivalent about the emancipatory possibilities of political and 
social life is not to give oneself over to totalizing view of state capitalism. Instead, as I 
proposed at the beginning of this chapter, we might begin to look for the possibilities 
for contestation or resistance within the conditions of the state itself. To return to the 
case of marriage, many will continue to argue that such rights-claiming only 
capitulates to the power of the state to identify and regulate relations between various 
constituencies. Such an argument can surely draw some support from the work of 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari as laid out here. But we can also go another way. 
For the conditions that make possible the claiming of rights also has opened up the 
potential for rights claims that can potentially disrupt those very conditions.99 Again, in 
the case of gay marriage one can argue that the granting of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples will only capture them within the neoliberal governmentality of biopolitics. In 
such a view, marriage seems to recognize the gay population as potential contributors 
to the economic machine of capitalism. We see this kind of argument within LGBT 
groups that try to show that same-sex partners are just as (or even more) “productive” 
                                            
99 cf. Karen Zivi (2011). 
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as their opposite-sex counterparts or that same-sex parents raise children who are at 
least as socially well-adapted (and, thus, economically productive) as straight parents. 
But if we employ the strategic logic I have been developing in this chapter, we might 
hold these various elements of the rights debate separate—in order to see how they 
have come into being, how they impinge upon each other, and what effects they might 
make possible. For instance, what if we were to admit that same-sex marriage would, 
indeed, change “traditional” marriage? We might begin to see that the introduction of 
new forms of kinship can release powerful potentials in various directions: to 
undermine patriarchy, to begin to delink the production of healthy productive children 
to standards of social worth, and perhaps shift ideal understandings of economic and 
social practices in general.100 Indeed, we may come to see that the social and 
economic conditions of neoliberalism have made possible this very innovation. For the 
production of the possibility of rights-claiming, freedom, and even individual 
entrepreneurship has certainly contributed in no small degree to the production of a 
queer movement seeking its own liberation. 
 
                                            





Failure: The Best Medicine? 
 
 Samuel Beckett opens perhaps his most famous play, Endgame, with an 
enigmatic invocation of Eubilides’s sorites paradox, or the paradox of the heap:  
CLOV (fixed gaze, tonelessly): Finished, it's finished, nearly finished, it must be 
nearly finished (Pause). Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, 
there's a heap, the impossible heap. (Beckett, 1958: 1)101 
 
Both the meaning of the paradox and its referent remain unclear. We are not given any 
account of what “it” is and what it might mean for “it” to be finished. There is only the 
possibility of an “impossible heap.” Clov suggests that, perhaps when it is over, “I can’t 
be punished any more” (1958: 1). He then shuffles off to his kitchen––a 10 cubic foot 
extension of the small cell in which the characters reside––and notes that it has “nice 
dimensions, nice proportions” (1958: 2). All we can see in the small room are 
Hamm—who sits in his wheeled chair and whose face at this point is covered with a 
handkerchief—and two trashcans, which we will later learn are the homes of Nagg 
and Nell, who are possibly Hamm’s parents. Hamm, then, appears to awake, yawns, 
removes the handkerchief from his face, and declares: “Me––(yawns)––to play” (1958: 
2). With that Beckett begins this play by suspending us (and his characters) between 
the sense of something (perhaps, impossibly) coming to an end and the 
commencement of a game or play. Yet, the play that the characters go on to engage in 
feels little like a game with any recognizable arc. Instead, Endgame leads us through a 
                                            
101 That Beckett is invoking Eubilides’ paradox is obscure at best and only becomes slightly clearer in 




series of broken, repetitive dialogues that provide little narrative that might provide 
information or shape to create a story of the characters’s lives. The “play” that unfolds 
will become Hamm and Clov’s––with occasional interludes with Nagg and Nell––
confounding, repetitive, and comic (if not clownish) dialogue.102  
 Beckett’s Endgame, as a work nearly devoid of context and action, may appear 
to be a strange place to pursue––much less complete––the project of difference to 
which this dissertation has attempted to contribute. Yet, this opening scene in some 
way recalls the epigraphs with which I began this dissertation: Nietzsche’s depiction of 
the human suspended as a bridge, an on-the-way, and Foucault’s challenge to take up 
the question and project of “What can be played?”. Throughout this dissertation I have 
attempted to pursue some version of this sense of suspension and possibility by 
considering dimensions of alienation in images of the human (and humanist politics), 
the self and subjectivity, and the politics of the state as these experiences condition our 
sense of the limits and potential of contemporary life. In these discussions, I have been 
circling around the question of how we might theorize and navigate the experiences of 
living a (human) life in contemporary conditions that appear to be simultaneously 
fecund and fallow, beautiful and brutal, promising and punishing.103 Certainly the 
feeling of being “nearly finished” deeply imbues the contemporary condition as it is 
                                            
102 The lack of action and in the play, along with the isolated world of the cell, lends the play to post-
apocalyptic and anti-political readings that see the play as a depiction of life in the post-Holocaust 
nuclear age (Adorno 1982 [1961]) or in the modern condition of the death of God or of God’s 
abandonment of humanity (Cavell 2002). 
103 One of the most compelling and insightful discussions of this kind of dilemma in light of the 
American imperative for optimism can be found in Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism (2011). In a 
different way, Sara Ahmed has criticized the contemporary cultural imperative for women to aim 
primarily at a state of happiness. See her The Promise of Happiness (2010). 
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marked by frequent economic crises, a changing climate, the rise of new covert forms 
of warfare, and so on. But the possibility of new forms of life likewise punctuate 
contemporary experience. In this chapter, with Beckett, I want to dwell with the two 
experiences of suspension and, more brutally, failure that he thematizes so well, even 
as we will see, he and his characters fail to achieve it. 
  I take up Beckett and failure here because Beckett’s work captures, in an 
especially poignant way, various conditions of alienation; Beckett pushes these 
experiences, along with his characters and his audience, to their limits, but his play 
stops short of promising a resolution or new foundation for taking on the dilemmas of 
meaning and recognition.104 To do so, Beckett undoes the traditional demands put 
upon a drama in terms of place, time, and (narrative) action. Instead of answering 
these demands, he suspends his plays between somewhere and nowhere, an uncertain 
past and an uncertain future, between nothing happening and "something taking its 
course." The plays are set in liminal spaces nearly devoid of context, outside any place 
that might constitute a shared common world. In Endgame isolation appears to be the 
essential condition of the characters: cut off from a public, social world outside the 
cell, if a larger social world can even be taken to exist at all. Even in their relationships 
to one another, they seem essentially alienated both physically and psychically. Nagg 
and Nell are isolated in their cans by their immobility; Hamm is bound to his chair by 
his disability (or his refusal to stand and walk) and by his blindness; and even Clov, 
                                            
104 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit point to the identification between the actors on Beckett’s stage and 
the viewers (1993: 28).  
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who seems to have the most autonomy through the mobility of his body, cannot rest 
because of his apparent inability to sit. Moreover, Hamm and Clov are locked in a co-
dependent relationship for subsistence in which no real action seems possible. Instead, 
there is only endless talking, Clov's extermination of a flea and (perhaps) a rat, his 
occasional pushing Hamm around the room, and the endless running out of things: 
biscuits, pap, words, and perhaps life itself. As Robert Gilman has noted, Endgame is 
not a work of social commentary; rather, it seems almost to be situated outside of 
history where Beckett pursues “human ontology, in the status of the stripped isolated 
self beneath social elaboration " (1988: 83-85). In totally stripping away the 
sociopolitical context, Beckett pushes us to come to terms with the idea that the 
difficulties of action and agency (and of politics) cannot be remedied by the right sort 
of context or by a recovery of an original essence, for no context or essence will do. 
Instead, Beckett works to thematize the uncertain, contingent dimensions of life that 
depend on the ongoing creation and enactment of context and its meaning in the first 
place. 
 Yet, in so doing, his work also shows us that things are not all bad. The 
characters (and the audience) sometimes laugh, they at times experience some 
moments of narrative cohesion and even joy, even if it seems almost always over and 
gone. As Nell says, “And we laugh, we laugh, with a will, in the beginning. But it’s 
always the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny story we have heard too often, we still 
find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more” (1958: 19). Beckett’s “play,” then, takes 
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place in a strange liminal zone suspended between humor and despair, failure and 
success. It therefore provides another approach to the problematics of alienation that I 
have been tracing throughout this project––alienation as an experience of both 
suspension and failure. With Beckett, I consider another way of understanding and 
experiencing this sense of alienation and the strange form of agency it supplies. 
Because success is too often judged from the perspective of normative modes of 
discourse that hold narrow views of the political and the possibilities for the 
experience and efficacy of a plurality of forms of action and agency, these modes of 
thought cause us to miss forms of agency, and forms of politics, that persist and thrive 
in the mode of alienation, failure, suspension, and even humor––as well as the ways 
these forms of life can affect and reshape these dominant modes of thought 
themselves.  
 Against readings of Beckett as overly pessimistic or as a carrier of an underlying 
humanist existentialism, I argue that Beckett's work presents a stark vision of the 
ongoing struggle to create a space for action, but a vision that moves away from 
dominant criteria for action, in the first place.105 In pursuing this project, Beckett 
employs humor, parody, play (elements of life that are often not considered “serious 
enough” for the hard work of politics),106 and, of course, despair (an experience 
                                            
105 As Bersani and Dutoit describe, “Beckett’s characters, unrelated to any reality, social or 
metaphysical, beyond the instant in which they may or may not begin again to speak, continuously 
reperform through their language their entry into the world” (1993: 36). 
106 Play is not universally denigrated as insufficient for theory (and politics). Hans-Georg Gadamer saw 
play as a central aspect of a hermeneutical aesthetics (see Gadamer 2004 [1975], especially Part I, 
Chapter 2). Gadamer’s concept of artwork as the putting of various elements in play resonates with 
Beckett’s dramatic scenes that depend as much on the arrangement of objects and characters (and, 
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ironically not considered unworthy as a motivation for politics), all of which project an 
novel image of the limits and possibilities of late modern life. In this pursuit, he 
provides an important way of understanding failure and alienation for political 
thought. Beckett shifts the time and space of action, dramatizes its fits and starts, and 
thereby provides an image of agency that illumines the persistence of life at the edges, 
at the limits of zones of the political, intelligibility, and experiences of subjectivity. In 
so doing, I argue, he gives us a way of seeing forms of action and agency that are 
traditionally excluded from politics, where agency and action were not and are not 
ever eliminated, but fail to meet the normative criteria of success. Agency here is only 
ever subjunctive, it must be taken up as a risky endeavor of failure to begin (again) 
where failure always risks both failing to fail (and getting recaptured by and dominant 
normative orders) and failing completely (that is, coming to nothing).  
 
Refusal 
 CLOV: So you all want me to leave you. 
 HAMM: Naturally. 
 CLOV: Then I’ll leave you. 
 HAMM: You can’t leave us. 
 CLOV: Then I won’t leave you. 
 HAMM: Why don’t you finish us? 
 (Pause.) 
 I’ll tell you the combination of the cupboard if you promise to finish me. 
                                                                                                                                       
even, dialogue itself as a kind of object taken out of its typical context) as on the development of a 
coherent narrative. In this sense, play takes on a kind of methodological role like Gilles Deleuze’s 
“method of dramatization” in which a concept can be analyzed not as a representation of a logos, but a 
creation of dynamic scene that gains its efficacy from its ability both to create and to illuminate new 
effects (2002 [1967]). Iain Mackenzie and Robert Porter have recently taken up this approach as a 
potential method for political theory (2011). Finally, Jacques Derrida, too, relied on a concept of play in 
the development of his concept of deconstruction (1978). 
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 CLOV: I couldn’t finish you. 
 HAMM: Then you won’t finish me. 
 CLOV: I’ll leave you, I have things to do.107 
 In dialogues like these Beckett thematizes the difficulty of escape, of bringing 
things to an end, even in a world as bare as that of Endgame. Here Hamm and Clov 
take up a game of failure and refusal in which they resist listening and responding to 
the other in anything we might call “conventional” terms. Throughout Beckett’s work 
his characters continually attempt to bring an end to their predicaments and to the 
demands of the relationships in which they are embedded by refusing the given terms 
and conditions of discourse––only to find themselves bound up again by the tangled 
imbrications of life and language. Indeed, as Bersani and Dutoit have argued, Beckett’s 
whole body of work represents an attempt to fail––to refuse the demands of language 
and genre draw down to nothing the language, meaning, and its contexts. But one of 
the most prominent and precarious aspects of taking up a project that intends to fail––
at least in terms of normative definitions of success––is that the refusal that these 
projects demand puts them in a troubling position in relation to their project of failure. 
Such projects of failure, as Bersani and Dutoit suggest, are “dangerous” on their own 
terms not because of “the common anxiety about failing, but rather an anxiety about 
not failing” (1993: 1). Clov and Hamm pursue their projects of refusal and failure in 
Endgame in the hopes of bringing their situation to end, but even this project continues 
to entangle them again. Likewise, as the author, Beckett pursues of a kind of 
minimalism of meaning and context as an apparent attempt to fail the conventions of 
                                            
107 (Beckett 1958: 37). 
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drama and meaning, all while recognizing that there is no chance of complete escape 
from the systems of power and meaning that give shape to our lives. Bersani and 
Dutoit again put this point simply: “Perhaps the most serious reproach we can make 
against Samuel Beckett is that he has failed to fail” (1993: 11).  
 The pursuit of failure is not unique to Beckett. Similar projects have been taken 
up by a range of movements and authors that aim to refuse normative terms of political 
and economic life, of sex and family, and even of academic disciplines. There is a 
growing line of thinkers from William James to Gilles Deleuze to Judith Halberstam 
and movements from separatist groups to Occupy Wall Street that have embraced 
some sort of failure as means to contest hegemonic criteria of success that privilege or 
demand certain bodies, subject positions, and forms of agency as capable of (or 
counting as) participating in political life.108 They have made similar calls for taking up 
the project of failure not in order to develop a more capacious attitude toward human 
finitude and the demands of capitalist modernity, but as a project of throwing off these 
very demands and standards of success. These theorists contest the criteria for agency 
set by dominant normative demands for sovereign, responsible, moral action, and a 
proper place for (democratic) political life. For instance, William James, in criticizing 
the conditions of Gilded Age politics, called for “people who are willing to espouse 
failure as their vocation. I wish that could be organized. It would soon pass into its 
                                            
108 One might include Thomas Dumm's work in this list, particularly his essay “Political Theories for 
Losers” (Dumm 2000), but I take his interest in loss to come from a different impulse. His goal is to 
“reinspirit life in the face of loss” in a way that seems to hold close to a humanist vision that the thinkers 
I engage here move away from. Instead, these thinkers pursue failure and loss as a risky practice that 
must be taken up with no great faith (though perhaps with some hope) for re-inspiration. 
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opposite" (James 2000 [1895]). Thus, James suggested that people should "raise an 
impotent row" against the collusion of moneyed interests and politics (1992 [1895]).109 
There is a certain humorous sarcasm in this notion of an “impotent row” for with it 
James acknowledges the impossibility of complete failure even as he calls for the 
attempt and holds out hope that it might change something.  Thus, James demonstrates 
the paradoxical movement in this approach to failure. On the one hand, his admission 
of the “impotence” of raising a row against the collusion of money and politics admits 
a kind of futile, though worthwhile, quality in the project of protest. On the other, 
James reveals his melioristic outlook in affirming that this pursuit of failure might “soon 
pass into its opposite,” ultimately breaking apart these powerful institutions.  
 As tempting as it may be to follow James’s meliorism, I would like to hold in 
suspense for a while this hope for a move from failure to success and instead consider 
what a political project of failure might look like if we could suspend this (perhaps 
more gratifying) move toward success. To do so, I want to consider for a moment the 
context of queer theory and its relationship to failure and refusal. The experiences of 
queer lives and the work of queer theory have––for a long time now––persisted in this 
alienated, suspended relation to the possibility of failure and success. Certainly, at 
times the pursuit of refusal and the experience of failure in queer life is primarily, as 
                                            
109 James takes up failure under a different valence––as an essential aspect of human experience––in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience: "Failure, then, failure! so the world stamps us at every turn. We strew it 
without blunders, our misdeeds, our lost opportunities, with all the memorials of our inadequacy to our 
vocation. And with what a damning emphasis does it then blot us out! No easy fine, no mere apology or 
formal expiation, will satisfy is soaked with all its blood. The subtlest forms of suffering known to man 
are connected with the poisonous humiliations incidental to these results. And they are pivotal human 
experiences!" (1987 [1902]: 130). I owe thanks to Alex Livingston for pointing me to James’s invocations 
of failure (Livington 2013). 
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Butler has suggested, about survival in conditions of abjection from accepted forms of 
life and kinship. At others, the project of refusal has been taken up in a creative 
attempt to establish a new way outside of more conventional ways of life. Queer 
communities, like the Van Dykes of the 1970‘s, have long recognized the potential 
power of rejecting normative demands of identity and belonging. The Van Dykes, in 
an attempt to escape the limits of patriarchal culture and the binary of man/woman, 
formed nomadic communities of “womyn” that excluded all men and celebrated the 
experience of lesbian sex and friendship. These womyn self-consciously rejected the 
heterosexist demands of norms of kinship, sex, and politics. In some measure, they 
clearly succeeded both for a time before they broke apart and through their legacy in 
the continuation of a small, but vibrant community of van and RV communities (Levy 
2009). Yet, the terms of their success were always beyond the normative models of sex 
and kinship, and their ultimate “failure” in their breaking apart makes the terms of that 
success difficult to qualify. The womyn of the Van Dykes at times describe their 
movement in terms of refusal and even failure, even when they are bound up like 
Hamm and Clov in a relationship to normative life that they can never fully escape.  
 
Feeling Backwards (and Forwards) 
 NELL (elegiac): Ah yesterday!110 
 From her position in a trash bin in the small cell of Endgame, Nell’s experience 
of the past takes on this position of longing for something that has been lost. Beckett 
                                            
110 Beckett 1958: 20. “Ah yesterday” is Nell’s refrain throughout the play the invocation of the past. 
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wants to acknowledge this sense of loss and longing and simultaneously to silence it (a 
desire seen in Hamm’s repeated demand that Clov “bottle her”). In so doing, he 
presents a complicated relationship between the past, present, and future and a desire 
to undo any smooth narrative that might help us to make sense of one or the other. As 
with Beckett’s characters, for many queer theorists the experience of queer life is 
framed by the experience of loss, one that should be held on to against easy narratives 
of progress in overcoming the rejection and alienation of queer experience. Heather 
Love, in a succinct statement of the position, argues for a position of “feeling 
backwards” which affirms the experience of loss by refusing to turn from it to an easier 
narrative of progress. She writes, “Backwards feelings serve as an index to the ruined 
state of the social world; they indicate continuities between the bad gay past and the 
present; and they show up the inadequacy of queer narratives of progress. Most 
important, they show us that we do not know what is good for politics” (Love 2007: 
27). Love makes an important point in cautioning against the political narratives that 
would incautiously endorse a smooth story of progress of increasing inclusion for 
queer, or any other, marginalized experience. For Love, the experience of feeling 
backward allows us to slow down the move to dominant logics of recognition and 
inclusion, which have been shown to reinforce the very conditions that they seek to 
overcome (cf. Brown 1993). She, likewise, suggests that feeling backwards also 
cautions against looking to the past as a kind of “golden age” of better times. 
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Backwards feeling, then, seems like an important counter to the narratives of success 
that depend on heteronormative ideals of kinship and reproduction.  
However, this kind of backward looking can also give rise to another problem 
that Beckett warns against. The trouble with looking back is that it places too much 
faith in the experience of the past to provide a helpful brake on the present (and the 
future). For instance, as I argued in chapters 2 and 3, Judith Butler’s turn to past 
experiences of violation can too easily lead to a kind of melancholic ethics, one that 
gives up on political institutions as a means to redress these experiences of loss and 
harm (cf. Honig 2010). Further, when taken to an extreme, this focus on the queer 
experience of loss and alienation can lead to a view of queer life as oriented toward a 
radical antisociality and anti-politics, as in the work of Lee Edelman. Edelman views 
queer life as inherently antisocial in its inability (and refusal) to live up to the demands 
of capitalist and heteronormative reproduction and sociability. In Edelman's polemical 
case against the logics of reproduction and futurism that saturate contemporary 
capitalist society, he call for a queer “no future” as a radical demand for the rejection 
of the logic of reproduction that drives dominant forms of heteronormativity and neo-
liberal capitalist projects and politics. In a highly polemical style, Edelman writes: “For 
politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to 
produce a more desirable order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to 
affirm a structure, to authenticate a social order (2004: 2-3). Beckett’s pursuit of failure 
and the end of meaning echoes something like Edelman’s sentiment here. However, 
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there is an important difference, for Edelman’s refusal of politics calls for a kind of pure 
refusal that Beckett recognizes is impossible. Beckett’s work is fruitful for thinking 
through the possibilities and alienations of politics and contemporary life because he 
resists the urge for purity even as he recognizes its lure. 
In response to Edelman’s "negative" approach to queer theory, Judith 
Halberstam has recently attempted to lay out a different vision of a “queer art of 
failure” that refuses “to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline” while 
pursuing through queer experience new modes of sociality and politics. As she writes, 
the queer art of failure turns its attention “to the impossible, the improbable, the 
unlikely, and the unremarkable. It quietly loses, and in losing it imagines other goals 
for life, for love, for art, and for being” (Halberstam 2011: 88). Against the antisocial 
movement in queer thought, she argues for a view that provides a “map of political 
paths not taken, though it does not chart a completely separate land” (2011: 19). Yet, 
unlike James, Halberstam resists the narrative that the pursuit of failure might be 
oriented toward its future success. We see this resistance in her only reference to 
Beckett in which she reads Beckett's famous line from Worstward Ho, "fail again, fail 
better,” as indicative of a tendency, “to give way to a desire for oddly normative 
markers of success and achievement” (2011: 186). This reading echoes a popular 
reading of Beckett’s “fail again, fail better” as a mark of his enduring humanism––as a 
statement of human resilience in the face of all that opposes it. 
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But Beckett’s work resists this kind of melioristic reading, and it is here that I 
would like to mark here two important distinctions between the approach that I am 
taking to Beckett on failure and the one articulated by Halberstam. First is a matter of 
genre. For Halberstam, following Stuart Hall and Antonio Gramsci, the queer art of 
failure is best pursued on the terrain of low theory (2011: 15-17), rejecting as 
patriarchal and hegemonic texts that are read as classics or part of the tradition 
(presumably including Beckett). In fact, she attributes the antisocial orientation of 
Edelman111 to his narrow range of traditional sources, particularly his dependence on 
the psychoanalytic tradition. Halberstam makes an important point in rejecting the 
authority of tradition in pursuing this project, but she goes too far in foreclosing the 
possibility of appropriating these sources for other purposes. Beckett himself worked to 
challenge traditional questions of the philosophical tradition not by rejecting them, but 
by parodying them in order to undo their grip on our self-understanding, as in his 
ambiguous invocation of the Eubilides paradox.112  
Second, then, is the orientation to this project of failure. Halberstam’s project 
takes up a great range of “low theory” sources from Spongebob Squarepants to the 
                                            
111 Halberstam also includes Leo Bersani in the camp of “antisocial” queer theorists, but as becomes 
clear in the chapter, I resist this reading of Bersani. Not only am I indebted to Bersani and Dutoit’s 
reading of Beckett here and to Bersani’s understanding of political “mattering” in Chapter 2, but I also 
find in Bersani a project of finding an alternate social order and experience of pleasure alongside the 
ordered world of much of Western thought and theories of sexuality. 
112 As Michael Worton argues, Beckett leaves open the question of who the "old Greek" is, thus inviting 
the kind of speculation that has led critics to read the "old Greek" as Eubulides, Zeno (who is the author 
of some of the most famous Greek paradoxes), and even the skeptic Sextus Empiricus. Worton cites 
Hugh Kenner who suggests that Beckett is also referring here to Sextus Empiricus's use of the heap as an 
example "to show that the simplest words - words like 'heap' were in fact empty of meaning" (cited in 
Worton 1994: 80). 
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movie Dude Where’s My Car? as she celebrates the “losers” of society as embodiments 
of the art of failure. But this very pursuit of low theory can easily lead, as it does in 
Halberstam’s work, to a certain glibness about the conditions of failure as a mode of 
life in which we “quietly” lose. There is nothing quiet about the challenges (and 
potential of) the pursuit of failure that I have considered here.113 Beckett’s work, 
instead, places rather brutally on display the desperate conditions of late modern life, 
even as he sees the impossibility of escaping them, and the need to go on. We need 
only to include the lines that precede “fail again, fail better” to see this point at work in 
Beckett: "All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail 
again. Fail better." (Beckett 1995: 89). In the context of these previous lines, Beckett 
undermines the idea of progress in the process of failing again (and better). For Beckett 
this cycle of trial and failure is unending, though he does seem to hold out some hope 
for a better form of failure. Nevertheless, Beckett’s view of failing better is not that it 
might lead to a more successful end. 
Thus, Beckett resists the demands that we might put on the play if we were 
searching for some sort of redemption or damnation. Against moralistic demands for 
authenticity as the goal of human life, either as the recovery of a common essence or 
as a pure refusal of one as in Edelman’s position, Beckett renders such a pursuit 
                                            
113 José Esteban Munoz has developed a slightly different vision of queer failure that falls somewhere 
between Halberstam’s pursuit of “low theory” and my pursuit of failure and alienation in Beckett. 
Munoz analyzes the performances of independent queer performers like Jack Smith, Dynasty Handbag, 
and My Barbarian, who he claims “perform failure.” As he writes, “The artists thematize failure as being 
something like the always already status of queers and other minoritarian subjects in the dominant social 
order within which they toil. Queer failure, as I argue, is more nearly about escape and a certain kind of 
virtuosity” (2009: 173). 
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ultimately impossible by replacing narrative with repetitive dialogue and a narratable 
life with amnesiac memories.114 Endgame contains important narrative moments, but 
these moments are marked by their incompleteness, their self-consciousness, and their 
inability to produce a linear narrative or history for the characters. Take Hamm's 
Christmas story, which is announced as "story time" and punctuated by self-conscious 
appraisals of his telling of the story. "Nicely put, that." "A bit feeble, that." (1958: 51–
52).115 The story thus remains ambiguous about whether it is just a performance of a 
story that Hamm has made up, or if it is a third-person telling of the story of Hamm's 
being rescued as a boy, or perhaps even the story of Hamm taking Clov in. In the 
incompleteness and self-consciousness of Hamm’s performance Beckett staves off the 
demand for narrative authenticity in order to highlight the repetitive and performative 
aspects of these narratives themselves. In the case of Nagg and Nell, the past is marked 
with a nostalgia, as seen in Nell's refrain of "ah yesterday" that can only speculate 
about a time when expression and experience seemed to coincide. As such, the 
memory of the past can only really register in the affects and effects that it might create 
in the present, though in the case of Nagg and Nell the affects are very few. They want 
to look to the past for some assurance of their ongoing connection but the old stories 
                                            
114 I am thinking here not only of Sartrean existentialism, with which Beckett would have been familiar, 
but also of contemporary variations of the themes of authenticity like those in Charles Taylor (1992) and 
Martha Nussbaum (1988). Nussbaum, following a kind of Aristotelian definition of narrative coherence 
in her commentary on Beckett, albeit in the context of his “trilogy” of novels, reads Beckett's resistance 
to narration as a failure to allow narrative to do its transformative work on the emotions on the 
characters or their audience. 
115 As Stanley Cavell argues, Beckett "never lets them [the audience] forget that those on the stage are 
acting, and know they are acting" and he does so by creating the experience that "no one in the place, 
on the stage or in the house, knows better than anyone else what is happening" (Cavell 2002: 157–158). 
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provide little help in this pursuit. Their attempt at memory, instead, falls short of 
providing this assurance. As with Love’s approach, the incompleteness and inaccuracy 
of their memories cautions against the project of "feeling backward" as a means to 
recover a golden age of meaning and experience, but unlike with Love the past here 
provides little help for slowing down or navigating the present. Here the past cannot 
secure the present or the future.  
Thus, Beckett purposefully works against traditional images of thought and 
action, against the idea that either must have an identifiable beginning in a reflexive 
sense of self and a identifiable end which can then provide a clear basis for future 
action. Instead, Endgame is marked by a repetitive structure that tends more toward 
entropy than to order, stimulation, or action. Absent an outside context, everything is 
winding down––they are running out of provisions, their health is failing, Nell 
apparently dies, and so on. They even seem incapable of killing the rat which Clov 
leaves half-dead. Their actions appear to have lost all possibility for either usefulness 
or the revealing of agency. For every time Beckett opens the possibility that an action 
may begin or meaning might form, he almost immediately revokes its grounds. The 
examples are copious: Nagg is given a biscuit, as a possibility for nourishment, but he 
can hardly eat it for his lack of teeth (13 and 66); Clov hands Hamm the gaff with 
which to push himself around, but he finds the wheels of his chair gummed up (43); 
Clov begins to laugh at Hamm's story, perhaps as a relief from despair, but cannot go 
on laughing (10). Yet, Beckett’s entropy can never be quite fully reached. As Worton 
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describes it, “Instead of following the tradition which demands that a play have an 
exposition, a climax and a denouement, Beckett's plays have a cyclical structure 
which might indeed be better described as a diminishing spiral” (Worton 1994: 70). 
Some form of salvation, as Bersani and Dutoit point out, might be found in ending the 
story, in “completing the narrative arc,” and yet Beckett always denies this completion 
to his characters and us (1993: 7). With Beckett, neither point on the arch that mark 
some form of agency—neither intentionality nor action—is ever really able to get off 
the ground.116 
To put this project another way, Beckett is concerned with limits—whether the 
limit that when crossed marks the beginning of something (as in Hamm’s invocation: 
“Me––to play”) or the limit that when crossed marks the end or death (as that for which 
we are all waiting in Endgame). Yet, unlike other pursuits of limits in modern thought, 
for Beckett the conditions of beginning and ending, intentionality and its results, are 
not transcendental conditions of possibility or boundaries to be crossed over. Whereas 
the Kantian project seeks our limits in order to respect them and the early Foucaultian-
Deleuzian project seeks these limits in order to cross them, Beckett and his characters 
                                            
116 Judith Butler has made a similar point on the value of the failures of narration, though her responses 
to it have varied significantly. In “Doing Justice to Someone” Butler takes a more “active” position in her 
assertion that justice can only be done when we stop requiring that one speak in pre-given normative 
terms. In contrast, she takes a more passive position in Giving An Account of Oneself (2005). where she 
argues that the impossibility of giving a full narrative account of our lives should lead to a more 
capacious ethical attitude attuned to our common incompleteness, finitude, and vulnerability. I take the 
former position as more active—and more amenable to politics—because it issues from a kind of 
demand for justice, even when the content of that justice cannot be determined in advance, rather than 




approach limits asymptotically. As we have seen, Beckett and his characters never 
quite reach a threshold of beginning or ending. On one hand, the play never seems to 
begin because it seems almost to have been over from the beginning, and no real 
action ever seems to commence.117 On the other, the play is always leading to the 
uncertainty of things possibly, or probably, running out. As such, Beckett establishes a 
odd relationship to alienation and the terms of existence. Unlike with Kant, our best 
hope is not in recognizing the boundaries of our capabilities and in working to banish 
error or ameliorate our illusions. And unlike the apparent118 Foucaultian-Deleuzian 
project of crossing limits, Beckett’s enterprise is to see what happens when we 
approach the limits of language, meaning, and intention as borders that we can never 
quite reach, understand, or cross over. As Bersani and Dutoit suggest, Beckett's work 
performs “the mobility of boundaries” and “the uncertain nature of the very tracing of 
boundaries” (1993: 7). To fail better, for Beckett, is to get closer to approach ever more 
closely limits of this project of failure and escape, even as we remain suspended.  
 
Idiots? 
 HAMM: Back to my place! 
 (Clov pushes chair back to center.) 
 Is that my place? 
 CLOV: Yes, that’s your place. 
                                            
117 Bersani and Dutoit thus write, “Our suspense as spectators or readers depends on our pretending not 
to know that we have been given a finished product, a product secure in and about its ending from the 
very start” (1993: 39).  
118 I suggest that the Foucaultian-Deleuzian project is only “apparently” aimed at crossing boundaries 
because, as I argued in Chapter 4, they both also recognize the impossibility of crossing over these limits 
in any “pure” or permanent way. 
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 HAMM: Am I right in the center? 
 CLOV: I'll measure it. 
 HAMM: More or less! More or less! 
 CLOV (moving chair slightly): There! 
 HAMM: I’m more or less in the center? 
 CLOV: I’d say so. 
 HAMM: You’d say so! Put me right in the center. 
 CLOV: I’ll go and get the tape. 
 HAMM: Roughly! Roughly! 
 (Clov moves chair slighty.) 
 Bang in the center! 
 
 This scene of Clov pushing Hamm around in his chair is one of the most 
ridiculous (and funny) in Endgame, and it illustrates the kind of game that they are 
playing, at times with even a bit of enjoyment. We can imagine the scene as one of 
presumed, but failed, sovereignty. Indeed, Beckett acknowledges the connection 
between Endgame and its reference to chess. He suggests that Hamm plays the king, 
but he plays badly (see Worton 1994: 71). Yet, the problem here is not as 
straightforward as chess where one player may just make bad use of the options 
available to him. In Endgame there is no board with defined positions and none of the 
players is able to make a move entirely on his own. Hamm demands to take up his 
position in his thrown––a wheeled chair––in the center of the room, but must rely Clov 
whenever he wishes to reestablish he sovereign position. But Clov’s inability to judge 
the center along with Hamm’s apparent blindness, which keeps him from knowing 
precisely where he is, means that Hamm will never quite inhabit the sovereign 
position. Moreover, beyond the spatial dimension of sovereignty on humorous display 
here, Hamm continually runs up against his own inability to command the situation, 
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and despite his best efforts all of the other characters continue to defy or resist him. 
Yet, this dynamic, of course, allows the game to go on. Instead, then, of a badly played 
game of chess, Endgame shows us that we all play badly at the game of sovereignty––
perhaps because it is a bad game––even as we feel the unending demand to attempt to 
act and make meaning in the world.  
 Thus, Robert Gilman suggests that Beckett intends to reveal the human caught 
up in this bind between the desire to be known as a subject (or to find justification for 
one’s life) and the actuality that such a desire can never be satisfied. The compulsive 
need to play that is manifested throughout Endgame, for instance, in Hamm’s refusal to 
stop playing even at Clov’s plaintive request to end, is an attempt to cover the void 
between the way things are and the way they wish them to be (1988: 83).119 For 
Gilman, the focus on play reveals that the ways that humans speak and act as attempts 
to express ourselves are always “artificial” and are “never directly true" (1988: 85). 
Indeed, one of the most poignant ways that we experience alienation is through the 
failure of intention and failures of meaning. And certainly there is no shortage of 
laments for this failure in literature, philosophy, and politics. Yet, Beckett, at least here, 
plays with failure and makes it funny (and thus comes closer to Halberstam’s 
understanding of the queer art of failure). Beckett, then, suggests in an oblique way 
that perhaps one of the best modes through which to pursue failure and its peculiar 
agency is through the parodic or through play. These modes have often been 
                                            
119 Gilman helpfully links this reading to Hugh Kenner’s notion that Endgame is a play about playing, a 
fact revealed through the tragically ridiculous setting––the trash cans, things covered in sheets, the 
bizarre ailments afflicting the characters, and so on (1988: 83).  
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denigrated in politics as an indulgence, as a sign of the alienation of capital, and as 
simply not serious enough to the task of politics. But read through queer perspectives 
of failure, we can find in Beckett a curious form of life in failure and play. 
 In order to push this point a bit further and to provide some traction for 
understanding how this project matters for politics, I want to consider Deleuze's use of 
the figure of the idiot, for certainly we see in Beckett’s characters (and perhaps in 
Beckett the author, if I dare suggest) a kind of idiocy.120 Though Deleuze and Guattari's 
own use of the idiot remains somewhat vague in What is Philosophy? (as well as in 
Deleuze’s use of the idiot in Difference and Repetition), Isabelle Stengers finds in their 
invocation of the idiot a persona that can dramatize, in a way similar to the picture of 
queer theory I have drawn here, the struggle against dogmatism and dominant norms, 
and thus open a new approach to cosmopolitan politics.121 For Stengers the value of 
the idiot is that he “slows the others down” and “resists the consensual way in which 
the [political or cosmopolitical] situation is presented and in which emergencies 
mobilize thought or action” (2005: 994). The idiot for Stengers does not give up on 
knowledge or the possibility of a common politics developing, but it refuses an 
authoritative role in determining or possessing “the meaning of what we know” (2005: 
994). Thus, much like the queer project of failure or Love’s notion of feeling 
backwards, a politics that models itself on the conceptual persona of the idiot is 
                                            
120 For a reading of Beckett through the work of Deleuze and Guattari, see Garin Dowd (2007). 
121 Deleuze's own use of the figure of the idiot remains tantalizingly vague and appears mainly in What 
is Philosophy? coauthored with Guatarri. As Stengers points out, Deleuze borrows the figure of the idiot 
from Dostoyevsky, but he and Guatarri turn it into a conceptual personae which they use in their 
philosophical and political project (Stengers 2005: 994). 
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“incapable,” or at least unwilling, “of giving a ‘good' definition of the procedures that 
allow us to achieve the ‘good' definition' of a ‘good' common world” (2005: 995). In 
other words, this image of politics refuses the demands and criteria of political “goods” 
according to taken for granted or commonsensical models of the good. Instead, such a 
politics (and for Stengers the cosmos is the primary operator of the figure of the idiot in 
so far as it can resists our demands and slow us down) works through a process of 
“equalization.” Equalization, then, works against unbalanced forms of power that 
create unequal distributions of power. 
 This approach to politics resonates with the argument of this dissertation which 
has worked against the model of recovery as the proper end of politics and ethics. 
Stengers and her politics of the idiot refuses “what is most important,” particularly the 
“idea that ‘good’ politics has to embody a form of universal emancipation” (2005: 
1001). Thus, Stengers' idea of a cosmopolitics and the persona of the idiot works 
against the forms of humanism that pose politics as a problem of alienation and 
recovery––whether in the context of recognition of universal vulnerability, material 
conditions of production, or in experiences of subjectivity. Instead, Stengers suggests 
that a politics inspired by the figure of the idiot calls for a common world that is “free 
to emerge from the multiplicity of disparate links” without pre-given constraints or 
commonsensical criteria of the good. It is not particularly difficult to see how this form 
of politics is manifested in movements like that of the Van Dykes or, more recently, of 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS). OWS took up a kind of political project of failure, not 
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because the project “failed” when the camps were ultimately displaced by police 
(often in form of riot police, despite the peacefulness of the encampments), but 
because the assemblies refused the traditional political model of issuing a definite list 
of demands that could become the point of negotiation, or subsumption, into existing 
policy positions or structures. Moreover, the movement was made up of those who 
many in both media and society referred to as the “losers” or “failures” of society––the 
unemployed, the heavily indebted, and critics of capitalism.122 
 It may be a bit more difficult at times to see how a similar model of politics 
might emerge out of Beckett. My claim here is less that Beckett can become a model 
for politics and more that Beckett’s dramas, in laying bare the conditions of alienation, 
suspension, and failure in contemporary life, thematize the challenges from which 
meaning and action must emerge and with which they must contend. The fact that 
Beckett pushes the unending demand or impulse for creating meaning in spite of its 
apparent impossibility creates and dramatizes a nascent social-political scene from 
which possibilities for action performatively emerge. Yet, we are left with a politics of 
the subjunctive, one in which we act in a state of suspension and alienation. Seen in 
this way, the characters on the stage are acting not in an active mood, but in a 
subjunctive one in which they must work and play at creating a livable social world 
within the cell. Hamm acts as if he is the sovereign, demanding his place in the center 
                                            
122 These examples might also be read as moments of “fugitive democracy,” as Sheldon Wolin (1994) 
puts it, or irruptions of politics within a given police order in Ranciere’s terms (1999 [1995), but these 
are modes of explanation that I am seeking to avoid here, for they tend to lead us to see moments of 




of the room. Clov acts as if he might leave, though he continually finds that for some 
reason he cannot. Thus, we see them acting in a state of alienation and suspension 
between the possibility of success and the intractability of failure in their struggle for 
meaning, power, and agency. Through the repetitive enactment of some desired state 
of affairs, acting as if, perhaps they and we can change the context for action. Though 
this kind of change may not be revolutionary–– Hamm cannot go out with a bang, 
despite his great wishes––it might happen nonetheless. Though Beckett might reject 
the possibility of the emergence of a common world or of anything truly definitive 
happening—indeed, his dramas even work against these possibilities—I read both 
Beckett the writer and the characters of Endgame as players in a role of something like 
the idiot. As Bersani and Dutoit suggest, there is a strange form of power in this pursuit 
of failure and resistance. Against the suggestion that such pursuits might be "merely 
impotent, perhaps even suicidal protests in the margins of culture,” they argue that 
"there is nothing to be lost in our foundering with the notion of getting lost, and there 
even something exhilarating in the idea of joyful self-dismissal giving birth to a new 
kind of power" (1993: 8–9).123 This kind of power is evident in queer pursuits of failure 
and disruption as well as movements like OWS that seek to throw off the demands of 
traditional politics.  
                                            
123 This position resonates with Bersani’s notion of self-shattering that has earned him the reputation of 
taking an “anti-social” approach to queer theory and life. Bersani’s argument, though, is more subtle. He 
notes that moments of pleasure (particularly sexual pleasure) require a kind of self-shattering that 
interrupts our attempts to hold together a coherent narrative account of ourselves. Thus, it is not that we 
dislike others, or having sex with them. Instead, we tend to both to desire and dislike the experience of 




 This kind of power echoes both Foucault's call for the "insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges" and the development of non-disciplinary forms of power as 
well as Deleuze and Guattari's pursuit of ways of life outside of stratifying regimes of 
power. And as I noted in the last chapter, the political efficacy of this kind of project 
may be risky. Beckett's work, too, cautions against moving too quickly in these 
liberatory directions. As he writes of his own practice as an artist: 
What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be no form in art. It 
only means that there will be new form, and that this form will be of such a 
type that it admits the chaos, and does not try to say that the chaos is really 
something else. The form and the chaos remain separate. The latter is not 
reduced to the former. That is why the form itself becomes a preoccupation, 
because it exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodates. To 
find a form that accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist. (quoted in 
Worton, “Waiting for Godot and Endgame: Theatre as Text, 74.)  
 
The pursuit of failure and the figure of the idiot both open themselves to letting in a bit 
of the chaos that much of Western thought and politics have excluded. The issue here 
is one more of form than of content. In other words, the problem for the contemporary 
artist is to work on a form that allows for difference to multiply within a given frame. 
This project entails the attempt to resist or even fail the dominant structures of art and 
meaning when they do not allow this bit of chaos in. Likewise, I have been arguing for 
a form of political thought that resists the drive both to enforce dominant norms of 
politics and to turn from those norms to an ethical grounding of politics in a common 
human essence. Beckett’s image of the human condition in late modern life exceeds 
these drives by refusing them and confounding them. The theorists I have engaged 
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throughout this project, likewise, open up their understanding of politics in order to 
break apart monolithic images of power and universal human conditions.  
 
The (Impossible) Heap  
HAMM (anguished): What’s happening, what’s happening? 
CLOV: Something is taking its course.124 
 
 In this world of the suspensions, failures, and of the indeterminacy of meaning, 
these characters are not simply hung up. The playing does appear to have an effect, 
and here the possibility of agency and meaning begins to emerge. Through the 
repetitive stories, inane chatter, and bitter exchanges, we find that the characters are 
acting in such a way to bring things to an end––to make something happen. As Clov 
tells us, “Something is taking its course.” As Elin Diamond, in a reading of Waiting for 
Godot that proves applicable here, suggests of the characters, "Their duologues are 
more than the time-passing antics of existential clowns; they are exercises in 
negotiating power relations without coercive identifications" (2000: 41). Indeed, we 
find that there are moments of "progress" from time to time, though like Deleuze's and 
Stengers’s idiot, Beckett slows this progress down to avoid the rush to resolution. 
Hamm, at one point, asks, "We're not beginning . . . to . . . mean something?" (1958: 
32). These moments should not suggest that Beckett is falling back upon a notion of 
deliberative rationality that might emerge from these suspended world, for there is a 
certain trepidation in these remarks that exhibits a fear or reluctance that coming to 
                                            
124 Beckett 1958: 13. 
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mean something might end the game. To succeed appears to risk getting recaptured by 
from the dominant order of sense which Beckett and his characters both revel in and 
suffer from. If there is meaning and deliberation here, it is the deliberation of the idiot 
who is unable or unwilling to meet the demands of dogmatic rationality. Instead, the 
arrival of meaning comes in fits and starts in the ongoing struggle and play of failing. 
Beckett's work, in fact, marks the ineliminability of the social world, even when one 
tries to escape it or bring it to an end in various ways. Instead, to fail better is to do 
nothing other than to act, or attempt to act, again and again—to continue to challenge 
normative conceptions and administrative orders while recognizing the impossibility of 
doing away with them once and for all. A certain success may attend these efforts, but 
for Beckett it is never complete or total. Beckett leaves us suspended between success 
and failure, between the rejection of the world and a humanist embrace of it. 
 Finally, Beckett returns to another version of the paradox of the heap near the 
end of the play. Hamm, this time, says: “Moment upon moment, pattering down, like 
the millet grains of...that old Greek, and all life long you wait for that to mount up to a 
life” (Beckett 1958: 70). We now see that the paradox exemplifies the suspended state 
that Hamm, Clov, Nagg, and Nell find themselves in. Yet, both Clov and Hamm have 
a different answer to the paradox. As we learned at the beginning of the play, for Clov 
life's moments simply add up to a heap at which time, he “can't be punished 
anymore” (1958: 1). We might take his reading as one of relief, if not redemption. For 
Hamm, the frustration of his condition continue even as the moments to mount up to a 
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life: he just goes on, “Ah let's get it over!” (1958: 70). We are left feeling that no matter 
how he envisions life and its end, he sees the only relief in its end. In both of these 
cases we find again the notion that neither of the characters is the actor/agent of his 
own life. Both of them are rendered waiting for the heap to mount up/for things to 
come to an end in the face of the alienation of life with its unpredictable events and 
often unsure meanings. No effective movement out of the situation is possible. As they 
constantly remind us, “outside of here, it's death.” And as we see in the case of the 
flea, the rat, and of Nell, inside the cell is death as well. 
 Yet, I want to suggest that the possibility of Clov's leaving at the end of the play 
serves as an indication, albeit narrow and difficult to read, that there is a chance of 
something happening, some change coming about, out of the barren world of the cell. 
Throughout the play, Clov and Hamm have played at their quasi-serious repetitions of 
threatening to leave, to end it all. Finally, then, something seems to change when Clov 
reports having spotted a boy outside the window of the cell. Hamm says to Clov with 
some conviction, “It's the end, Clov, we've come to end. I don't need you any more,” 
and Clov replies, “I'll leave you” (Beckett 1958: 79). Clov then describes a possible 
new perspective on the world, one in which one learns to see things clearly and suffer 
the world better. This perspective will perhaps even bring some relief from his fear of 
punishment declared at the start. But, predictably, Beckett now begins to darken this 
moment of clarity, and Clov finds himself suspended between this new possibility and 
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the belief that he's too old for “new habits” (1958: 80–81). The last the play tells of 
Clov is that he is dressed for the road, though we never hear if he leaves.125 
 In some sense, Beckett has left us suspended once again for we do not know 
where, or whether, they will go after the curtain falls. Still, we might wonder if these 
Hamm and Clov, in repetitively, subjunctively playing out their wish to see the end of 
their untenable, co-dependent relationship, serve to bring about a change. It may not 
be redemptive, but maybe it makes a difference. These “events” at the end are perhaps 
like a lot of life's happenings. We never really know what, if anything, is occurring 
until it has passed, for the scene is always in process of becoming. We are often 
brought to a point where it seems like things are about to change significantly one way 
or another, and then the curtain falls. Yet, the curtain falling is something definitive in 
itself, too.126 With its falling, we also see that Clov did not leave; the play is over and 
there is no more action to unfold. Here we realize with Bersani and Dutoit that Beckett 
has also given us “a product secure in and about its ending from the very start” (1993: 
39). The undecidability of this moment can, then, be surprisingly thrilling. For Beckett 
has left us suspended where we started: with the experience of a (human) life as a 
bridge and not an end and the challenge to let a little bit of the chaos in in order to see 
what can be played. 
                                            
125 Likewise, at the end of Waiting for Godot, Vladimir says to Estragon: Well? Shall we go? ESTRAGON: 
Yes, let's go. [They do not move.] (Beckett 2011 [1954]: 85). 
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